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ABSTRACT
lae evolution of the treaty-making power in the Republic has been 
heavily influenced by the fact that South Africa, as one of the 'older’ 
British Dominions, acquired independent through a slow but orderly 
constitutional process. In ■i c first two chapters of this thesis I have 
^  therefore attempted to sketch briefly the force at work in South Africa
’“'J n 'tt{ earliest f orm.iti ve years. This ha.-: stalled m  examination of
c ‘ 1 ; onstitutit i.i 1 ;aw I ssue:. ( nc lud i n fh pr- rogatlve powers of
the Crown in relation to treat!c >• and declarai i i.s of war) as well as 
U  problems of internal! nai law. My resear it in th s field led re. to
won don and 1111 wva. : of mcttr - il lodged in the various Comr'onweal th
libraries.
mm
In the i i.ir.i and fourth chapters I have concentrated on more immediate 
matters, namely, th. ■gotiation and conclusion, ratification and implementa­
tion of treaties in present-day South Af.lea. The dearth of published 
in! ormation on th * topic ha necessitated the construction of an overall 
"""* pi.ture by in- in!-tv avii o information obtained fret, the Department
°•  ^ Affairs with the views of the International Law Commission as
tJ xpr< ssed in the 1969 Vienna C nventiort on the Law of Treaties. It should
^  be i t d that. , ilthough South Africa has not yet ratified the Convention,
it recognizes its international validity and attempts, whenever possible, 
to give effect to its provisions.
Chapter five covers th constitutional limitations on the treaty-
weei
making power as well as the inter-relaiionship f international law with
"1 municipal law. In both these relat. i ar- as South African practice has
be cm moulded n British lines. A a result I have been led to compare
— I the law (: -th precedent and principle) in South Xi rica v. . th that of Britain.
«J I have attempted to show, too, that the Blacks tone doctrine that 1inter-
nation ! law 1 part of the 1 iw o! the land' is not applicable to treaties.
 ^ A number of States have acquired indepvnd nee in recent years or are
in the proce s of doing .o af the present time. With this in mind, an
r*t
international i • t- rence was convened in Vienna in April, 1977, to discuss 
succession of State to treaties, and a dtaft convention was formulated.
I have included a chapter on the South African approach to succession of 
*** States to treaties not only because the problem is topical but also
fl because it affects the Republic personally'. South Af ri an courts have
M  been approached on several occasions to decide whether treaties have
n
1
ill
survived the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasalund. With yet 
1 another change in the international status of Rhodesia imminent, the
J matter is far from settled. In addition, the Republic has recently
-'t granted independence to Transkei and Bophuthatswana. Although these
j  States have not, to date, been accorded recognition by the international
community, their existence is i fact and the problem of their succession 
to treaties is pressing. I have attempted here to analyse current 
inter :t ional attitudes towards succession of States to treat ies and 
to compare these to the approach of the South African Government, and 
the courts.
The final chapter of the thesis covers the South African attitude 
** to interpretation of treaties, set against a background of current
into nationa 1 practice. The task of summarizing the approach of the 
international community has not been easy, especially in view of the 
fact that the recent provisions on interpretation to treaties in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties have at. meted a fair amount 
of criticism by States and academic writers. South African courts have 
had scant experience in interpreting treaties. As a result, I have 
concentrated on assessing the attitude of the Go ernment, which, 1 
believe, mirrors the probable approach of the courts. This attitude 
was made manifest during the course of the various South-West Africa 
disputes which were aired before tin International Court of Justice. 
mJ> I would submit in conclusion that the treaty-making power of the
Republic of South Africa today reflects a number of Influences. The 
basic pattern was set during those years when South Africa was part 
of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The British influence has 
proved to b powerful and ouruble Apart from this, recent world 
trends, exemplified by tin Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
inti the draft articles on Su. cess ion of States In respect of Treaties, 
have helped to shape the South African scene. This illustrates the 
strong desire of the Republic to be regarded as an active participant 
in the intvrvational community despite the increasing hostility of 
the latter. 'ina11v, events and attitude peculiar to southern Africa
M  have 11 so pi t; d a part in moulding South African practice. These
thrvi elements have combined to produce a uniquely South African
(Tf
approach to the exercise of the treaty-making power.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE TREATY-!' AK7NO PCVEH IN THE UNION OF
OOUTH AFRICA AN.: T;T. R& LHI 10 oF H^UT) AFRICA 
Iut roiuction
An appreci >tion cf the present 'tetua of the treaty-mnkin^ power 
in the Republic of South Africa ia impoaeible without goroe knowledge 
of the historical background involved. It if therefore >rc. osed to 
tr ee historically the devclcpi nt of Jomii ior authority within the 
British Cosmonw* -1th of Natiors, of which South Africa was e. member 
until Kay * 19ol. The early t volutio; of the Commonwealth centred mainly 
on the* acquif itior. of colonial autonomy within the British Empire which 
involved, pritr : ily, devt loprr.ent: ir t! <t rei of constitational law. 
However* once the i okmions bet ir. to assert claims to ai international 
personal"* ty distinct from c * of the t pi re as whole, problems of 
international law rcsv. Any liecission of th development of .he 
treaty-making power in the Common wealth m  genc r.1 -nd in the Repi blic 
of couth Afr.ca in particular n s t , the: e "ore, take account of both 
constitution fl anc. irten. sti- nel 1 w - vets c. the historical 
progression of thr k'minions : rc:a oloni to sov, reign status.
(a) The < c..: t : ra. t - w  : o T H
Cl) Executive md Lt/^slRtivt . a , r. whe British -olonlea 
The development o' ; ito:.cT.y m  the dominions and their powers in 
respect of treaty-making beg:m with the introduction of responsible 
government. This type of govrnm nt ir. the Dominion was inspired by 
the Durham Report of 1839 which had recommenced responsible government 
as - solution t the difficulties tin hnd ari sn in the operation of
representative institutions in Lower -ad Upper Canada.^ Instructions 
were rent in I to thr Governor of ’• av coti and to lord Elgin in
Cem -la to t nr- e ’ feet thr. t tl>y a ho .la henceforth set on the advice of
Ministers acce tab]. to the representative It i'lature* . responsible
1. Gunther Lueker kr.e ■ . • •ty• t . I oac.- j.n the CoftDcr.wec 1th of 
Aasti-a iia (IflOtV)" 1
2. Halcbury’s : j *■ _r.j ;j edited by Lcrd Sinonde 3 ed (1953) V 
446.
3* B.C... . ., it u: :Odfrey r'hd .lipt Confetitutiora^ law 8 ed (1970)
government was subsequently extended t iv-wfound] $r>d, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa.
Prioi to 134C, executive power in the Colonies vested in a 
'.lovt-rnor appointed by the Crown, assisted by an Executive Council 
chosen by and responsible to him alone end not to the elected legislature.
is nud resulted in clashes between the executive and the legislature.
1ne grant ot responsible government effected a substantial change and 
rave the colonies an autcnomx in internal affairs, which cevelopment 
was intensified by the subsequent fed err.' ising movements in Canada, 
Australia and, in 1910, the unification of outh Africa. ' In each 
c<>se, a re±ax t .on of imperial control followed the grant of responsible 
c oveminent, nlthcugl the 1 mperi.•! •Jrvemn.ent ii i not relincui ch all 
control over colonial affairs.
- :.e con. t itutionc-1. et; tus of the Colon ei before 1914 was deter­
mine^ t)y e va rious colonial constitutions rs well as by the govern­
ing Itrperi 1 statute, the Colonial Laos Validity Act of 1865,' which 
had been pa: red tv eliminate the dou:tt t.v t had been cast on the 
valid, ty of cc:oriel legislation which conflicted with English law. 
it had been sugro: ed. it nui . rr of ;dg- ; ents deliverer in the mid­
nineteenth century by . ut 1 Austra. iar. courts, that any legislation 
pa ced by a colon: . legislature would be void if it was repugnant to 
the lew of Er. land, whether com x • - 1; * or statute. Had such statements 
seen .vrrect, * he recent grants oi responsible governmeni would have 
een stultified by disnblin the colonial legislatures over a wide 
field of legislation. The Colonial Laws Vali ity Act freed the 
colonies from the doctrine that colon- J lawa rust be consistent with 
the basic principles of the English common law and it affirmed the 
power of colonial legislature, to -mend thtir constitutions. However, 
the Act nw-int- »nrd a substantial degree of colonial subot -ination, in
h . Kalcolm Lewis 'The International Status of the British Self- 
love ruing in ions’ (19 ■ -3) Brit it; »--rboc\ of International
Law 21 at 22. - -
5* 28 and 29 Viet., c.C; . Lee Annexurc
6. Aade nr.d 1 hi Hips op.cit. V ‘.>-6.
7. Lee Annexure A, section
8. See Annexure A, section H.
that the United Kingdom Parliament retained the power not only to 
legislate for the whole Empire but, in addition to veto any colonial 
legislation that might conflict with euch power.
Furthermore, the idea wis prevalent that <he Don inions were not 
able to pa s.*. legislation having extra-territorial effect. 'v This 
belief hed led to colonial reliance or the Imperil Earllament at 
Westminster, which had then either legislated directly for the entire 
Empire or which had c-e to the nil of -i particular colonial legis­
lature in need of an extra-territori 1 low for some purpose. This 
happened in c. ■ • . such ns extradition, for-i; n enlistment, merchant 
shipping, copyright, bankruptcy and n-.turoliza. on. A art from 
tris, vhe Imperial Parii r•cent, showed ar; increasing disinclination' to 
interfere with Dominion lepi .-t ivv autonomy. Professor Dicey, 
uescribin the position ar it prevailed in 1914 wrote:
•The power of the Or -.-n i.e. of the British Ministry to veto 
or disallow in any way y dill passed by the legislature of 
a Dominion ... i row most ip ; ii rly ex- rci.-ed, and will 
hardly be used unless Lhe bill directly interferes with 
Imperial interact; or is « r ; .ros the Colonial legislature 
ultra vires, Thus the Crown, or in other words a British 
Ministry, will now not veto or die 'low any Bill passed by the 
legislature of ■ Dominion on the ground that such a Bill is 
indirectly opposed to the interests of the United Kingdom or 
contr; diets It 1 principles generally upheld in England, 
e.g. the principle of free trade."
A further restriction was placed on Dominion autonomy by the exist­
ence of the rivy Council which was empowered to admit apaeals from any 
court in the omin.ons. In the Cast of oath Africa, appeals to the 
Judicial Comm it tt -? were prescribed by the South Africa Act of 1909.
The nz ell ate jur diction of the Judic-r 1 .'c-nmittee operated not only 
to maintain the overridir. force of Imperial legislation, but also to 
preserve uniformity of law so the prro tive of the Crown. *
9- Dee Arnexure A, section ??.
10. KcLeon v. A ttorney-G^rer : < r .'o-:* D, leg [ 18913 A.C. 455. 
.1. Lewis op.c:t. 2 ? .
■
Constitution i. ed. (i'll) Introduction.
1/. 9 EiV. v"::V" ,/), ) ,C -.
l,f • hew: 1 op.c t. c '; Ap.-" If r >.■ :th .fr . c< ! ; ourts to the
Privy iouncil were only abo ished by the . rivy Council Apreale
Act 16 of ! -DO.
(il) of_t’ " ini03, iu t of Technical md
Comm*' rc i a 1 ■'. ^ re^ments
As early as 1854 the Dominions acquired a voice in the 
negotiation of technical and con lerciol treaties. The British 
Government, through the ictivitirs of Lord Elgin, the Canadian 
Governor-General, End secured acceptance by vhe United States of 
America of the so-called (eciprocity Treaty, a trade agreement 
operating between the United St tea .nd Canada. Although the 
treaty bore no Canadian signature, lord Elgin, as Governor-General, 
acted essentially is desired by the Canadian Ministry, in accordance 
with the system of responsible government. .'hilt the treaty was 
British in form, it recognised that eac* part of the L-pire was distinct 
in its interest:;, and established the doctrine that it was proper for
15
special treaties tc ' negotiated f r colonies that required them.
In 1559, th British Government a proved an >ct of the Canadian
Government that increased tariffs or im or ted goods (including British
goods). This established the ri n of a c:eIf-governing colony to
det' mine the tariff on both fcrei n and British goods. This Act,
together with the events of 154, laid the foundation for the principle
of allowing nelf-rover:ing colonic freely to manage their own trade 
16relations.
This, in turn, me'nt that the I::* rial Government had to come to 
the aid of the 1. on in ions in the neotiat on of their commercial agree- 
rcntf with foreign powers, an the practice was adopted of associating 
a Dominion representative with the Brit h ambassador to the countr; 
concerned during the negotiations. After 1 " 4, it became the rule for 
the Lcminion representative to sign together with the British 
ambassador.
A Colonial Conference was held at vttawa in 1894 which discussed 
the principles th t were to pply in the future to commercial treaties. 
These principle were subsequently embodied by Lord hipor, the Colonial 
secretary, in 1 di: oatch dated 23 June, 1 95, which provided, inter alia,
15. Arthur Berriec.cle Keith T.-.e Dominions as Sovereign Bt-tec
(1938) 6 .
16. W.l .K. Kennedy and I ,J. ; chlosbnrg Th, 1 * id Custom of the 
South A_fricor Constitution (19 5) 4'-?.
17. Keith op.cit. ?; Lewis op.cit. 26.
that separate treaties mi. ht pi*oc rly be concluded with colonial
co-operation for any colonies that desired them, subject t the
proviso that the Imnf-rial Govern t should be kept informed of the
progress of the negotiation:.. however, t u- oil .tchread farther:
•Any agreement made must be ;,n agreement between Her Majesty 
and the sovereign of a foreign t te, and it would be to Her 
Majesty's Government (in the United Kingdom) that the foreign 
State would apply in case of any questions arising out of the 
agreement. To give the rlonies power of negotiating treaties 
for themselves without reference to Her Majesty's Government 
would be tc give the:, an in ten xtional status as separate and 
sovereign HtateS, and would be equivalent to breaking up thf 
Empire into a number 01 independent Jtnte/, a result injurious 
to the colonies and to the moth r country, and one that would be 
desired by neither party.5 1°
This method of negotiation ». e not altogether r- tit factory as far 
as the Dominions were concerned because it involved the intervention 
cf the Imperial Government not only in the gr-mt of authority to 
negotiate but also in th« signature and subsequent ratific tion of the 
treaty■
Further exteusion of the >ower cf nepotistlog commercial treaties 
w s conceded in 1907 when it was r.grrcd t t a British negotiator need 
no longer assist the Dominion representative. Imperial control was not, 
however, altogether abrogat'd, as the treaty haa still to be signed by 
an Imperial represent tive. Furthermore, ratification v  m to take place 
only after consideration by the Dominion Government and the Imperial 
Government, and v-ould be accorded orlx if the letter Government were 
satisfied that the treaty wat in agreement with the 'inciples laid 
down in 1895•
As a corollary te the decentralisation ' power of negotiating 
commercial tre t es, the Imperial Govomrreni introduced the practice of 
including in its own commercial treaties r, clause providing that the
treaty should not be- me ippliv ibl-- tc m elf-governing Dominion unlv’s
21
the latter give notice of adherence within a particular time.
18. Keith oj3.lit. .
19. Dispatch fr< :a the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the 
Governor-tienei 1 of Canada,the Governors of the Australasian 
Colonies (t-xce: t G. stern Australia) and the Governor of the Cope 
of Good Hope. . 7829 of Ju.y 18 <5.
20. Keith op.cit. 8.
21. Sir Kenneth Koberts-.Vray Commonwea i th and Colonial l.aw (1G66)
250 dates this practice from 18r :, while Keith op.cit. 9 contends 
that this practice began as e rly as l8?7.
6In 1899, 9 further oractice was instituted iving self-governing 
Dominions the rit.ht of separata withdrawal in all commercial treaties 
negotiated by the Imperial Government. the first treaty which con­
tained surh a rirht w s a convention between Great Britain and
pp
Uruguay of that year/' This right was extended to most existing
treaties, by agreement with the foreign States concerned, in compliance
23
with a resolution ado ted at the Imperial Conference of 1911. '
(iii) The Cor due i of Forvign t'olicy
The British Dominions, prior to the first . orld War, had not
attained that degree of autonomy ith res ect to political treaties
that they had corn* to exercis* in regari to commercial treaties. As 
24
Docker points out:
•This was not surprising, iiace t e Imperial Government 
incurred responsibility in the eyes of foreign powers for 
m y  Internationa delinquency committed by any part of the 
Errire.’
Political treaties were uadr by the Jrrwn on th< advice of the
Imperial Ministry, which treaties were binding on the Dominions
29
whether or not their Governments consented to them. The Dorn .nione, 
with rare exceptions, were excluded from 'anticipation in the con­
clusion of -act. treaties.' Despite this, th< Imperial Gove ratten 
from as e rly as 1557, do; ed the apprise* that colonial interests 
(as distinct from purely Imperial interests) had to be considered
27during negotiations.
In ec-.f political treaties conclude with foreign States the 
Imperial Government inserted a clause t ranting the ominir: the
power of separate adherence; nevertheless this practice a not 
always followed. .he hugue Convention of 1 1 an . ! < , as we tl aa
the Genei-il Act of Algecirai re nr;in i vrocco in 1906 were ail signed
22. lewis on.cit. 27.
25. cd. 5745 p.18.
24. boeker op.< it. ?.
25. Lewis op.cit. 23.
26. Robert b. tewart 'Treaty-Phking 1rocedure in the British
Dominions' (193") 52 American Journal of Internet ion Law 4c?.
27. hvith oju.cit. 10.
]
]
]
]
]
]
-I
J
]
1
u
J
]
]
1
j
1
J
by Imperial Ministers for the topi re as a whole <nd the dominions
28
were not » iven the power of .• operate r liu.-renee to I h t 1 •> eatjo 
procedure was followed with the signing of t> c Anglo-French Lnvente 
of 1904 and the Acglo-Kueeian Convention of 1907. The former was 
I sicnlly a military alliance directed against potential Gerran 
aggression as at the time both 1 ranee md Great Britain were growing 
feaiful of Germany’s rapidly increasing /•aval and military strength. 
France and kussia were at this period already allien- and the 190? 
Anglo-kussi. a Convention had th< effect of combining the Franco- 
Bussian Alliance *nd th>: Anglo-French Entente in a higher unit of co­
operation. So f-r no Dominion hud raised the question of ..ominion 
participation in general ft.r< i, n po icy. However, tie failure of the
Imperial Government to consult the Dominions before signing the
2Q
Declaration of ,ondc,; in 19C evoked widespread criticism. As a 
recult, the Imper ial Conf< rer.c. of 1 11 resolved that in the future 
the Dominions, where practicable, "hould be consulted before inter-
30
national obligati one, affectin' them were undertaken.' The Irperial 
iorenment, de: >1 a -hi , dec 1 inec to i •lir.quish it; exclusive respon­
sibility for the determination of .v tiers of high policy in the realm
31
c l foreign aff ire.. Whil . o n  a ion ner;ct iators might henc< orth 
negotiate nd r.j ■ n treaties, ‘ hey inevitr t ly acted, r regards 
signature, together with Imperial representatives. The outcome was 
that the tr-ity bound the Crow i as a unify, although the obligation 
n.ght be restricted' ‘"(for example) to ,outh Africa &io :. In this 
way the diplomatic unity of the Expire was maintained.
While there wan consensus that the treaty-making power during 
that period vented in the Crown, trey tie?, which alte; ed the law of 
the land or affected the right and duties of British citizens would 
only become operative internally by legislative action taken by the
28. Lewis op.cit. 23-4* Keith op.cit. 12.
29- Ieith op.cit. 12-13; Isburv* < of ■ 1, .1 op.cit. 453.
30. Cd. 5743 p.15•
31. Cd. 5745 p.71
32. Keith op.cit. 13.
Imperial Parliament and made applic.' ole tr the entire Empire, or, in 
the absence of such Imperial legilation, by an Act cl the Dominion 
Parliament. Sir William Aneon n marked that this practice seemed
34
’to follow from the general principles of the [ .nglish] Constitution*.v
In I'1!?, for the first tins, negot. itorn were ;• pointed by the King
on the advice of the Lominicn Government , tendered through the
Colonial and Foreign Offices, tc act or, behalf o* the various
Dominions at th-> hadio-tclefraphic Convention of that year. Special
full powers were if-nued for each delegation,'' although the United
Kingdom delegates received the ordinary, unnualiied full powers which
authorized them tv, si 'n for the whole Empire.^ A similar procedure
* r, follow in V 14 when a conference on the -afety of l ife at Sea 
30
was held. ' T.e significar e f these irocedures lies in the fact
that the votes of the various plenipcter.t Ties representing the
United Kingdom and the Dominions -light, for the first time, be
,c
differently cast.'
(iv) IT  I.! . race
The question of war and peace strikingly illustrates the slowness 
of the transition of Dominion status from dependence to independence, 
although, p; radoxically, participation by the b minions in the first 
„orld ,1ar may be regarded as ' .e urime fac- or n the eventual hasten­
ing of this procv 3,y^ The United Kingdom Government, subject to its 
responsibility to the Imperial Parliament at Westminster, exercised 
sole authority in all matters 1 1 atm, to the declaration of war and
4q
the maintenance of peace. It war not icurd to consult the 
Dominion Government*; in regar to these matters. As a result, the 
Dominions recognised that they might b-come embroiled in a war about 
which they had not been consulted.’ As early -x 3370, e Royal 
Coo;iseion appointed by the Governor of 'Victoria recommended that the
33» Lewis oji.cit. 24.
34. Willie An.,on Yh ■ j _ ■ tl.- Goia t i iu‘ ion 2 ed (2 89b; 3
103.
33. Keith q^: .cit. 14.
36. Roberts-V.vay n^.cit. 290.
37. Keith ioc.rit; 1)1 art -..r y loc.cit.
38. lewis _u.cit. 21
39. Roberts-, ray ojp.cit. <"-.’51.
40. htfcwarv. oj_).cit. 467.
41. Lewit op.ci * . 23•
Australian colonies should be ver the n  hit of concluding treaties. 
T.'iis would have h d the effect of making them sovereign States and 
would have enabled them to remain neutral had the United Kingdom 
dec ared war. here wan also ooroe t"1k in the C\pe on t whether the 
Cape Colony could remain neutral in the f n-lo-Boer .Yar of 1899-1902.42
either of those ideas wrv , however, erieusly ntert dned by the 
I-.minions. They acce ded the constitutional poe tion to be such that 
: part of the Er.pire wb :. at wn, t.• w ole %ur,t b ■ w r. ' '
In any event, tie declaration of war by the Crown in 1914 auto­
matically brought the Dominions into hostile relation: with Germany, 
and separate declaration1 by th<- Dumia )0g were unnecessary. The 
Ct roan For d m  * fice announce'- or. 1.5 April 1914 th/d 'Germany must 
be considered at war with all Briti-h Colonies.''
(v) Tho Establish-.-.^ nt of Foreign ( cf m  the io / in ions
let another factor i Hunt rating tl •. degree of control exercised by 
the Crown over the tro -Ly-ma/.ing powers of the Dominions lies in the 
fact that, prior to 1914, Dominion: h d no Foreign Lffices, nor did 
they send or receive drpir/r. tic agents. Australia and Canada created 
Departments of Lx »rn«l Affa.rs as e rly as 1 Ka) and 1909 respectively,
but it was not the purpot <• of t os* i e: rt .s to conduct and control
4^
foreign affaire and international relit ions. "
The attitude of the British Colonial Vffice wne pi tin.
'A Foreign lower can only be approached through er Majesty's 
Bepreluntative, and any agre-rrent entered into with it, 
affecting any part of Her M esty's f.>minions, is an agreement 
between Her Majesty no the Sovereign of th< foreign State ....
To give the Colonies the power of negotiating treaties for 
themselves without reference to her I ajeoty's Government 
would be to give them an int<;national status n- separate and 
sovereign ftotes, nd would be equivalent to breaking up the 
Empire into < number of independent .atee .... The negotiation, 
then, l iBf between her hajcety : nd the - cvereigr. of the 
foreit.-. t-.te, ust b. cmdueted by er Majesty's representative 
at the Court of the fortign Power, who would keep Her 
r aj. styGovernment iniona/d of the progress of the discussion, 
-.nd reek instructions from th*"- iu nece: pity arose. It could
I
42.
45.
44.
4%
Roberts-./»\-»y loc.cit.
Tir Wilfred iaurier di.l point out, during the C m  nan Naval 
Lebates of 1910, that th actual extent to which the Dominions 
would participate in hostilities would be r ratter for each 
Dominion to decide for itself.
Tyilv vluxniiclje 14 Augu. t 2914 r,t. quott d m  Lewi:: op.cit. 
Locker op.cit. 6.
herdly be ext ectt.d, however, th; t he would be .sufficiently 
cognisant, of the circumstances nrd wishes of the Colony to 
en.ble him to con act the negotiation satifectorily alone, 
and it would be desirable generally, therefore, that he should 
have the assistance, either oe a second Plenipotentiary cr in 
a t'.ubcrdin«t< cap. city. ... of a delegate appointed by the 
Colon ill Go vern:-f nt.'
As a ret 'It of the constitution 1 position of the Dominions, all 
overseas diplom tic negotiation? affeeting i-outh Africa prior to 1514 
were handled by the British Crown, After the formation of the Union 
of wauth Africa, diplom .tic • ctxvity v,ar channelled through the 
British Foreign Office, which wru aided by the South African Prime 
nister nd the Governor-General of South Africa, in their capacities 
''<* representtive/• of the I ritirh *overnnri*-nt and Crown. The Union 
had no interna t i ,nal status. It was t- im ,ly a colonial subordinate of 
the British .^.vire, '
8ef< re the First -orlti Aer, South Africa lac ed even the basic 
diplomatic machinery vital for the conduct of its own foreign affairs 
and treaty-making powers. Bekker contends that one example of the 
far-reac’ ing results of the lack of such machinery was the handling 
of the South-West Africa iffair at tht end of the nineteenth century. 
Cn 3 February, 1884, the tr-tish Government eeuv a telegram to the 
Gcvemrent oi the , ipe of nod Kope reque. ting the latter to proclaim 
British jurisdiction over Angra Pequeua (the r. .me given to part of 
South-1 cat Africa at that time) and the adjacent territory. The 
'.overnor of th. «. <•)© replied by asking that the v.'• itei be postponed 
until after the general election which w s then in progress, as many 
of tht Min:at - r were unaviileble. Thr< e r.onthn Isfer, it reply to a 
further re< t by the British Gov rmnont, the new Cape Government 
begged a furth • r po; tponvnent of ten days. On 29 Kay, 1?:>4, the 
-overr or of the '• >pe advised that V  wo., finally ready to annex the 
territory on behalf of the Brit, h Government. This advice was, 
however, ' ree .tnys too late - iit.morck had already annexed the 
territory on i’6 Kay, IF84.
4b. Dispatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the 
Govarnor-G# Tv-rnl of Canada, the Governors of the Australasian 
Colonies (except Ac tern A act rv 1 • u ,■ and the Governor of the Cape 
of Good Hope 0.7824 of July, lti9b.
47. M.J. Bekker H:.■.tori'.. > - mpirmse Stur-f v-'.r. die Suid-Afrikaanse
Diplomatieke on bco.,,] __v an _11:.kake 1.-r 1 ai:isarie
' iceertation for the Depree of *■ A. . otchefstmor University 
(1973) P.36.
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Thus the lack of a permanent department to handle -'uuth African 
foreign affairs cost South Africa not only the right of po session of 
the territory,but led ultimately to the >re rnt day problems surround­
ing the Mr. nr: tv over South-West Africa. Bekke.-'s interpretation of 
these events, viz., that South Africa's fai.jrt to annex Angra 
Pequena and the surrounding territory resulted from the lack of 
diplomatic machinery vilal for the conduct of foreign affairs, is
open to doutt. C e idlam, in his article ’The hace for the Interior*
4q
in C a r r . b r History of the Briti.1 n Lmpire ' attributes the 
failure of the Cape Government to act tirr.eou.-.'! y simply to the 
e>,istence of the parliamentary crisis which hr.I arisen with the 
defeat of the . t anlen ministry. It *ns not until Thomas Jpington, the 
new Prime Minister, had appoint-' 1 a new cabinet that the Cape Govern­
ment could • rop« rly turn it attention to the question of the annexa­
tion of Angra vequena,
It was on.lv ifter the 1-jkb It Confe rence t; t the first
Department o xternal Affair v. created. In 1 dune, 19k?, the 
Prime ? inister, Geneiul nertzog, became the first Minister of External 
Affairs (a tradition which continued for twenty-eight years). Professor 
Dr. H.D.J, Bodtnst-'in of htellenbosch University was appointed as the 
Secretary of the Department. "n In the 1927/S parliamentary debates. 
General Hertzog expressed the ituition to be as follows:
'The Gov rnor-General is no logger the representativs of the 
British Government in outh Africa, but solely of His Majesty 
the hit »*. Therefore, all the work of the Office of the 
Governor- cnvr-l for the British Government, all the communi­
cations between that loverr ment and ourr ■ Ives no longer takes 
place between him and th Britiri Governm*nt, with the 
result tb-t the work of tht office of the Governor-General 
has ",-rely been t m  if erred to the Department of External 
Affairs.1 1
Prior to th;.* development, however, the majority of treaties were 
negotiated by the . riti h juv-mrr.ent. Treat it s which were directly 
negotiated Lv Dominion Governments were exceptional end of minor
hj , .. ______ _ , . .... ,importance. In these instance", an ( -nenhoim noted/ the
4'-. 2 . d. vol.8 (16)) at ' 0-8.
SC. Beitker op.< 11. ;>9.
51. House of A• e-bly !*• ■ t;-.* vol.K ,col 35 i2s February, 1926).
y2. l eith or .c t. 6C-  * \ • *
53. L. < ' unheii Inf crn'-t' >\ 1 - '■ IVrpt -pp ‘ ed (1955) I I'chce 198.
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Don-,inions 'simply exercised for the- m  iters in question the treaty- 
making power cf the mother country, which had been to that extent 
delegated to them'.
(v i) Summary
ky -i - . t Dominion; h d obtained some voice in treaty partici-
^  ") a t L°n. e far a., technical and commercial treaties were concerned,
k' ■' the dominions had achieved a large r • sure of freedom. It had become
r- -» --a* ternary for technical and commercial treaties negotiated by the
^  J Crown to be made applicable only to the United Kingdom and to its
overseas possessions not enjoying responsible government. Clauses 
___ J  ve.rii.- insertec speci: ically exempting Dominions with responsible govern-
ment : rorr. the oper ‘ ion of such treaties, but allowing for the right 
of separate adherence should the Dominions desire this.
vn the other hand, he ^peril 1 Government at Westminster 
.. e<.* i vt ly con*;rolled Dominion legislation, judicial ap. c-ale, and, 
in p..rt icuiar. tore . gn politic' ! relations. In Oppenheim'•$ view, the 
Dor inions 'h, i no i.it« rn timal position whatever, because they were,
..om the point oi view o 1 international law, ii.ere colonia portions of
the ;:ovher country' . Their ri nt to representation at International 
L 1 _! admxaistrat.ve conferences and to enter into certain treaty arrange-
, wants of minor importance with other States were not sufficient, in
the absence of -my other e, tern,' L attributes of so ..-reign status, to 
give the Domini one any separate legal existence in international law. 
Cppenheim r- r >rd . the exercise of thea, right i simply as a delegation 
1 °y the mother country of its treaty-making power to the dominion in
"'I quest io*', p it hough he does concede that the situation wsa 'somewhat
-* «nomalou«'.
- o
L, -*
54. Ibid.
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(b) Developments during World rVar I
Active participation by the Dominion: in World War I led to 
recognition by the Imperial Government of their clnime to share in 
the deliberation: on and control of Imperil war policy. ^ Although 
the supreme corm'ind in oil v stters of army, ?ir force and navy 
vest d throughout the war with the British high command, the 
Dominions wen- not excluded from a share in their control.  ^ In 
'17, the Dominion i-rime Kir.latere were invited to attend a series of 
special and continuous meeting of the ritish War Cabinet.'' Two 
bodies re-■ ;>il1 d from these meetings, viz. the Imperial ,.ar Cabinet and
cfi
the Imperial ir Conference.
The 1 . • er- .-1 War Cabinet comprised the British War Cabinet end the 
Dominion representatives sitting together under the presidency of the 
Irime hinirt- r c. f t' e ' •nited kingdom. Its main functions were to discuss 
tie conduct of v.■ r in particular, ar.d Imperii 1 a r policy ir general.
'ue Dominion rep re entatives were on a footing of equality with merr.oers 
of the Brit ish iar Jabinet. Jhey hr d equ 1 powers of initiation and
t-x •: ination of noli ry, and rcta. aed respon. i.-ility to their own
59electorate?.
The c ret . zy of State for the Colo* es presided over the Imperial 
■ ;r Conference in which Dominion representatives once again acted on 
v footing of equa.ity with xritieh Ministers. This body was primarily 
concerned with nun-wir problems effecting the Empire as a whole.
During 1917, these bodies reached two important decisions which 
ted the ec titutional no interna ti n. 1 develop ent of the 
Jominions. Dirst, the Imperial War Cabinet resolved to hold meetings
"annually, or at ary intermediate ti: e when matters of urgent
«i 1
Ir erial concern required to be settled . Decondly, the Imperial
* 4
r
55• »ar : t invt Deport, 2917, i’arl.l’: r - . Cd 'C05 of 191 f p.l.
56. Keith, op.cit. 15.
57* (i n^eral Smuts serv'd throughout the war on this Cabinet, 
f "t. Lewis op.cit.
5 .. ..-ir Cabinet Deport, 1 17, i irl.. r per':, Cd 90 5 i'f lcl" p.?.
60. !t wis. loc.cit.
cl. ir Uabiret -Voport, 1917, Barl.Pap-r- . Cd 9005 of 1911 p.7*
ht: a r :lt ' t h i s  resolution th< Irr.u. ri ■! War C -hinet met oetween 
J u n e  an< . : y of 1918, a n d  again ii I. even be r 1918, when it remained
tion) until the ‘reaty of Versailles wa-; signed in June 1919.
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War Conference resolved to cumron a special Imperial Conference
after the war to consider the 'rendjuatm,nt of the constitutional
re 11 tions of the com orient rts of the Empire' on the basis of
pill re-coi. ni* ion of the Dominion - as autonomous nations
o. our r tn..] Ccm.^uwe,.,^h ... [and recognition ofj the 
ii/nt o, ominr n.' ,nd Indi^ to an adenu te voice ir
oreifn policy and in f- reign relations. '
These resolutions were of relevance from a constitutional point 
o' view in t-.at they established the right of the Dominions to be 
consulted on ail important natters of Inperi 1 policy. From an inter- 
n ' ,ra] pci,.t of view th. y r,;de no formal advance if the treaty-
Dominions. This was largely because the war
ye rs were not sjitable times in which to press claims for separate 
mternoti-.nal tonality. Vltir-te y, however, these events prepared 
* '* "vr ! :;v es,‘ 1 -i- hment of the international statue of the
-cr ir.icn-- which took place after pe .ee was concluded. '
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(c. ev lop , nt.' in the Intcr-kar ./eriod 
(i ) ihe I a n s  j .-ace Con*>n ice of ] '0 Q
A - :or -• -vance in the f reaty-r king powers of the Dominions was
r, de ,t the c o e of th, war f t th. ris .eace Conference, dir hobert
" ’ " ' r i! ' ■iniu.ter of Can da, achieved the recognition of the
-- r *e existence of the Dominions in lieu of a single Imperial 
delegation comprising both : ritish and Dor in• or. itlegites.^ On the
ver nd, ‘ h- .opinions wert . qua ly let rmiru i to ret in their identity 
with the riti •. Empire * a whoL as one of the Joint Dowers 
represents >t the .onferehce, nnd to obtain what benefits they could 
. r . t ’. i £ i e; • tic- tion. A* rerv : t, the position occu led by the 
vominione «t the Conft.-re-ce h s e< decc 'it. \ as '-nom lous' . As 
• ligerent rowers with special irests', Canada, mu-tr- ia, South 
Africa and I. w»rt each re r >» ted by two Plenipotentiary Delegates,
6c.
63.
n
4-9r Cabinet u-aort, i'ari .1 a^en « Ud. Q( of l?l8, p.9. 
Lewis ojp.cit. 31.
C •. Keith ex..I it. 15.
65. Verloren Van -e-aat f- .Is: -g . ed (I967) 38.
I
1
-i
1
u
1
]
1
1
u
n
u
]
1
n
J
1
n
]
]
i
t-i
i
v-i
"I
n 
»^
15
New Zealand w  s represented by one such Delegate. In addition to this 
direct representation, it wes stipulated that the represent?tives of 
f ne Dominions ('-nd of India) be included in the representation of the 
nritish bmpire delegation by means of a panel system/ ^  In this way 
*>:e dominions were accorded fuller representation than that granted 
to the smaller allied rations which were co-belligerents in the war.
In harch 1919, a memorandum was circulated by Sir Robert Borden 
on behalf of the Dominion Prime Ministers to the effect that :
'all the treaties and conventions resulting from the Peace 
Conference should be so Irafted as to enable the Dominions 
t° become P-rtiea and Signatories thereto. This procedure 
will give su table recognition to the part played at the 
1 'e F'-’ble by the British Common** .1th ae a whole, and 
v. ill, at the same time, record the status attained there 
by the Dominions. The procedure is in consensus with 
the principles cf constitutional Government that obtain 
t . v.-.fs.'.ou - the L. ’pire. The Crown is the Supreme Executive 
in •ne nit ed Kingdom and in all the Dominions, hut it acts 
or. t e odv c of different 1.ini tries within different 
-onst-itut ion i uniro and under Resolution X of the Imperial 
r conference, 1^17, the organisation of the Empire is to be 
1 aed on equality of nationhood.*6?
.he principles formulated in the memorandum were accepted. The 
Dominion representatives were duly :ven full pow.re by the King and 
re a the .err til.es 're a ty on behalf of their own countries.
The Treaty n ids:
'For t’u purpose the igh Contracting Parties represented 
as follows: ...
ni: f AJ TY THE KING cf THE U M  FD KINGDOM CF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND IP FI A! ) AND CF THE BRI 11 1 IX. MINIONS BEYOND' THE SEAS, 
EMPEROR CF INDIA, by
Ihe right Honourable David Moyd veorge M.P. ...
[names of other British de1egates follow.
And
for * he Dominion of Canada, by: ;
for t)te Coirimonwealth of Australia, by: __ ;
for the Union of outh Africa, by:
for ti e Dominion o: New 5 raland, by: 
for India, by:   1 69
66.
n
Tne Pr-'cf : re u.d Procedure for the Negot iation and Ratification 
of Treat: er at.,M .f'f- .'ntu 7 b .C *T' 937) 77 at 78.
67. • ve Correrpcnciet.ee - :,d i*ocur .?nt- relative to the Representation of
Can uA 4t the i > <Cf Conference ..nd to the ratification of the Treat,
of .eace * 1"h ien ^ ny Canada, Terrio: si Papers 1919, Special
Session No. +l, xc quoted in Doeker ojj.cit. 11; also quoted as 
Canadian S>-.' ricnai .1'a;.err 41, J by lewis op.cit.32-
68. Ha 1 sbury1 s 1 awr of Kr.pland op.cit. 45,5.
69. -ee Tri .ty o Versailles, United Kingdom Treaty cries 1919 no.4,
■
16
m e  word in, is significant in that it i resumes the formal unity 
of the hritish , •pire only after tvery 'tominion P-rli mant bad 
signified its approval and hod idvivc-d His i-ajeoty accordingly. /(' 
right o: the Deminions to be regarded as separate inter- 
national personalities with full treaty-, ,king p„wer. re-inforced 
jy their admission as original m.- to ere of the League o: Nations.?'
lce agGin« individual membership of the League not permitted to
i..vC.. t. *i • r in' ipl* that the Brit. :i Empire remained a unit,.
‘•-e ‘-"•'ire ay such w s accorded mesbershi of t c League nd a 
permanent place on its Council. Bcide it, r. independent
.teague me: tors and, t 'he . ?  t.i , c o m ,nent parts < : th Lmpire, 
were groupe d nada, Australia, .'south / fries, New Ze; land <nd India.
Tne ^minion were entitled to r- presen ti,.n in the Asse bly of the 
League as -cvervi.:n ' fates and were oligi /.e for -dvction to the 
Council Thus 1 teir equality with other m  rben of the Lesgue war, 
assured.
As original members of the League, the Dominions became eligible 
for aelec on International l,:*bour Cr a m  sat ion. They enjoyed
direct .'.nd se; sr-ta represent .tior -it all >r.eral International Labour 
Conferences.zv
-he ; t- ‘ty-c km* pow rs of the Dominienr were stren thened 
further when the Lei -ue a pointed certain of them as Mandatory States 
:ver fot mer co I on let- c t h< ire. fhe Union .-f South Africa
was given a »C‘ M- z.iate over Souths .Vest A rica, ’ ew land was ar pointed 
., n latory over amor- and Australia over cert - in islands in the South 
f- .. ic Cce- n. ni ;cat. c ly, these i .ndat -s . ere received by the
Dominions direct fr rr the Secretari'-t of the I ague, without corre - 
por dence lu-vinp been conducted through t e Imperirl Government. As a 
result, th. v cm in ions were reton:... ole for the due performance of 
‘ r" - B ri'' ‘ ' rot to the I . eri: 1 < ovcrnrrei t but direct]y to the 
Lesgue of Nati G/..
The form of vi ,r r-: : on o the conferment of the h'-nc ,te over South- 
■ei i Africa in the record par; r h of the preamble to the Mandate
70. Fi r f. full disci - oion of outh Africa1; position sec pp. 65-8 
be1ow.
> - • See Ar.r- x to the Covenant of the League.
,
Cape i. « September 1U1 >.
73. Lewis op.cit. 3; Keith op.i.it. 16.
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which reads that the 'Mandate shoulJ be conferred upon His Britannic 
j^ jescy to b^xercisf d on hu b> half by the Government of the Union 
Cf bouth Africa...' ni^ht point to the conclusion that the Mandate was 
conferred upr.n the I riti-.h Crown, however, this clash* H h  the 
t urn paragr- ,.>h o' the preamble as well as with Article- of the 
mndate itself. The former states that 'whereas his Britannic 
hajebty_Uor and on behalf of the Government of the Union of South 
Africa hat agreed to icccot the 1andate while the latter
echoe: this by providing that 'the territory over which a Mandate is 
c c n : - d teunicj'.ajesty for and on behalf of the Govem-
of th, Union cf Couth Africa There ere c number of cogent
!f" SOUB *}:y the te nnd to be conferred on South Africa and not
upon the Briti h Crown." fir,t, onl) , State could administer a 
ranc .-ted territory, a rubr c for hick the 'British Crown' could not 
qualify. Article 2' cf the Cover nt of the League of Nations specifies 
t hat advanced net one ’ would be '* ndatories on behalf of the ue .me' - 
in tie cpst o th-V.est Africa the Union was selected as the 
'adv need r• t because of its geographical contiguity to the 
mandated territory. Moreover, while the Union was a founder member of 
the league, ,Ln Britannic 1 - ty', nar ly King George V, was not
himself a member of the L -arue of Nations. Article 22, by reference 
to ’other members of the Let gue' contemplates thatM andntories must be 
i emV e. < » t}.e i ■ -rue. ihis contention i.; reinforced by Article 7 of 
the * andate which confers compulsory jurisdiction on the Penr. «r.ent 
Court of Intent tioi »i , u: tice in disputes between the *M mdatorv' 
and 'another member of the I e- gue'.
I here are umber of judicial interpretations of the situation 
which lend support to the view that the Mandates were indeed conferred 
on the individual Dominions rather that on the British Crown. The 
earliest of these iec isions was reached by the South African Appellate
L.J. : loir. oper 'heput-lic ind i -idate' (1 61) 24 Modern Law 
e v i ( w I S- t < >7 •
fee, toe, '.J.i . I Vi, ird L outh-'iVest Africa nd the Supremacy 
of the South Afr can a r i.- ment' (1969) 86 outh African
biw Sourn-1 Ic«4 t 195, who support the view that the Mandate 
for Sotitfa-..est Africa w a conferred upon South Africa as a 
sovereign independent State de-rite the fact that full independ­
ence wan only realized in 19J] with the passing of the Statute of 
Westminster 2. Geo.V, c.
]
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Division in B_. v. Christian, 1 * a case which posed the question 
wh<-i.i er a citizen of -cuth-Weet Africa owed allegiance to the Crown 
” 33 f° make : im .iabli to the charge of treason. In the course of
r/B
the judgerrent ; ■ill ier ,A. stated that the Mandate had not been 
conferred on the 1 British Empire' but upon the Union Government as an 
independent sovereign State and a nsembv i of the League of Let ions.
Much the same approach was taken by Van den Heever ... in
79_  v. Cffer. where he st ted :
.he .and te was conferred on the Union .... The language used 
in thr instruments referred to rrv / h ve been confusing because 
of the ( nbarzorsing z tuation in which n -rbers of the Common­
weal tn found themselves, but the intention is quite clear. The
Covenan. was an international document and the parties to it 
vere ’h. tales" or "nations". 1
He went on to say ^ that the mode of exore;rion in the different
recitals of the preamble made no difference, but that 'for the purpose
of the alloc; tion of M mdates the Kin act d as head of Ctate of a
separate membvr, the Union’.
Th< New : .I n i Court cf Appeal in Taf ^ loo v. Inr cctoi of Police,
de-liar with the similar uidate over Camo-a, likewise decided that the 
f mdnte was conferred 'directly or. th< Dominion .... The authority is 
given by the .. ag e of . ati ine iirectiy t the .■ominion as a member of 
the League*.
The unanimity of the Coe onwee th courts on ^his point was mani-
1 ested by -he udgement of £v tt J. in Hf ro.- t v. . tevt risen, a case
of the high Court of Australia dalin> # th the mandated territory of
New Guinea. The learned judge stated :
The New Guinea Act correctly orsigns the authority of the 
i or. .nonw alth  ^^ over the territories to the action of the 
i rindpal Allied and Associated .owers in nominating it as 
Mandatory and section $ cT the- Act gives statutory authority 
to the Governor-General not to acre • the N-mdnte from the 
h inds r f the King but to acce t the h md. te ; o soon as it 
is if :ued to the Commonwealth from the Council of the League 
of t it one. In other word , the greatest care was taken by 
the Commonwealth adviser; to protect the international 
statue of the Commonwealth as such and to this end the King, 
acting through the Commonwe 1th Ministers, accepted the 
Mandate d:. rectiy from those who in the oyer of internat ional
r-
19?4 A.i . 101.
At 119.
1954 . .A. 73 at 84.
It id.
[19:7: ; .... 1 .1 . Pv at 0(1.
82. (193?) b' C.I.Ii. 528
8 3 . kef- ret ce; In t it- extract to the 'Commonwealth' are to the 'Common­
wealth of Australia'.
77.
78.
79. 
SO. 
81 .
1 '■ ’ia'' t-re power to grpr.b it .... All the documents tho* that 
.v.-. itever ujthcrity obtoii cd by the Commonwealth in relation 
to New Guinea woe; by original grant to itself (the Commonwealth 
being of course identified with the King in Right of the 
Commonwealth.1
(ii) The Imperial Conf ence of 1' - a?
i’he precedent of separate representation for the Dominions 
created at the i arts 1 ear* Conference8'* was not followed at the peace 
conference etween the Allied lowers and Turkey held at Lausanne *'
1 :‘1H -‘.alter occ sion 3rit--in yielded to French objections con­
cerning the separate representation of the Dominions at the conference, 
tn . July, I1.' . t-.e re ty of Lausanne was . Lgned by British p leni- 
potent lane -alone. *r-n r; tif.c; lion was to be exjressed, the 
<->( \ v:r: o f . outh Africa, Auatr- lia, few ' (lard and India signified
t.heir concurrence. >i:idn 1 nwever, raised the objection that as it 
f; ■ no - ute’. b f ign ‘cry it c uld ac-rcely be expected to give parlia- 
*nvar\ 1 r v: ‘ c tue Treaty; md without such approval the Cana an 
Government oruld accept no r« -pohsibility as to ratification.56 
n t. 1 rch, 1 , the I -icific Halibut Fisheries Treaty was
negotiated and ; "ned by »ricaa and Canadian 1erinutertiaries without
8?
any British intervention. Fop the first time a treaty had not only 
been negotiated by . c in:, -n rr >re>:entative ilone, but also sirred by 
him alone.
Th* above two incidents led to an investigation at the Imperial
Conference, which opened in London on 3 October, 19?3, of the whole
subject of the ;.-votv»tion, signature and ratification of treaties. 4
A kerolut .c.n of this Conference defined a tre? ty as
'an agreement which, in accordance with the normal practice of 
diplomacy, would take the form of a treaty between :ends of
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
h. And rrrdntainei by and 1 rge t the .ira: lament Conference in 
Washinvton I'-AI-T.
85-. In 1922-3.
86. Verier*: r van Themaat oj-.cit. 397.
97. Keith on.cit. 17-18; ; uberte-V-ray op.cit. 292.
8. For the hi tory of this Treaty tee .'.slcolmf. Lewis 'The Canadian- 
Am*ri( n Hal ibut Fisheries Tr sty* (1923-4) 4 ? ritish Yearbook 
of Internotiot _ I :;vv 1< ' ; , too, " orman r.acKenzie Two Recent
Canadian Tn )t i.IT* Tl ) 1 Hi i 1 _  J.* -1V- (4 >d I; ; *• i^ _m tonal l*w 
191.
Imperial • for- nee 19. ': S. mr \v of I rocec.hv Cm 1.196? pp.13-35.
I ' t«te: , ; igne-1 by plenipoter.vimier, provided with full powers
i by the Heads of the States, and authorizing the holders
—  to conclude o treaty.' 90
j 'he Provirions of the Resolution relating to the Heads of States
—' treaty were as followr:
1 11• Negotiation ,
' 'n) It is de- irabl• that no treaty should be negotiated by 
'r‘: ' L ,e ovornmente of the Err; ire without due consideration
' 1 < f it? possible effect on other ports of +he Empire, or, if circum-
kji stances so der and, on the Empire as n whole.
’(10 Before negotiations are opened with the intention of
J conc tdin,- a treaty, steps should be taker, to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire likely to be interested -re 
in tar eci, . o that, if any ouch government considers that its 
' t int* , i ta would fc-- affected, it rr-y have an opportunity of
*j[ expreefiing its views, or, when its interest.- «re intimately
involved, of participating in the negotiations.
1 it. , j.n ila c: ses where r.or< than one of the governments of
iswl ' “‘f |..aj tidij ites in the negotiations, there should be the
fuile; t po; sit 1e exchange of views between those governments 
" a before and during the negotiations. In the case of treaties
negotiated at International Conferences, where there is a
i.’ ieh mpire eiegntion, on which, in accordance with the new 
r as\. : lished pr ctice, the Dominions und India are separately
represented, .uch representation should also be utilised to 
attain this object.
r | 1 t©P® shou 1 - b»* taken to ensure h^st thoegovernments
of the Empire whose representatives are not participating in the
negotiations nhould, during their progress, be kept informed in
regj-rd to any points nrising in which they may be interested.
» -
p
,..j *2. i rnature.
‘ (a) hi Inter 1 treat:, ee imposing obligations on one part of 
the ! - lire only should be signed by t representative of the 
government of that p? rt. The Full lower issued to such 
representative should indicate the port of the Empire in 
f < respect of which the obligations re to be undertaken, and the
k j preamble and text of the treaty should be so worded as to make
its scop' clear.
r i 1 (b) v.here a b: l ter 1 trc-r ty imposes obli. "-tions on more
» » than one part of the l.ryire, the tr< -ty should be signed by one
or more pieniyotei♦iariei cn bvh If of oil the governments 
r » conce • r.ed.
f*!
► -
f l
tc; regards treaties negotiated fit International Con­
ference ., the exittir practice of signature by plenipotentiaries 
on behalf of all the govermeenti of the Empire represented a 
Conferenc- rhould be continued, rid the Full Powers should be in 
the form employed at i arif and Aanhington.
90. Cmd. 19&' p.13.
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1 ' • l^-<lif i c a t i o n .
'The existing practice in connection with the ratification 
ol treatieo ahould be maintained,
-’his procedure is es follows
v 1 ' *' 1 'titic’tion ol treaties imposing obligations on one
part of the Empire in effected at the instance of the 
government of that part:
1'  ^ ‘ J i'ii ion of treaties imposing obligations on more
th ■n one p?rt o1 the empire is effected after consultation 
between the governments of those parts of the Empire con-
ce:ned. It ts for -ach government to decide whether 
• r,.i imen1.:1.i™y approval or legislation is required before 
desire for, or concurrence in, ratification ir intimated 
by that government.' 91
l ie t }.e Keaolui ion did not cover oil controvert 1 issues on the 
subject, it did form the foundation upon which further conventions 
relating to the treaty-making powers of the Dominion, could be built.
.h-. uesc h: t ion, in effect, approved the Canadian action regarding ti.e 
• icitic : l;iut fisheries freaty by providing that a treaty which 
11; v< ' 0I‘e i '*'t ‘ Empire only should be si t ned by a represent-
Uuive of that part and should be ratified only at it s request. It 
also approve* the practice of including /ominion representatives in the 
British lr ire aeleg ition to international conferences.
The Hes* lut ion went or* to deal with informal agreements other than
treaties r> defined above:
’Apart from treaties made between Heads of States, it is 
not unusue for agree onto to be mode between governments.
Such agreement#, which are usually of a technical or admini- 
etrative character, are Made in the name# of the signatory 
governments, and signed by representatives of these govern- 
ments, w o do not net tinder Full Powers issued by the heads 
of the tates: they are not ratified by the He; is of the
States, though in some cases bopv form of acceptance or 
confirm- tier by the governments concerned is employed. As 
regard agraementf of thi r nature the exia tda, practice 
should be continued. but v -fore entering on negotiation# 
ti.e | -vernmento of the Empire .should cor,, ider whet er the
inter#-; t of any other part of the Empire m>:y be effected,
a i, if oo, tops r ould be t.-'ken tc ensure that the govern- 
mer.t of such part is inf .rmed of the proposed negotiation#, 
in order tl t it may have nn opportunity of ex;re ing its
viei. . 92
91. Cmd. 198? pp. 13-15.
92. Cmd. 1987 p.14.
'1
y Examined at a vhoie, it will V? s en th t the 1923 Imperial
J Conference tende i to consolidate the position of the Dominions in
regard to thtir treaty-making power rather than to advance their 
J  -r err.ationai status." rhe second part of the Resolution * recognised
the propriety cf the practice whereby the Dominions er.4 „red into 
informal agreements of a technical or administrative nature w th
icreign totes, negoti tionc being directly conducted with the Convuler
Officers accredited to the Dominion Governments. The Resolution 
suggefLed only that dominions negotiating such agreements should bear 
in rind the intere; tr of other parts of the Empire.
The terminology used in connection with the Dominions and Greet 
in, viz. . Govern ents of the 1 mpire" and 1 P^rts of the Empire*
U  is notable i.i that it implied that the ultimate unit was still the
ipire wi ich consisted o a number of self-governing and less
independent parts. This indie .tes th-'t while the Dominions had been
granted power; not usually allocated to territories with colonial 
statue, it could not be end that the Dominions enjoyed full inter­
na* ional status at the cloue of the Conference, nor did they possess 
attendant tre. ty-meking capecity.
J
]
J
3
( iii) Tl.e Imperial. Conferenc e c f lr<26
The 192^ Imperial Conference v» ve particularly important in that
it acknowledged the extension of Dominion autonomy from internal to
96
external affairs. The inion -h Couth Africa together with Ireland
i had taken the initiative in insisting that clarity be obtained in this
97
re ■'rd. A; rmult, tl - far ov, - H four Report of the Committe-. - on
1
.J
U
J Inter-Imperiil '.-lot inns at the Imo.-r i 1 Conference of 1926 defined93'Co-onwealth ■ t cue * as follows;
*11 a- y are autonomous ccmmunitier within the British Empire, 
in no way aubordin te one to another in any tu :>ect of their 
cvme tic or external .ffairi, though united by u common 
allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members 
of the British Commonweal th of Nations. * '-'9
u
°3. I oeker op.ci t. 15•
'14. Cmd. 198? p.l4 as cited bove.
95. Verio r r van Thetr./int op.C • t . Is : .
96, The ■Sevelo: :' nt . f the 1 ichinrry . ! h < tnodn of Je and e Action in
r or*.-. /ii Afj i r« T" hT '■. A _C. (I - ■ ’ )~2t.
** 9?. Verier**) v.: n Thema-it op.cit. 199«
^  9< . The drit "h Commonwealth ccm-isted of Great Britain and the self-
governing Dominions,while the iritieh Empire ir,eluded non-self- 
overning territories •*.. ell.
99. It ,.,-ri 1 onferencs',1926: '.ternary of Proceed ngr C d.2768 1 .14.
A
■ 1,1'' Lv'! " ii'iuiv-:d th't th 1 root principle* governing
In-er-Imoeria' rel.tione was the ’equality of status' between Britain
‘ f Dcr ■ ii ; tiue, os for os the Imperial Government was con-
* ' nion;. were, in the future, to be regarded as separate
subjects of international law.1
As reg srds the treaty -making powers of the I minions, the Balfour
' e: ‘ rt first reviewed the situation as it pertained in 192):
'It wa; agreed in 1923 ' at any of the Governments cf the 
Impire contemplxving the negotiation of a treaty should give
iteration to its possible effect upon other Governments 
ar. a should take steps to inform Governments like I*, to be 
interested of its intention.' 2
Tl.e . ;-.e: olution had left it to the negotiating State to decide
whether any other Dominion was 'likely to be interested’. The Balfour
heport recommended that, tht negotiating S'; te be obliged to inform all.
other Commonwealth Governments of :ts intention to conclude a treaty,
and in this way to allow each CoiraBonwe.ilth Government to express its
/iews. -f no adverse comment, were exare. sed 'with reasonable
rompt xtude1 . the negotiating - late might proceed 'on the assumption
at its policy was] generally acceptable1, but
'before taking any steps which might involve the other 
Governments in any active obligation, [it 1 td to] obtain
thr ir definitive a: e n t   (Moreover] the initiating
Govern - nt r .y assume that a Guvernr ent which has had full 
opportunity of indicating ita rttitude and has made no 
adverse comments will concur in the ratification of the 
treaty. 1 3
The 3a1 four Heport criticii ed the pr ctice reg .rding treaties
neg- t iated under the auspice cf the League of Nations where
•adherence to the wording of the Annex to the Covenant for 
the purpose of describing the contracting party has led to 
the US' in the preamble cf the term "British Umpire" with an 
enu'.?r tion of the Dominions ml India if parties to the 
Convention but without any ment on of Great Britain and 
No-'them Ireland and the Colonic.- and i rotectorates. These 
sre only included by virtue of ‘heir being covered by the 
te/r "British Empire". This practice, while suggesting that 
the Lua.imons and Jnd;i r- lot or. t footing of equality with
1. Halebury't; 1 ewa of England op.cit ^5^ notes that the effect of this 
Conference was t recogn. - e t.h< independent rt s cf the Dominions 
in international relations.
jJ
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Great Britain ar participants in the treaties in question, tends 
to obscurity end misuraerntnnding and is generally unsatisfact­
ory . 1
^  As a means of overcoming this difficulty, it was recommended that all
treaties other than agreements between Governments
'whether negotiated under the auspices of the Lvague or not 
shoujd be ir de in th< r.,-me of he.adt of Stater, and, if the treaty
if; Signed on behalf f any or oil of the Governments of the Empire,
the treaty should be mode in the naire o':' the King as the symbol
J of the special relationship between the t afferent parts of the Err-pire .... In the cose of a trerty applying to only one j irt 
of the Empire it shou] be stated to be made by the King on
"1 behalf of that part.1 ‘+
^  It Wf $ a!sex decided that plenipot- nti r e  for the Dominions should
be issued with full powers Ly the King, acting on the advice of the 
Government conoerred. The full ;owers v re to indicate thi v part of 
the Empire for which the plenipotentiaries were to sign. The following 
specimen for: of tre ty,«6 recommended,v. if, attached a an appendix to 
the Committee's f►port:
3 
3
— » that • nd : ve appointed ®r, their "lenipotentiarien
be President .....................................J  .........................................
His haje ty the King [fitl- fu above,•
- -j
for Great Britain nd Northern Ireland and ml < 
ports of the Briti. h Empire which art not
SPECIMEN FORM OF TREATY
The President of the United States of America, Hie Xajesty 
the King of the Belgians, His Majesty the King here insert 
Pin ! ajesty1*' full titlej, His ' ph ■ ty t.e b .ng of Bulgaria, 
he., VC.,
Desiring
* v<- resolved to conclude a treaty for that purpose and to
a b .
for the Dominion of Canada,
CD.
for t ne Commonwealth of Au^tr lia.
KF.
for the Dominion of New Zerlard,
OH.
for the Vnir.n of out'« ^‘h ica
2J,
for the Irish Mroc ; tat#,
HI .
for India, MN.
md. 27t v pp. !2~ ’.
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who, having communicated their full powers, found m  good and 
due form, have agreed as follows.
In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have 
signed the present Treatyt
AB...............................
CD............................
£F............................
G K ...............................
IJ...............................
KL............................
rt;...............................
(or if the territory for which each Plenipotentiary signs 
is to be specified:
fir lr at driV’in , he.)................ AB.
( for v- nada)..........................   .CD.
(for Austral i') .........................EF.
( fi r New lea land ).................. . .OH.
(for South Africa).......................IJ.
( for the Irish Free State).............. KL.
(for India)............................. MI.)
The Balfour Report also clarified the position as regards the 
coining into force of multilateral treaties registered under the 
auspices of the League of N>. or.s. It resolved that any ratification 
clause should •take the for of a provision that the trety should 
come into force when it has been ratified on behalf of so many separate 
Ke-oers of ’.he . v ague ‘. Trui would er - ;r that 'ratification on 
behalf of different prts of the Empire which are separate Member of 
the Leacue should be counted as separate ratifications.1
The Report dircussed in s< ne detail representation of the 
T vt, ini one at international confer nces.0 In go doing it built on tie
foundations which ) d been laid at the Imperi 1 Conference of 192).
The underlying principle involved was that each Dorn!mor. h i to decide 
whether it d-s ’red to be represented at such a conference or whether 
it was content te leave the negotiations in the hands of those parts
of the Empire more directly concerned.
5. Cnd. 2?68 p.24.
'a' :nr f:S the conduct of foreign affaire in general wr.a concerned, 
the Report
irankly recognized that in t! is sphere ... the mejor share of 
responsibility rests now, and must for some time continue to 
re£ 1’ with His Majesty*" Government in Great Britain. Neverthe- 
less, practically all the Dominions are engaged to some extent 
... in the conrict of foreign affairs, particularly those with 
foreign countries on their borders.1 7
(i?) The Imperial Conference of 1930
The ta; L of tr.oeo st tesren attending the Imperial Conference of 
19l0 was primarily to consolidate the position concerning the 
negct iition and conclusion of treaties that had emerged at the 
Imperial vonferences of 1Q._) and 192b. The 1930 Conference emphasized 
the aspect of communication and the ysten of consultation in relation 
to the conduct of foreign affairs generally and treaty negoti tione in 
particular, it summarized the main points as follows:
(l- Any of his Majesty's Governments conducting negotiations 
should inform the other Governments of His Majesty in case 
they should be interes .ed and give them the opportunity of 
ex.. res ing thei, views if t .e- v.- -nk th.it their interests 
nay be affected.
(2) Any of His Majesty's Governments on receiving such 
information should, if it desires to express any view, do 
sc with reaso: .ble promptitude.
(3) Hone of Hi3 Majesty's Governments can take any steps
which .right involve the other Governments of Her Majesty c
in any active obligations without their definite assent.’
The Conference underlined the fact that it was of particular import­
ance in rel tier, to tre ty negotiations that any Government which 
believed that it was likely to be interested in the negotiations 
con acted by my other Government should hive the earliest possible
opj ortunity of expressing its views. In order to avoid causing
embarrtasment to the negotiating Government, ether interested Govern­
ments wore urged to relay their comments at the earliest instant.
It u recommended at this Conference, at it had been at the 
Conference of 1926, that the instrument o*' ratification, as well as
II
7. Ibid. pp.29-6.
8. Imperial Cu ference, 193 : Nummary of Proceedinge Cmd.371-7 p.27.
treaty itself, should list those parti of the Commonwealth that 
had assumed treaty obligations.
If the agreement took the form of an agreement between Governments, 
was to be negotiated without any intervention by the- Crown and 
without the use oi the Great Seal of the If ujo. In such n agreement 
haje-ty w s not regarded u a cent acting pi-rty. If the treaty took 
the form of a treaty between heads of t-'-te, ther the 1930 Conference 
r eof, irr^ ed that ill document;, involved in the nt; -ti.- tion, signature 
rat ii icat^on were to be issued by the Crown the request of the 
Government in question/'
in addition, the Imperial Conference of 1930 n> roved the report 
Oi ihe 1 ■ • conference on the operation of Dominion Legislation 1 and,
?.n the foj lowing year, the main redOEimencat ior.r. of that he ort appeared 
in the Statute of Westminster.
vvi Che Ctatute of Westminster
The Statute of -estminster thus cl rifi d the powers of Dominion
1
The Statute of Westminster ‘ vis not rectly concerned with the
external status of the .ominions, bit rather with their internal
constitution; 1-law problei s. Cne of th# rain provisions of the Statute
repealed the Colonial laws Validity Act, 1 if, in its application to the
D minions, ho law of a Dominion would, henceicrth, be void on the
ground of repugnancy to an Act of the Imperial Parliament or to the
13
£r.£"lish common law. The Dominion Pariitt ent was empowered to amend 
or repeal Act: of the Imperi ! Parlinmet in no frr as they formed port 
of the law of t Dominion nd to legislate with extra-territorial effect/'' 
The Statute - Iso gave statutory effect to a long-st .rding convention 
of the Uniteo Kingdom Pariin ent, viz., not to pass legislation extending 
to a Dominion except at the request and cc nsent of the Dominion concerned."
9- Stewart op.cit. 468.
10. Cmd. 3717 pp. 17-21.
11. Cm- . 3479.
12. 22 'v 23 Geo.V c.4.
13. Section 2.
14. Ibid.
15. ; ection J>.
16. Preamble to the • tatute -,f Westminster read with section 4 thereof; 
see too A.V. Dicey An Introduction to the Study of the Law cf the
Con- titut ion K  # 1 (196'.' • introduction p.11.
ar-i i -mente in accorcie-.ce with the principles expressed by the 1926 
ana 1^50 Imperi il Conference a, by giving them .full control over 
matters of i ominion concern.
In an attempt to put beyond all doubt the f-ct that the Imperial 
<u iir-n.etit *•':.<•• no longer the sv.prtlaw-making body for the Union, 
the Union var.iament, in 193'n enacted the .tatus of the Union Act. 
This Act had three important effect: . First, it dec] red the Union 
Parliament to be the sovereign 1 egieL tive body for the Union. 
uevoav^y, it provided that those parts of the Statute of Westminster 
relating to ^outh Africa as one of the Uominlons ’shnll be deemed to 
be an Act of the Parliament of the Union ant. shall be construed 
i .cordingly1„ The object v s to ercure that the Statute of 
Westminster would remain applicable to iouth Africa even if repealed 
by a subsequent Act of the I perinl Parliament. Thirdly, the 
St. tus Act ruled that the King, actii - personally or through a 
lOvernor-General, woula exercise hi>. executive powers in relation to
the Union 'in regard to any aspect of its domestic or external affaire'
P 1
on the novice of hi a Union Ministers. " Any Imperial intervention in
PPthe nffairs of the Union was thus clearly ruled out.
hot content with these measures a one, the Union Parliament aloo
pr
en cted the Roy 1 xecutive Function! and >enls Act." Tbit. Act pro-
vided for the striking of a Koy 1 Great L< il -nd a Royal Signet for
the Union which were thereafter used to seal all documents in place of 
the British e-alb.' Hie Act decreed. tl it whenever, for any reason,
17. Act 69 of 1934.
18. iectior 2.
29. ecticn ?.
20. ■ c-e further K.v, Wheare U h<- statute d  tr.rr *. ; -a. . i ami men
Status 5 ed. (195?) 244.
21. Status of tht- Union Act ( of !<• <4 section p.
2. . i.'ot uuti 1 -*2 and 194? did Australia xnd New ,e land respectively
adopt the tntute of 'We. tnnstcr. Cat "in and Ireland did not deem
it necessary to incorporate the St tute in*o their own law at all.
2?. Act 70 of 1934.
24. Section 1.
23. In land had pas ed a similar Act in ll; '1.
26. Section 6(1).
th t ine's signature to any instrument requiring the sign-iranual 
could not be obtained, or would result in undue delay, the Governor- 
ui-neral shou.' i, subject to such instructions as mi.-ht from time to time 
be gjven by the f.ing on the advice of his Union Ministers, execute end 
sign such instrum nt on behalf of the King, The Governor-General-in- 
Council * s required to authorise such action,^ the Great Seal of the
pQ
nion was-: to be affixed, and the instrument to be countersigned by a 
minister of State for the Union.'"'
Ever ittce i''30, the Governor-G*neral had been an officer of the
..n:on, appo: ntt-d nd rerrovab ! e by the Uni n Government. He could not
receive any instructions no to the exercise >f his authority except on
tre proposal of ♦be Union ministry. All this ensured thr-t the complete
exercise of roy 1 power in extern 1 r ffairs vested in the Union Govern- 
30
31
mer.t.
One author ’ has written that the Statue of the Union Act and the 
loyal Executive Function! and Seels Act nrcceeded
'upon the sumption that the Imperii 1 Conference decisions 
of 1926, declaring that the f-ominiont and the United Kingdom 
are "e iua in etntua, in no way eubordin te one to another in 
any r.apect of their domestic or external affairs", should be 
regrrce i s -sufficient evidence of South Africa11 constitut­
ional right to control all its atff irs external end internal 
alike. Upon such assumption the two Acts of 1934 proceed to 
declare t :ue end provide f. r a method of exercism, all 
the powers and cj oacitier ineic.:t to such status.'
d' The 'Carc» Town Agree .t-nts* betw "". - - uth A 'ricf India
(i) Hisvury
The Introduction of Indicois into Natal fir-t took place in i860, 
when, after several years of agitation by the Natal Legislative Council,
the British and Indian Governments finally agreed to the establishment
32
of the indentured labour xyst m.' The period of indenture was
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Section 6(2).
Section 4(3)« 
section 4(1).
Keith qp.cit. 27.
Herbert Vere ivatt .9- i i; .. and Hi/ dominion Gov^riK rr, (1936) 303« 
M. Vane 'The South African Indians and UNO' (19U ) 28 quarterly 
hevifw 162 at 16
originally three yean but later extended to five yenre, after which 
tire < he Indi.iti! were alio, vd to remain in Nat/ J av free labourers.
* r'j Inoi.'nt took advanta ge of th* scheme nd settled in Natal after 
v ..no .uf.ing the: r ternvs of indenture, together with ih* ir wives and
e<’ • 1 key became hawkere, market g rder art and domestic servants
< ' - • -iso fount' employment on the railways and in tie coal mines.
however, t ny ;nd: «ns returned to India complaining of ill-treatment 
on e sugar estates, illegal w thholding of wages and lack of medical 
attention. As a result the Indian Government ind the Commissioner of 
“r‘u •xT'1' 1 ion in London suspended all further emigration until 
conditions h d improved and reforms had been instituted. Tnis was,
]«i the enri iest indie/, ti-n th t tne Indian Government meant to
>. on .ern itse.t with the question of the treatment of Indians in 
South Africa.
.indian traders and merchants degar. ;o arrive ir. Natal soon after 
tne labour r rr ie their first appearance. They conducted bisiness 
not only wit t e -ndians, but "Iso witi the Zulus and Europeans. As 
they prospered and threatened to become formidable rivals to the 
Europeans in commerce and industry, re they incurred the mounting 
ur.ger and resentment of the 1 tter.
as soon as Ntal was granted responsible government in 1893, ' it 
took action to curuiil the rights of the Indians. A tax of £3 per 
annum was impose on Indians who had com leted their terms of 
indenture, on In ir-n women ; nd on chil dren over the age of sixteen.
The object was to induce these people to return tr India. In 1896 the
3. > w No.14 of I8d3«
4. Act 8 of 1896.
5. T.H. Vat . eenen Land : 11; Qccn.- tioi. ,1, i t wiership in .-.uuth 
Africa (1962) 8.
80.0 0 Indians new resident i; f. *:al were excluded from the parlia-
34mentary franchise.'
A limited number of Indi no (about 13*000) h; d me/ awhile battled 
in the Tram van 1. The Tran; va n war, formally annexed by Britain in l88l 
with the signing of the Pretoria Convention on 3rd August l88l. This 
Convention w ; urerseded b) the London Convention, signed on 
27 February, l8::4,' Article 24 of which allowed all persons, not
being l atives, who subjected tnetsselvee to the Daws of tne Republic: 
a, to enter freely, to travel end to reside in the Republic with 
their families;
Vo) to hire or ..t res houses, factories, store; n . shops;
(c) to trade either personally or throu rh such agents on they saw fit 
to appoint;
nor were these pci ions to b subjected, either ot to their persons or 
to their belonging-, to taxers to which the citizens cf the Republic 
were not subjected.
The immt inti- t .‘f ct of these provisions was an influx of Indians 
into the Transvaal. This c used an outcry among the burghers and tho 
Volksraad v m  pre; . ured to do something about the matter. As early as 
l?8fi a .'ranst 1 la tiublican Law " excluded Indians from acquiring 
citizenship and owning land. Before this law was passed, the 
Volkoraad entered into protracted correepondencs with the Imperial 
Govemmert, but eventually decides that the law would not be objected
39
to beir.j contrary to the spirit of the London Convention. Ihe 
Asians, indignant at this measure, petitioned the '.mperiel Governm ent 
in an attempt to thwart the operation of the law and during the enruing 
ye-rt the Imperi' 1 Government exerted cuch diplomatic $>r<asure on the 
Vclhsraad in connection with the application of this lavf. -he ...»uAen
question h:1, even at this ea*ly stage, achieved .ate;nuticn;; ,to«
*^0
sortions and earned the attention of the Imperial Government» 
irony of this itvation wfe that after the cessation cf hostilities 
oetween Boer md British in 1902, the Imperial Government in the 
Tr nsvaal decided to implement the policy oi the former itepuclican 
Government and to this end the Indemnity and Peace Preservation 
Ordinance cf 1902^ was enact. 1. This allowed only those A;' iana 
then in the province to live there while others might enter only on 
receipt of a permit. This ruling wne confirmed by Ordinance 5 of 1903.
;6. Law No. ' of lS8v.
37. Article 2(a).
38. Article 2(b).
39. Van Leerpn oo.cit. 9-
40. This friction between the iritish nd Republican Govern nto wss 
one of the cau ee of relations between 1 hem reaching b: <• ■- -P 
>oint culminating in the outbreak of the Boer War.
41. act 38 of 1902.
ihiiB representatives of the Imperial Government ■ cbieveu the control 
ovtr whe influx of A* i nr into t Trensvao L which the Republican 
Government had been thwarted in rioinr been.. -■ of the intervention of 
the Imperial Government.
“hen the Transvaal was granted responsible govern ent in 1906,
legislation v, is enacted to restrict the entry of Indians. The so-
i+%
caled Black Act ' was also par . od whi t - coi oelled Indians over the 
age of eight ye.ms to carry parses bearing the thumb print of the owner. 
These measures lei to the fir t passive r sist-nce campaign in which 
Mahatma Gandhi war to feature so prominently. As a result of the 
campaign only 500 Indians registered voluntarily. General Smuts appealed 
to the Indians to register of thei - own ccord in which case, according
to Gandhi's version, Smuts undertook to ecure the repeal of the Act
provided the majority of Indians registered. In the tend the Act. wan 
not repealed and only those who had registered won exempted from carry­
ing passes. The Indians then burnt their passes in protest. The 
Transvaal Govern ent retaliated by parsing the m. nsvaal Immigrants 
Regulation Act v  in order to prevent Indr ns from entering the Transvaal 
altogether.
This Act empowered the Minis' ter Of the Interior to prohibit as immig­
rant' 'any person or clos of ptrs ••«:■ -.e .* by the 1 mister or. economic 
grounds ... to be unsuited to the requirerents of the Union or any part­
icular province thereof1. 1 ter that ye r the Fsiri ter is*u.’d rt gu^!a-
tions declaring all Asian perrons to be unsuited on economic grounds to 
the Union and to every province in whicl he was not m1. reedy oomicileu.
The effect of these regulation- was to r. ike all Asians prohibited 
immigrants and to restrict the fr< o movement of Asians from one province 
to another. Tnose who enter*a in defiance of the law were deporte ;
42. By letter patent dated 6 December 1 06, see h. i.. Hahlo and
El 1 ison K hn The Union of Gouth Afr ca: The .Deyy'loPi^nt_qf^ts 
Laws and C* nstltutjoiL (l^p) 112.
43. Act 36 of 1908. , , _
44. Section 9 of Act 36 of 1908 re* 1 *ith 6.9(a) of G! ')# of 19 1
R_. v. Ain Hong 1913 TrD 768.
45. Act 22 of 1913.
46. Section 4. ,
47. C.J.k. Dugard 'The Judicial Process, ; csitivism nd Civil Liberty
(1971) 88 Sorth African law Journal 181 at 191.
• l’-8 n y o&ce of :in cro; ;d the border .nd were promptly sentenced 
to 11 r.Tiu of imprisonment. Certain Indie,is were even shipped back to 
India.
The Indinr. government ret lint d in 1911 by refusing to allow
;>ny future migration of ndentured l-bourr r to :> tel. 'in while,
the Supreme Court ruled*^ that a narriage according to Muslim or
Lindu rites, being potential.y polygamous» was not reco ni%ed by our
law. This meant thrt mo- t In virui <r rri? -«.n would net be recognized.
In i 13 the ind •" ns in hotel assively resisted the h? poll tax and
Gandhi led striking Indians at the Newcistlt coal mines. This
encourag 'd further atriheu md the In ms were sent back to the cottl
mimes an prisoners ur :er arn «-d guard. After public denunciation by the
V eroy of Indi a commission was appointed which recommended
abolition of the poll tax and recc p.itior. of Indian marriages. Smuts
and Gnr.dhi were able to negotiate nn agreement and the recommendations
Ua
of tm> Cc umir . icn were accepted. The Indi n Helief Act was passed,
which not only i pier on ted thei-e j ,,co.- mend tions but abolished the pass
lawr- as we’ I.
This Act, in a ioit ion, inauj irate the system of v.iunt ry repatriat­
ion . The Indian Government agi*eed to it in the hope th t with a
reduction in the size of the Indian community in Natal the European 
fear of the Indian would lessen and consequently better treatment 
would be meted cut to those who remained. Section 6 of the Act 
empowered the Kinister to provide any India;, with free passage to 
India on condition that he signed a document abandoning on behalf of 
himself, hi; wife and linor ch.ldrea, *11 farther rights of entry to 
and of domicile in the Union.
In 1920 t; e A- iatic In- uiry 1< nr.it>. Lon, popularly known as the 
Lange J; mmiosion, recommended that the Union Government further 
encov vcluntnry repatriation by offering improved sea transport 
facilities. This was done and by the end of 1926 21,780 Indians
. Kashi a Sbr-hir v. Mahomed Essou lc,05 TS 39 at 61; Seed at13 
}xecutors v. f’ne Tester 1 ' . 1 - • C2.
‘ 1 f'a 1> • *"any once a(.-axn c r o : d  the border " >d were promptly eeiltenoed
to terns oj imprisonment. Certain Indians were even shipped back to 
India.
; he Indian Government retaliated in 1911 by refin ing to allow
any future migration oV indentured labourers to '.at: 1. Meanwhile,
the supreme Court ruled " th:t a m rriage according to Muslim or
Hindu rites, being potenti^'iy polygamous, was not recognized by our
Izw. Vhis meant that most Indian marriages would not be recognized.
in 3 the Indians in Natal passively re isted the -■ 3 poll tax and
Gandhi led striking Indians at the Newcastle coal mines. This
encouraged further strikes **,d the Indi.-ns were sent back to the coal
mines as prisoners an ;er ar ed :y rd. fter public denunciation by »
Viceroy of India, a commission was appointed which recommended
abolition of the noli tax and recognition of Indian marriages. Smuts
and Gandhi were able to ne?otinte an agreement and the recommendations
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of the Commission were accepted. The Indian Relief Act was passed, 
which not only implemented these recommendrtions but abolished the pass 
law: as we"! 1.
Thir Act, in addition, in irated the system of voluntary repatriat- 
itin. The Indian Government agreed to it in the hope that with a 
reduction in th" size if the "ndian community in Natal the European 
fear of the Indian would lessen md consequently better treatment 
would be meted out to those who remained. Section 6 of the Act 
empowered the Minister to provide any Indian with free passage to 
Indin on condition that ne signed a document abandoning on behalf of 
himself, hit wife and minor children, all further rights of entry to 
and of domicile in the Union.
In 1920 the Asiat.c Inquiry rale: .on, popularly known as the 
L-nge Commission, recommended that the Union Government further 
encourag*: voluntary repatriation by ofiering improved sea transport, 
facilities. This was done ani by th«: end of 1926 2 1 , Indiana
48. hazhia Ebr dir v. Mahoiri. 1 lias op I'-'OS 'y1 at 1 ; s
Executors v. T? a 1 fata1 / . G « ) JC2.
had voluntarily r^trict, ' uDucr this
, ‘ "  ,ry 1 ;“;triation scheme the fiuropenne in South
‘""d ^  f'atal " -1' =•''• f»eed incres: jng
" ..........   "ductry. The Oovemmeet took tees to
--.educe a ■civiHted l.hour' clicy, in effect a .hit. labour 
Policy, to prevent future competition to Suropean commercial euprerae,.
;  „  ^  !'°rke* » * * “ * Act =nd the liquor Act.*5 The
thee‘ Aete “ > •.‘oWieh an industrial colour ha,
Z  ' : ; P'"leU 10 r-on-Rircp.enr in the Union and none especially to 
the Indian c -munity in Matni.
r”patrla ‘ •eeourage-J still further by the Cap. 
HEree,'e“t "hich “ ”«• "boot in the folioaing cenner:
In is:- the Class Areas Bill -a. tooled before lariiament.55 ,t 
eopouered the Sinister of the Interior to appoint a commie ion of not
'/;* ‘r  t W ** P,re0"' 10 ,BTtati'- l! -v complaint by an urban local 
“  " 1 I f i t J  r area was being infiltrated by Indiana.
aepM or. the findings of the eo, mis ton. the io.frnor-Ceneml
CPU.a prevent ini, no irom - cquir ng immovable property in that area, 
ah. Uirr . S severely criticUee in -Wliarent, not on the .-rounds that
i. - u  discriminatory in nature, but that it did not go for enough.
-sere -ere constant demands for repatriation as 'the only solution'57
M  “C U  “  ,het 'the have get to leave the country'.58
.reve; r , ached the tstute Book as a result of the fall *e
-he bmuts over,..vent and the con, equ-at dissolution f Parliament, but
in vuly 19.5, ,n response to rising public anger .gainst the Indians, the
50. pzsumw wg a w r ejg”-.
51. Act 26 of 1Q22.
5?' Act 11 of 19; 4.
53. Act 27 cf 1 j.
54. Act .5 of 1 6.
55. Act 30 of If48.
56
57
5#, Ibid. col . 14 ; .
. —  1-1’ 1 C  19,4).
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err pent under General Herta^g introduced the Areas Reservation 
and immigration and Registration (Further Provisions) Bill59 which was, 
ln effect’ ° 1!0re drastic version of the Class Areas Bill. The Bill 
nr,vited that in the event of urban loca authority rubmitting a 
report to the Pinister of the Interior that a certain area was wholly 
or largely occupied by a particular clan:-, of perrons, and should be 
reserved "or residential and/or tr-dirg purposes to that cla.,s, the 
Ximster was to appjint a co^isrion of not more tnan three persons to 
n.vc-K it-'te t:'" suitability of the area; that is, to determine whether 
it was odeuuatc in extent and facilities and whethe" it was the only
for that particular class in the town. If the commission reported 
favourably the Governor-General might within ix months proclaim the 
a '••las • Tea. thereafter no member of that class might acquire, 
lease or renew the lease of ay land out, ide that area. Conversely,
no-one who did not belong to that class could acquire or lease land 
w;thin the proclaimed area.
r'ress reports, the testimony of those who appeared before a f elect 
co^,ittee to study the Bill end public opinion of the time generally 
u --cate th-it by applying thi- type of measure the Union Government 
hoped to encourage Indians to leave South Africa of their own accord.60
indann oppoc ■ tion to the Bill » ; ■ inevitable. Both the Ratal Indian 
Congress and tie Indian National Congress (India) claimed that the Bill 
was a breach of the Smuts-Gandhi agreement of 1914 which had contained 
an assurance by Smuts that 'existing laws’ would be administered ’in a 
just tenner and with due regurd to vested rights'.' The Indian Govern­
ment understood +his to mean th<t no new legislation would be enacted 
after 11' t. r/ing the effect of imposing restrictions on Indians, 
however, the nion Government die-greed with this interpretation and 
u  th t the Bill had in any way breached the Cmuta-Gandhi agreement.
1 '• ± r!lTrnb 1 y Rebatet vol.5, cole. 6502-3 ' July 1925).
60. J.E. Corbett oo.cit. 51-2.
*ol. C.F. Andrews 'Documents 1 anting to the New A Latte Bill and 
alleged Brt-ich of Faith' 1'• aa cited by Corbett oa.cit. '54.
Indian Onngr.nn nrganined a nano meeting to protect against 
- e ill in the Durban Cit, H U in Seg.ember 1)25. The 23rd February
' aeEl5Cated 8 National Of rayer by Indir* throughout
.ou.h Africa and a deputation of outfc Afric a, India,.e left for India
11 ^  my r« P ™ ^ M e  voic in India also lodged strong 
protests.
The Government of Ir ua n r  t propc ,d a round table conference in 
p n  19o in an ntte .pt to forestall the impending legislation. Dr.
o.F. t'.alan, then South African in, ter of he Interior, stated in
‘ , r : , n n e n t  t h «  i R i o «  3ov r r n t  .. . not oppo to the idea of a
conference. caver, the negoti .torn /first could not agree over the
“" " 1S f,:,r h° ‘ lg • “cl; ” conference. T1 , t»o Governments clearly
viewed the confer ,,c„ fr„. differ,   To the Union Oov.mnent
It was primarily a mens to encourage and expedite reputation with 
the object of ei.brtcntially reducing the Indian population in South 
Africa. .0 the Inman Government the -..in objective was to improve 
the legal position of Indians remaining in South Africa.
one result of the official opposition cf the Indian Government to 
the Areas aeae- vat.on Bill „d of its negotiations for a round table 
conference on the 'Indian quest on', . a  that on 1? February 1S26 
or. !■- Ian moved the disch 'rge of the second Reading of the Bill.
:" Xe'd' 4t """ referr,d tr ' !=ct cor. lit tee (under the cL.iirmanahip
of Dr. ! U  1 which was to report to the House on or before 1 April.63
The Indian deputati n urged t> • ,-elect committee tr advise 
V sponsion of the Areas Beeervation ill, stressing that if this 
measure . «  not taken there could be no hope o- e round table conference
between the two Governments cicce-.i. , such were the feeling of
noetility engenderec by the Bill.
vn the other hand the elect coi mitt, o heard deputations led
—  by urban :ccal authorities in Natal, by political bodies,
by Agricultural and Fars*,* Aosoc . inn- and by Chambers of Commerce
*hc all advocated paasa*e the Bill that cession and no conference 
at all.
r '• of Af-^JiljL.^bak £  vol.6, co 1.6?1 (17 February 1926).
63. Ibirj , col.676.
1J
1
1
::
w.
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Cr'° ' ! tr‘e 8*y points which emerged from the evidence led before 
tie select commit.,, woe that p-emoge of the Areas Reservation Bill
 . ' ’- el: hood, mean the end of voluntary repatriation. This
" "  : 'eCii,e y th£ 6ppc,'lte of 013 th"t the Union Government had ho ed
* ac: ,eye by pasrin« the Bill- The deputation representing the
...... ' I" ' ccnvinced the select committee that the effect
the eCBCtr"nt °f th« Bill would bo to antagonist Indian opinion
v th ln ;,0',lh '•frie8 nd '"ro-i, so that i„ Nate] end the Transvaal 
■e .no,-nr would bend together to defe t the Union Government •« 
repotritio,. olio, whilst in India pressor, would be exerted on the 
.rdian government V  refute to crept re. wtriation. Passage of the 
!', n .",;kt k''W  "B oW - t e m  benefits in that it ml lit alley the acute 
' "  0f ndlans ™ d it »ould restrict Indian expar.sion,
C; t " *OUl ' alCC ,n breach not only between the Indian and
the European in South Africa but also betw-en Indie and the Union, ana,
' ‘M i : “  *0UJd ""'Babiy mean the end of the voluntary repatriation 
» ,ich the Union Government's main method cf solving the
Inii'-R problem, a.-. Corbett put it
liaBiiff
Iri thc lif 1 uf tkese finding, when negotiations for n round table 
ct ni rencc „r,. re: umed by the Indian Govem-ent, nr after further 
ir, forrra 1 diecm.sions had been held between the Union Government a.ad 
the Indian dele^tion, the Union Govemiitnt, on 13 April 1926, sem a 
tc.vgras to the Indian Government offering to hold a round table 
conference m; t ei.f-pend operation of the /.rear Rerorvstinh atll 
pending itr outcome 'prodded that the Indian Government wa, 
willing to accept tie portion that "public opinion in South Africa
ft. Corbett oo.cit. 6C.
1
«ul Viev With favour cry. settlement which does not hold out 
reasonable Prospect cf scf.p.ordir. the maintenance of western
legitim te menas* and provided it was 
ng ’t0 ,l0re *U  — M e  methods of settling th, Asiatic
pie. tlor . .he decision of the confer, ce would oe subject to 
confutation by the two Governments'.6^
, !hC In‘ilBn :0’,en” ent these conditions as a suitable
t “  :°r * r°Und tabU COI|fereBce. The full agreement between the
m  1 ^n.g,,ituted the offici i basis of the conference
read rxs follows:
The select committee accordingly recommended the holding of the 
conference and suspension of the Bill, and Moment adopted the
report Of the fleet committee in a motion introduced bv the Kit water 
of the Interior. ''
hhe round table conference opened in Cape Town on Friday
W r  17, and lafcfced until January 11, IQJ?. Those representing
' 3. Corbett loc.ct. oiling An;. 4 2_,p(. further Corr,. .ondence
'C *I?p( 'n n aad Union Gevexnment.s re Areas Reservation Bill
Corbett oo.ci t. 65-C citing . C o. • pq v-vi. 
t '* /'1 »t-nbly Debates vol.?, col.2?22 April 1926).
' • “v ""a Sir M d m n M  iiabiyll.d, Heober of the 
. IL ' 'S 'xecutiv, Council, .he was the jjader: the Hon.
-  ■ Coroatt, Indian Civil S o m e ,  Sectary to the Go.erntent of
: “ i ~  deputy-le.ider; t , t.Hon. V.: . Srini,., . tastri,
laddieon, Kenber of the U,i„t, tie, A. « mbl, ,h4 ^
ty £"‘, reVlry tD the S n w m n a M  of India, »h.r; M s  th. secretary 
l',r the Indian delegation.
.u Union delegation cone r„ 0: th i J.B.h. Hertzog, Prime
U r ‘ the Bon- Dr- 6-F - 1 ’ ' Hlni. t, • of the Interior; the 
hoc. H.P. oraswell, Minister defence, the Hen. ...... Beyers.
i ’ ' f "  ‘'"d Icdu6triee « »  Hon. I. Boydell, Minister of 
C- ' Seheidt> ""ere ri lor tie Interior; hr. £. Brands,
- rincip.il iteration .fficer, C nd hr. . . ring, Chief Clerk,
Department of the Interior.
re£?Uxt8 0f thie conferen - r  « died in a Joint
Coaamnique'' issued simultaneously . , th, two Governments and a
■ «  ry cf the Conclusions they had reached, more popularly k e n  as
the cap, ,'o.n Agreement. The Agreement dealt .ith three major issues.
nrst, a »e, and more attractive scher , of assisted emigration from the
m on was established .hereby emigrant were to be transported at the
Union Governs»nt*s expense and bonusei were to be paid to them.
-ul". o: sixteen and over were to r, „ v, m , 0„ arrival in India,
children under sixteen were to receive and cripple, .ere to receive
. ensions. A,: assisted emigrant wishing to return could do so within
three year, but not within 1, is than ye, .-, provided he refunded the
cost of th, assist, nee he had r.ceived. ;fter three years absence 
I’alon dofflicile would be lot.
lor it,-, part, the Indian Government undertook to m:rist the
repatriates on the.r arrival in India and h-l;> then settle into their 
new honea and jobs.
The Union Government hoped that the new prov, ion enabling emigranta 
t , r turn to Couth Afrioa within three ye would encourage eai .-ration;
' -cv re soned that Indiana would be more likely to emigrate to unknown 
conditions in India cnee it w,-s possible to return to South Africa.68
f " House of Assembly Debat, a v >1.8,coir.. Ivh>-7 (16 perch 1927).
16 Seccnd m0jor t”nov,.tto« of the Cape Town Zgree.-nent .as the 
so-called 'upliftment else In the third section of t_e Summary of
-onc.Niions, the Union Qovert nt stated that 'it is the duty of every 
eivilined Government to devise ways and means to take possible
'* r"r t:,e UplirUns of "<rysection of their permanent peculation 
to the full extent of their capacity and opportune i and accept the
that ln the "Vision of educational and other facilities the 
considerable number of Indians who twill] remain part of the permanent
population should not be allowed to lag behind other sections of the 
people1.
In accordance with this stated principle the Union Government 
promised, inter alia, to advise the fatal Provincial Administration 
to appoint a commission of enquiry into Indian education, to consider 
6ym,itt,.ticnUy the question of improving facilities for higher education 
"t t-‘ l'"'a ; Itive College at Fort H re, ni to initiate
investigations under the Public Health Act into sani'.ry and housing
conditions in nc- round Durban. Turthomor. , the principle of equal
fOT equa" ’0rk *hich ".-Ply to all employees including Indian,
and which .-s contained in the Industrial Conciliation ct70 and the
huge A c t , , , to be strictly adhered tc. In addition, a rather vague
promis- was r I, th t .her the lav with re, rd to the -ranting of
trading licences was r-vised, the Indt, n viewpoint w-ul. be considered.
*hlr< ly, section II o the luminary of Conclui ions reasserted the 
right of entry into the Union of wives and children of Indians 
domicile-: in couth Africa (which right h d teen restricted by the 
Areas teserv non Sill> in terms of par graph 3 of the Reciprocity 
ittso-utioR of rhe Imperial Conference of 1)18, ^
In tne <. oint Communique the Union Government si ted optimistically 
been confronted will be material^ rrned by the N  reement which ha„
r'9- of Ar.-erblj lel^tef vol.8, cole. $09-10 (?1 Kebruarr 1-27)
70. Act II of 19/4.
71. Act 27 ol 1925.
72. See Ann.yure utlaclW to; 3. i'achai Intern tionnlAsnects 
O-f- . ..t, ■w'QUth c.PriC in In . ia>. .ue. / ion: i860 - U9?I) 290 ff.---
‘v  I n . -he: < between ti c two Gcvemmejits, and in order that 
the agreement may cone into operation under the most favourable 
au.pice.s and have a fair tri„l', the Union bvernnent would not 
' 1 U^I ttuvr with the Are Reservation Bill of 19P6.r:
s.rnents a-reed to watch the workings of the Agreement 
and to exchange views fromyime t, time as to any charges which
it "1' 'u  ^e '};C li ii -n Government was requested to
ai/oi ; an Agent-Ueneral in South Africa 'to secure continuous anC
 ''' " ^ ‘ L°" 1 on ; -tw.en the Uni on Government and that of India1.
eeI l’!,; ? -ie 1>r"> Agreement was a compromise in 
wMch Irdia conceded the new repatriation -c^me nd South Africa con-
ce.^  : the uplift ent provit :ons. it war ;.,liant attempt to reconcile
the opposing h.ropean and Jndi n .ttitude.- towar. c the , ,] 'tivn of the
prohlem, nd v.s a pc . cy which - in .dv net of current D.ropean
public opinion.
As f r ,s n; 'triation wr, rr erned the Cape Tow, Agreement proved 
tc be only a temporary dtimulw.t. According to Smuts some twenty years 
-■te. durin. the debate o.i the Asiatic L, nd Tenure and Indian Representa­
tion 3ii: (1946),in 'the first years the repatriation of Indians with 
financial tsi, t nee from this Jcv m, n was a succes., and then reports 
cruT.e rack from India from those *»••• .ad ret rned to their motherland 
that - rieir conditions there were far worse than here f..nd that they were 
r happier in South Africa, with the result that this effort at 
' patriot ion cam* to pr ctically a dead stop',^  Available figures' ' 
o indicate that t^re was a ehsrp decline in the number of emigrants 
especially from 193 onwardr.
In addit iont it neemed that most of those who took advantage of 
'.-.is scheme 4o return to India #eru tfeor.e poorer labourers who were 
non-competing and who were econoi: ica ly useful nd desirable to the 
Europeans. fhe tradere who w»re the mein source of friction remained.
So it can be re, v. that the I ropean's fe'-r * f competition tuid expansion 
from the In:Ians war. only momentarily etillv i.
Tile main ,,dv ntnge gained by the Indians in South Africa was the 
t-enoval of the threat posed by th n >s eservation Bill with its
73, House of A s^mbly h e U t^s vol.8. col.310 (?1 February 192?);
Joint Jomrr,unique' ; i r a .* T T
,’A. Ibid; Joint Communique >m r a . ?.
79. IR u.- e of A ? ; < bly Jrb- 4. - v l.‘b, col.416? (25 I ,rch 1946).
73. . < e A nr vx re 'C1 <tt ct < 1 her- t.,
•-v'.-ipulsory r-. g re gat ion, the r>- triction of the rights 
‘ i-i .i r. to own ,nd lease property nd the limitation of the right 
entry into the nion of I, iien wiv, ,nd childn n. In compliance 
,-itr. m e  Cepe Town Agreement, the first Agent-Genemi f India,
   .............. ~ " ^PPointed. de was responsible for introducing
certain education,! refry* and established hastri College, an I: ii;m
' e"Vtir“'I} :':'"-o o x i xr- H^irban. An educ tion 1 committee consisting of 
.ducutionel experts from India was appointed mi , sy of its recommenda- 
tions in respect of Indian education in N .tnl wen ado. ted.
nowover, t-.e expected improvement; in respect of housing conditions, 
sanitation, u'',^.ge facilities, w.ter supplier and ro,is etc. were
'* Reside tr.is, the Cane- Town Agreement had encouraged 
i0n mong ‘he :ndianf remaining in South Africa. This had the 
e::\ct of !:sUring , enre .rung the In-. Ian. for pro: ir facilities and 
amenities which could uni) be f„und in European area,. In particular, 
the Cape Town Agreement had imbued the Indian community with a feeling 
security, which in turn had -n-oura. ed Indian inv. str.-eni. mainly in 
the lie d of immovable property. The result of this combination of 
-  ctors war t^ t for mony ye.rs prcio,:inantly Diropean .rea« were 
syster -•.tically .en-trated by Indl-nL
Meanwhile, in 1952 a second round table conference was held in Cape 
Town between representatives of U  loverr. 'nt' of India ax,. South 
Ainca. he Joint Commuainue'subsequently issued indicate that the 
original Agreement of 192? wa r#. if firmed • nd, n fad, extended, in 
'hat the two Gsvernments agreed tc explore the poo: a Hi ties of a 
ccIonisation scheme for settling Indians both from India and South 
Africa in other countries.
In 1943, members of Peril rent from Natal nd the ot,-r provinces 
pro* ef ted ago ins* the large and rapt-ay increar-ini crl< on which 
immovable property wee being ecquir i by ndi nr in the , rt of 
Durban and other traditionally white a rev . These con 1 mtr, led to 
*he enactrent. of the Trading ind Occur tion of Land ran- v, al and 
fatal) he at. riot ion act of 1'43, pt ;.itl . I;, k >en • the egging ct.
77. Tee Ai.nexure *; * =«tt chi h r«t- 
Act 75 of 1943.
' 1J e't ,'hl3 Act was to prevent Europeans from concluding ngre*.
 n ‘ - "t ome of which would enable the 1 tter to
1 ' 1 ' ' .n -n the muni, ipal area of Durban or any ether
bfc s^fined in the Government Gazette. Not only would
such a ccrtract be null nd voii, but , , . .Ity of C1CC or six month.'
' ! .'isonment could be imposed on the partie a. *rll. The /emging Z.ct
' ' an ii‘terim mei.oure, lasting only for three years, 
this time it nan intruded that Parliament should review the 
situation in Natal and the Tr.-nrvao’.
‘'teCX0t 'ry of the ^ Indian Congress addressed o telegram to 
the House o: Assembly where the Bill *,% being road stating that tie 
xudians rc/arde: such reprersiv, cl-. legislation so a violation 
of the Cape Town agreement. Colonel the Hon. C.?. Ctallord, the
I'mister of Mner. retorted that the Indian community itself had under-
mine;: tne I -is of the Agrme=ent 'by going out of their woy to mehe 
these purcl; ;e, [of l„nd:, nd tn dinrrg ri the conrecuences'.^
When, - - * r three yeers, the Pegging Act lapsed, the electorate 
insisted that - more permanent solution be found to prevent Indians
.
in t-,e A si '.tic Lf-nd enure r nd Indian Representation Act'"1' being 
introduced. Vht Act ?erp6tu: ‘.ed the restriction of Indian property 
ngnts anc ro-embodied the principle of segregation and clear areas.
Indi ns were oIlowed to purchfi e 1 =nd, but only in certain prescribed 
,ir‘ K* Art a!' 9 era; ted the Indian community the franchise on a
cocmunaj basis. The franchise clauses were deigned to ; .ve the 
ii:’"'T: - "Qd the Transvaal three repreaentatives in the
A: • ^  b i.y md two in the enate. All the rspreet. titatives ware 
.uropa ii . i. In addition, in order to qualify as o voter, an Indian 
r.p'i to h-ve nap ed St ndarJ VI md h-. ! at least to earn £]20 per annum 
or own property wr rth .250 or more.
: irj '■? f - eeor- i r. an.- of the lil' in ; -.rli -, nt Sruts
11 ’ 1 f' ‘ A m-i round table Cor ‘erer.ee # arid provide nc solution
79. House of A. embly vol.46, c I. dip (i4 April 1945),
Act 2! of 1^46.
'1 • P.L A» - embly Debatea vol. .  coi . 4170-7; (?5 larch 1946).
, 1 tLj' w'vi essentially a domestic question for Parliament to solve 
" y  ^  "S«y yeors and [if] it is allceed to drift further,
1 ' f' :t’ roCKS' 'ite ma'J then come to a stage where this
question become a first cl ,as international is,ue, ard the
indention no. is to prevent it from becoming such'.^
t ^  1 • ' :8 'v,<u?'ed Just how soon the Indian question was to become
' international is,_ueand it * ,a, , erhaps. ironic that
t ^  enactment of the Asiatic Ind Te,ure and Indian Representation Act
proved to accelerate, and not at all to delay this.
reactron to th se measure in Ind,, .as si ,rp and 1=,.mediate. Ihe
......^en-meni lelc compelled to termin +e the tr de agreement between
' e tecGo-ymmenta and to recoil Kr. h.X. Deamulch, its High Commies.
‘ ' HI ricd* vhe ^dian Government concluded that a
dri6en wklch wf,e lik«lv to impair friendly relations 
between stotes, and on the 22nc June, 146, i,r A. :,s,,alw,mi
Xudaliar, leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations, wrote
..t -general, Mr. Trygve ie, requesting that the question
o: ihe treatment of Indians in the Union of Louth Africa be included in 
tne provisional agenda for the second p rt of the first session of the 
General Asse..r]y under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter. The letter 
Stated, inter alia, that passage by the Inion Government ,f the 
Asiot?c Land -enure and Indian Representation Act constituted a uni- 
lateral repudiation by the Union Government of the Cape Town Agreement 
and the Joint Comswnique'of the Louth African and Indian delegations
at. the second round table conference u } *2.
T>:e Union Government, wher informed of the contents of this letter
by Mr. Trygve Lie,promptly conveyed its intention to be present at the
*e er.bly and lodged its objection to the juried it ion of the General 
/ f, e'.’ibly on the grounds that the matter at issue was essentially witbvn 
the domestic jurisdiction of the Ur ion of ; >uth Africa in terms of 
Article r-?.- of the Charter which ■ tata that ‘[njothing contained in 
the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
r,a‘r.ers which are e.r •ent iallj within the tic if otic jurisdiction of any
Bl ' e r v‘& 1 requi- e the msmbeis tc ..ubmi t such matters to r »tt3cr exit
unofr the pi sent Charter...1.
At the 19th meeting of the General Committee on October 24, 194b,
11
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repr<’SM'taUVe °f th* "”i« of »»«. Africa nuintaiae, Hat atae. 
qUeSU°n n°t Inclanlitioralc, but Indian., domiciled
I* ^ x" unl' n o' iou;h Africa, the question, accordini to
or At7, of the Ch< rter w o  e.- jentially within the domestic juris-
action of the Union and should therefore be removed from the .sends, 
-ho General Committee failed to support the request of the Union of 
• out). Africa and at its ,6th plenary meetin, on October 21 of that year 
decided that the question should be considered jointly by the First 
tt’oiitical and Security) and hixth (legal) Committees as it .as a 
rr.-itter which concerned them both.
:'"e JOlnt Flret and a**"- Committee held a series of meetings on 
November 21. 25 , 26 , 27 . 28 r. JO, at which it diacu.-sed the election 
Of the tre/.tmcnt of the In: -  in .owth Mricn.^
(ii) Effect
(A'. Proposition ,:_%st__the United Ration, may al.-vs act .her.
°^^ a • ~ , t; cr.it arv involved ~ "
‘ treaty may be defined aa 'a written agreerent bv which two or
:r.ore State, or international organizations create or intend to create
'« relation between themselves operating within the sphere of inter­
national law'
It ha:, long been argued that any dispute involvir the interprets- 
rxcr of a treat) is, j'er_ definition^, essentially an international 
ratter and that thi, entitles the United Nations to intervene whenever 
treaty n,".To and obligations .,re involved. This claim was supported 
as early as 1922 by the Pormar-nt Court of International Justice in the 
.T- t.ior.nl j ty becreei " ' care xg fellows:
T U t  may veil hyp:on that, in a matter which ... is rot in 
principle, regulated by international law. the right of a tate 
to use its discretion is nevertheless restrict-- > by obligations 
w.'uri, it nay have undertaken towards other states and the dispute 
' e 10 th(; qu'-ot 'in whether • state >. a or has not the right to 
t ike cert i tn ciuauures becomes in the circumstances a divpute of 
an international character.'
:
■35.
84.
85.
Yearbook of the United Nations '1946-4?) 144.
A.D. McNair The 1. • v. o f Treat tea (I'kl.) 4.
n i n ana Morocco 1 '3 PCM, Series B, No. 4
Rosalyn Kir ins The Development of Twtern tional Law Through th-
Pol iiical Organs of 2he UN H W J 7 ~ o “ b-----
Was buttressed in m y o  by an Advisory Opinion of
Tr , ,. 86  ^ ' )n' Ccurt of Justice in the Interpretation of Pmnr#
' ~ 7 T ' ~  ' 'ne contention here, based on Article 2(?) of the
a tr’ ' " J, ,t ,;elf her the Court nor the General Assembly had
tC eXnrrlne the case« as ^ch an examination would con- 
-ritLrf.,r, rive or intervention in matters essentially within 
jurisdiction of Ctatec. The Court found that for the 
‘ . t , “ Ul; clarification of a legal nature regarding the
Procedure dealing with the settlement of disputes 
' ^^ tn t r in the treaties concerned, "(tjhe interpretation of the
treaty ... could not be considered as a question essentiallv 
..thin the domestic jurisdiction of a State. It is a question of inter-
la, which, by its very nature, lies within the competence of 
the Court1.
his rule has been accepted by many statesmen. Among those who 
averted it was ield-Kar-al Smuts himself, who, while addressing the
."neral Assembly ^ ^ ^ " b e r  1946, stated without hesitation that 
'« t.MN exccoti n to the domestic rule is, of course, to be found in
t“ '  ^ ' ’ although he went on to deny emphatically that
the Cape Town Agreement constituted a for,. ,1 trerty in any way.
nowever, ecme States hove argued f. t any ratter which is 
ecsertiall/ within the domestic jurisdiction ox a St at a will remain 
^o despit.' its being the object of treaty obligations. Some support 
for tms claim is to be found in the fsct that Article 2(7) refers to 
matters which are 'essentially' rather tl m  'exclusively' or 'solely' 
within the dom-stic jurisdiction of a state. It runs: '(n)othing 
contained ia the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations 
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
juriaJiction of any ;t«te*. The >ord 'essentially' prompted Judge 
Krylov in M s  dissenting opinion in the interpretation of Peace Treaties 
CB£:e t0 6tate th',t he wording of this text contemplates that the 
case might come within the domestic jurisdiction of the State, despite
.Romania (majority judgmoTt) 1 Hi icj he ports 70-717 ----
87. )' ' Smu; ■' btotement in he ply on t. e Legal Aspects of the Case:
ilLHlcyjal- Documents ing to Con&ider it ion by the United Nations
il2i£.rli7 Mly of the h>;)n>.--ent , lions the Goverrrnent of India' 
cn ti.e Tre-tmer.t of Indians in the M_.,,n_-f . oUth~"Africa liq'4?) —
To ff; CTS7l.Fincham Dome O ic .'urii-dlction (1946) 12r>.
 Ct "" lt 2t ‘U'P been de It with in ft treaty. Liven in that case
’ v 8111J -emi-^ n essentially within the dumeatic jurisdiction^
V'enL on to accvse the iermanent Court in the Nationality
- •*-c 1 uemg the chiei means of implanting the false opinion
lt qUeKtl0n is regulated by a treaty it ceases to be a matter
rely ,o ,t . i jurisdiction and of transforming this opinion into 
a legal assumption.
"in 1 "V V ":n one of - he representatives to the General Assembly, 
"hile discussing the Franco-Tunlslan question in 1952, blamed the
f;:lacy of the argument that the mere existence of a treaty between
France end Tunisia placed the Franco-Tuniaian dispute beyond the ecope
c: Article 2(?) or the assignment to the word 'essentially' the same
rtn.i.r.,. L tsolely' . He pointed out that the attempt by the
Belgian representative to replace the word 'essentially? by '-^el-
nt the Jan^/rancisco Conference in 1945 w.,s rejected by a substantial
^  - this rejection clenrly indicated the 
genera, desire to limit the competence of the United Nations.9-5 This 
ncccms with the view of Judge Krylov9 ' to the effect that stress was 
laid at ,an Francisco on tne fact that a broader concept o, the 
cc'iir-ot ic jurisdiction of the State was primarily necessary for the
&F, :oi lyn Higgins og.clt. 85 claims that the Union of South Africa 
m-.~e r;ucw an asr.jr" ion vis-n-vis the Cape Town Agreement and the 
treatment of its Indian nationals. The oresent writer, however, 
contends tl. t the Union had alwaye claimed that the matter was 
purely dorertlc for various reasons but had just os consistent!v 
denied that the Agreement constituted a formal treaty.
■
(dissenting opinion of Jucge^Krylov) 195C' ICJ Keports 1 1 2 ,
9G. Ibid.
United 1 .it ions G^CK ,’tn sees., let ettee, 545th mtg., pr.ra. 29.
There were six votes in favour of the substitution and twenty- 
eight votes against it.
93- See, too, in this remrd ? ,S. Raj an United Nations and 
-^•r : tic Jurisdictii . (1955) 2 5 2 . "
94. Ibi .. li?.
91.
92.
I.
ectlJJ‘ °* - Her Sti-tes. C.B.H. Fincham/' ' in considering the effects
-JD :.,tion by the sponsoring powers of the word 'essentially1
1 been used in *:he Dumbarton Oaks text,
wrote:
?' v '"' sponsoring governments felt that the word
nr'^ t lenu 3 c :e3 r too readily to • restrictive inter-
^retation, :,ince no do cstic dispute of any im.,ort'nc* is
^  M0Ut rei)crcursione in the outside world. The tens 
r ■1 ‘ " supposed to } »ve a somewhat wider connotation....
u domestic jurisdiction is continually
■. King at tates igrco, formally or informally, to handle 
more ana ,s, re of tNii sfiairs in concert"/^ Ao*rt fro^ t^e 
j.* ;-iat. the WOrd ’'ei-B€ntiaUy,,has a somewhat more liberal 
’ 3' 3-E difficult to see how its use can change the
** applied. [It must be Recognized 
■m>_ tae sphere of domestic jurisdiction ends at the point 
•vh-ru treaties and international conventions begin; and it is 
^  ' '' "* e dividing line *ith which we are concerned ic not
tne tenuou,- boundary- between, "essentially" and "solely" but
..e i ine bt tween mutters of domestic jurisdiction on the one 
' as ', matters regulated by international law on the other.'
He concluded that the Change of wording was purely verbal and devoid 
ci legal Eignilicence and could therefore play no part in the delimita­
tion of the sphere of competence of the tinted Nations and its vembers, 
as here only legal criteria must be used, n laid down in the 
rationality decrees case. IVhile « freeing that legal criteria Aune must 
be used to decide what matters fall under tae heading 'domestic juris­
diction ' and what r:ntters the United Nations is competent to deal with, 
the present writer submits that the actual wording of Article 2(7) of
the Charter i. a leg 1 criterion and cannot simply be dismissed as mere
confneed ver'iafe. Had the word 'solely' been caed instead of the word 
'essentially' the jurisdiction of the Un ted Nations would have been so 
widened that it would have bey. difficult to find any treaty that could.
qO
not be submitted to it. There i weipht n the argument that, in the 
light of the specific prohibition contained in the opening words of 
Article 2(7), if matter were <* sentially within the domestic juris- 
licticn of a r vte there cculd be no intervention in it at all by the 
General Assembly.
95* C.B.H. Finch,', m Dorn - r tic J u t i 8 diction (1943) lOOff. 
% .  Ibid. 10?.
97. Ibid.
98. GAOR ?th sess, 1st cttee, $4^th mtg, p ra. 29.
becn argued that owing to the pacta tertiis nee nocent
- 1 ’ U " -are f-.ct that e treaty exists cannot provide the
1,1 ‘'L jurisdiction over a matter which is otherwise domestic,
"f"e Ul  ^ exist only between the States that are party to
,in < ^  vis-a-vis third parties. This theory, for example,
tr.e Dae is of the argument advanceu by vne Czeshos, ovanian
re^re^er.to tive to u.e Jc-neral Assembly in the Interpretation of Peace 
Treaties case, who said :
^  *rf ^  tl !t the United Nations General Assemble can
t. r ,, , T " u‘ '1y 1 3 1 8 6 because everybody knows that the peace 
' * *• w' re concluded between the governments of each
. ‘ ' ‘ re han,), and the countries which were at war
+ t ;Iun"ary and Romania cn the other. The parties
gv the reaties, then, are Bulgaria Hungary and Romania on the
an':, the for:-l-r vne.iies of those three countries on the 
ot..-r. tne Lnited Natiom, is not a party to those treaties and
: J ■ no ri6 ht Whatsoever to tike up matters concerning their
implementation-'
The i olit . 'legation also used this argument to oppose a draft 
iv.ro: jtion colling or the Inten. itional Court of Just.ce for an advisory 
opinion on this matter. It stated" :
'The rc.ee treaties were binding orly on the signatories and no 
rights ecu. : be oeduced from them in favour of third artiee.
States Which h id nothing to do with the treaties could not be 
permitted to decide who was to interpret them and in what 
manner the interpret tion should be made.'
Rcsalyn Higgins very el 11 fully j Ties the plea that vis-a-vis the
nited Nations tr.e treaty is r. - : ‘ cr ilicc actr and therefore the
' nited nations r, y not discuss the interpretation of the treaty pro-
*' - ' jns. .-he .';"”.its that tug Jnited Nations cannot claim, rights or
obligations under the treaty because it is net a party to the treaty,
but adds
'If the a rig rent means nothing more t' an this, it is correct.
But this in not the rime thing as denying to one party of a 
treaty the possibility of guidance on ;tt interpretation by an 
intern itional orgjfi, even if the organ is a political, rather
99. GAIK 9th sees, plen, ,903rd mtg, para. 126.
1. GACI< 4th sees, Ad Hoc Pol Cttee, 13th mtg, para. 20.
It the subject matter of the treaty is organic in nature, that is,
it it cf national rather than international interest, if it affects
tne internal policy and laws of a country alone and if it deals with
Gi interest to a third party, it is arguable that such a treaty
will fall essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State and
that consequently the United Nations t..ay not intervene at all.'' The
most popular ey •male cf such a trc ty is the protectorate treaty. So,
for example, during the discussions of the ! oroccan and Tunisian
questions in the General Assembly, the Belgian representative denied
that the .reaty of ez, 1912, by which it was agreed that . orocco1 s
externa] r - ■ t ions would be govern*; d exclusively by France, could serve
to remove the question from the letter’s domestic jurisdiction. He said**
'The contractual provi ions governing relations between orocco 
and France were organic in a ture and directly affected the 
constitutional system of the parties ... and the functioning of 
their government. bach matters were essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction and the United Nations could not inter­
vene in them. The fact that tl -re organic relations were 
governed by treaties ... in no way affected their nature ...
[and? did not make intervention lawful.1
The Belgian representative not* 1 that the position in this, regard would
have \ een different under the Leagr- of ’ at ion", because Article 15 of
the Covenant of the League h i  established the criterion of the League's
exclusive jurisdiction and it followed that an exception based on
domestic jurisdiction woula not have been valid where the matter had
been the subject of a treaty. However, the corresponding Article 2(7)
of the Chorter of the United 1 atiom hnd established the new criterion
that domestic jurisdiction w* "• fundamental.
If. it po ssible to argue t; at the subject-matter of the Gape Town
Agreement was organic in nature? It seems not, as the Agreement dealt
not only with the treatment of Indians in the Union itself tut their
   _ _ _ _      .
3- Rosalyn Hi -ins ibid. notes. ' t i th subject-matter of the treaty 
deals with matters within the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
under th* term • of t;.< cl ter. fo. ex -.upIt, human rights, the United 
Nations is entitled to consider th setter on this ground alone. The 
question of human rights is, however, a distinct legal issue and will 
not be further dealt with here.
4. GACK '■ th sese, 1st cttee, 630th ntg, ara. 40.
repatriation to India ae well. These m asurer involved not only South 
African nationals hut alr.o Ii lian rv-tioi a la and necessitated action 
beinc taken not only by the Union Government in .iouth Africa but also 
by the Government of India on Indian territory.
In this regard, S.L. Polak. ' writing ir. 1927, that ie, before the
Cape Town Agreement was concluded, cor. ‘ ended that matters especially or
differentially affecting Asiatics could "at be considered as the
internal and domestic affairs of douth Africa alone.
'The very fact that they have been constantly discussed at the 
Inperi 1 Conferences ... .should iii >06- of such a contention.
From the moment that the interests of sections of the population, 
denied south African citizenship and deriving origin ... from 
another important part of the British Commonwealth ... are 
threatened, i sues arise far tr ascending in importance the 
domestic concern of South Africa. Questions of high policy 
affecting intra-imperial end for ign relations are involved.*
Finally, it may be noted that the validity and effect of an inter­
national agreement are not matter., vitally important to the question 
of competence before an international court. This allowed the 
Permanent Court in the Nationality Decrees  ^ case to indicate that 
investigations will not go beyond the point necessary to establish 
that an agreement exists.
Co it seems tt it the United N Hons in most instances will be able 
to act where treaty rights and obligations are involved; therefore, if 
the Cape Town Agree ent can be considered t : be a treaty, the United 
Nations acted perfectly legeuly and within its rights by claiming that 
the Agreement fell within its constitutional powers.
(B) Proposition : That the C-pe Town Agreement is a Treaty 
(a) The element of Intention as a Requirement for a Treaty
Cne of the first ooints to note is that not every agreement ccn-
7
eluded between Stater is neccst urily a treaty. Schwartzerberger lists 
among the essential requirements of a treaty the fo"lowing: the parties
intended to act under international low, and they intended to create
5. S.L. Polak ’The South African Indian Problem - a Constitutional
Point1 (192. ) 2. Inij .n Review 579 at 5-3-
6. Nationality Decrees m  T; ajn -e d Kov .:-o 19-5 P - - ries B.No. u,. 4.
7. G. Schwartz*;aber#- er nunl of International Low 5 ed. (19&7) 151.
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international obligations. These requirements, he believes, enable us 
to distinguish treaties from other agreements which a State may m- ke 
with an object of international law and, more to the point, distinguish 
treaties from a mere 'gentlemen1s agreement' by which it is intended to 
create moral obligations only.
This element of intention has been emphasized by other writers as
p
well. For example, D.P. C'Cornell write- th t "the name given to the 
instrument is immaterial provided ... their agreement is intended to 
create rights m d  obli tions or to establish relationships governed by 
international law'.
o
In similar fashion .J. Devine' poses the questions Do the parties 
intend to create Internationa- 1 ;w oblig tions Do they intend their 
government to be regulated by international law? 1
General Smuts, addressing the Joint First (Politic. 1 and Security) 
and Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United Nations on 21 November 1946^  
contended that the Union Government 'at all stages and at all times' 
made it perfectly clear that the C uie Town Agreement of 192? and the 
Joint Communique'issued bj the second conference of the representatives 
of the South African and Indian Governments in 1952 renewing that Agree­
ment 'were not, in any sense, instruments giving rise to treaty obliga­
tion! . 'hat the respective Governments set out to do at the Conference, 
which resulte d in these instruments, w-.s not to enter into any treaty, 
but merely to formulate mutually acceptable policies to be carried out 
voluntarily in friendly co-operation towards a solution of a problem 
essentially within the domestic domain of the Union, but in which the 
Government of India claimed to ! tve interests and responsibility. It 
war. no more than wlrV. is known as a gentlemen’s agreement with no 
legally bindi .g force in international 1 w.'
Smute'r views, at least at first glance, do seem to reflect the 
attitude of .he South African Government both in its actions in South 
Africa and at the United Nations. On Monday 21 February 1927 the 
Minister of the Interior, Dr. D.F. n, presented the Cape Town
8. P.P. C 'Connell Tnte? ? a - ,i cn',1 Law ed. (1970) 1 1°5«
9. D.J. Devine 'Does South Africa riecognize Khodeiicn Indeper ence?' 
(1969) 36 Couth African ' » Jcmnal l-'}& t ;59•
10. GACP 1st ness, Pt.ll, Jt.Cttee, 5-
* 11
Agreement to the house of Assembly. During the ensuing discussion 
he stated that
1[i]t will also be ofcviou, that the agreement which has been 
reached is more in the nature of an honourable and friendly 
understanding than of i rigid o.-a oind; i. treaty ... [ and 
thetw the Union Government have not ... surrendered their freedom 
to deal legislatively with the Indian problem whenever and in 
whatever way they may deem necessary and just. Uor, on the 
other hand, have the Government of India bound themselves 
either permanently or for any limited period, to co-operate 
with us in the practical solution of our problem in the manner 
agreed upon.1
Dr. l-’alan, during the Second loading of the Trading and Occupation 
of Land (Transvaal and Natal) hr strict: on Bill i;. April 19^?,1 *' 
maintained that Vis attitude as m rife ted in the correspondence that 
took place between himself and the Indian Government irior to the con­
clusion of the Gape Town Agreement 11 v cor ;tartly been that a solution
of the Indian ’ roblem is a matter for outh Africa and for South Africa
only'.
Furthermore, General Smuts in 19^6, in discussing the Asiatic Land
13Tenure and Indian Representations Bill, ' e- hasized that the matter was 
and always h .:: been a domestic matter and th. t the Gape Town Agreement
amounted to nothin more than an ?• ccc tance by the Union Government of
a proposal r.; .e by the Indian Government, which reposal had proved to 
be merely a temporary solution.
At the forty-third meeting of the Qener 1 Committee held in I ris 
on 22 September 1948* the representative of the Union of South Africa,
Vr. L.K. Lovw, rtaffirmed the position of his Government which adjudged
14
the matter tc be one of purely domestic concern and jurisdiction. :e 
pointed out that this was the third successive year in which the Indian 
Government wa seeking United Nations intervention in regard to the 
legislation affecting South African nntieiialc who were of Indian racial 
origin and th:t on both the former occasior the South African delegation 
had prote* ted that this was an essf iitially dor et tic matter falling within 
the ambit of Article 2(7) of the Charter.
11. house of . i cmhVy Debates vol.8, coif. 910-11 (21 February 1927'.
12 . House of Asse .bl.y Debater vol.46* col . 4)0 (14 April 19^3).
1). House of a a: bly Debater vol. >6, col. 4172 (25 Larch 1946).
14. Yearbook of the Uni tec1 t ions (5. 41 -41) 304,
lr)
ra.jan adds that on other occasions the representatives of the
tnirn Government had expressed similar views, the Agreement and the
Joint Communique having been variously termed 'declarations of policy',
'an honourable and amic ble underst- nding1 and 'an arrangement’.
><hat, then, was the attitude of the Indian Government towards the
oouth African 1 In if -i question* in general and the Cape Town Agreement
1A
in particular' General Smuts maintained in 194? that the Indian
government had uways acknowledged the fact that the Agreement was only
a gentlemen's igreen.ent with no legally binding force in international
law, not only at the conferences in 192? and 1932 but at all times
thereafter s wei 1. Furthermore, in rely to an a rgur.ent advanced by
the ■ ndian represent utive it the United -' lions, it was also pointed 
1?
’.;t tV t unti : the question of ti. treats >>nt of .Mouth African Indians
was brought before the United Nations in 1944 the Government of India
itself had not recognized the alleged solemnity of the Agreeti-.-iC and
the Joint Communique and that at no stage before this had India eve:
1 P
claimed that this Agreement had the force of a treaty obligation.
However, urir.g discussions by the First Committee in May 1949' ^  
the representative of India referred tc the Crpe Town Agree: ent and the 
Joint Communique of 1932 es fora contracts and agr-. erents, which, he 
said, showed conclusively that the issue did not fall within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the Union of outh Africa.
It is also interesting to examine the historical background to the 
Agreement, for evidence of tV intention of the parties. It seems clear 
that both the Indian Government a the Imperial Government interested 
tlemselvee at a very early stage in the question of the treatment of 
Indians in South Africa. It will be remembered that the very system 
o r indentured labour it'- lf was not initiated by the Natal legislative 
Council actin. alone; it needed, in addition, the bleosing of the 
Indian and Imperial Governments. Even before the turn of the 
twent eth century the Indian Governront and the Commit doner of Land
15. F.S. Rajan o£.cit. 248n.3*
16. GAf H 1st sees, Pt.Il, Jt Cttee, 3.
1?. M.S. I..-tj.-n op.ext. 248; GAOR th s m e , Ad Hoc Pol.Cttee 104.
18. Y r t  00k o r 1 he Uni' t .i f '-t 1 on; (194? -49) 30?.
19. Ibid. 306-7.
and rj.-iifration in London had temporarily halted the migration of
i.niia’i - ••bourert: to Natal because of the poor facilities found thvre
ar-d t. !.e abuse; hn -.tised there. The Imperial Government both before
and e.tf-r Union had consi. teatly he >dea Indian pi--as to exert
-Lplonv tic pressure on Louth Africa in respect of its treatment of 
Asians.
-he problem of the discriminatory treatment of people of Indian 
1 riUin nad also been the subject of discussion at the Imperial Confer- 
e.icts of 1 )1 , .! ' . 1924 ant 1926c ' as well as at the rime Ministers'
Coherences in the early i }c 1 *s.4 It is arguable that the very fact 
that these matter; espec: ally affecting Asians had been discussed 
constantly n: these conferences should dispose of the contention that 
they were the domestic and internal affair of South Africa alone/'2
pi,
rol k contended .t urther that the Indian ' nd Imperial Governments not
only had a right to intervene, but a duty to do so. He added:
'From the moment that the interests of sections of the 
population, denied South African citizenship and deriving 
or- in ... from another important psrt of the British Common- 
»*hu th ... ;■ re threatened ... the atter must be diplomatically 
represented to the Dominion Goverr.rrent ... upon the direct 
initiative of the j-olonial Office itself. The fact that India, 
unie- leat year's1- Imperial Conference resolution has now 
direct relations with South Africa, cannot exonerate Hie 
Majesty1 Government from the duty of friendly intervention 
when duly appealed to ... India has an absolute right to call 
to her aid Great Britain and all the other Dominions that 
participated in the (I nference.1
The Indian representative to the United Nations in 1946 claim 
that the fact that negotiations had taken place between the Indian, 
[Imperial] and South African Governments over many years and that 
agreements had been signed by them proved beyond doubt that the question 
of the treatment of the Indians in South /frica had never been solely 
one of domestic jurisdiction. ie explained that he did not thereby 
me<n to imply that India (and Great Britain] enjoyed a special authority
20. GAC , 8th sess, Ad Hoc V'ol Cttee, 90-91.
21. House of A:q- n.bly Dcd.ritt-a vol.46, coin. 5410-11 (14 April 194)).
22. o.L. Folak op.cit. 58).
2). S.L. Hoi ibid. 58>4.
24. 1923.
25. GAGk 8th 6666, Ad Hoc Pol Cttee, 99-100.
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viy-a -vis people of Indian on "in in South Africa, ;,s 1 that would 
pat• ntly he ar infringement of the Union Government's sovereignty over 
.tt i nationnlo' , But it did not follow that the South African Govern- 
merit could adopt the attitude that it and it alone could resolve the 
problem without reference to any other party*
t doe?; appear that the attitude of the South African Government 
towards the question of the treatment of Allans in South Africa has 
oeen ambiguous. On the one hand, the Government has coneif tently 
stated thit the matter is internal and domestic and there'ore solely 
it. concern. Cn the other ham , it had always willingly entered into 
negotiations with both the Imperial and India: Governments and had 
accepted their advice on many occasions without de-ming it t: be an 
ij unwarranted interference in South African domestic affaire. It is open
to argument whether t: is patt.err of behaviour of the pr ;t had in fact 
created a norm for the future.
■
Finally, it remains to examine the attitude adopted by the United 
Nations to the question whether the Cnpe Town Agreement amounted to an 
international treaty or not. In June 1146 the Indian Government brought 
"1 he attei tion of the United ff tions the problem of the racial dis-
crimination to which South African national•* of Indian origin were 
subjected by the Union Government and requested the General Assembly 
to consider t: is prcblem. Tht .oint (Political and Legal) Committee
a. ved n dr • ‘t French-K •xicar re. luticr. which . tnfced that the trest-
'"t
mant of Indians in, the Union should con I >rm to the international obliga­
tions under tha agr<-ei snts concluded between the- two Governments and 
a ’ f d the t-*- Governments to report to the next, session of the General
i*Ji
Astiembl;, on f men*urc% t'-ket. to th t efxect• C-*n 8 December 19^6$
after full c nsider-'tion of tho - otter and nrolcnped deliberations, the
'7
General / 51 e L-l v adopted the following resolution by thirty-two votes 
r'-i to fifteen* with seven abetentiensi
1 The d.'tipr-'l Assembly,
Having tf :en note of the application made by the Government of 
India regarding the treatment of Indians in the Union of South 
Africa, nd L-ving con- dereti the % tter:
1. . tr-.ti that, b c# tcv of that fre treat, friendly relations
between the two Meuber St ten hr.v« been impaired, and unless 
IJi .1 s atisfactory nett lei .ent is re ched, these re] - it ions are
likely to be further impaired;
n ___________________________
26. Ibid. 106.
27. 44(1).
n
1,:i of the opinion Ihnt the treatment of Indians in the 
’ion should be in conformity *ith the international obiifa-
ticne under the agreements concluded between the two Govern­
ments and the relevant provisions of the Charter;
Therefore requests the two Governments to report at the
next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted 
to this effect.' 2f
This resolution amounts to clear support by the General Assembly
(f '-he in tv mat ions ’ status of the Cape Town Agreement. Pursuant to
par? graph of the resolution, reports were submitted by both Govern- 
ments for con; iderat ion by the second session of the General Assembly. 
These reports were first referred to the Political and Security Committee 
of the General Assembly, which, on 1? November 19<+7, adopted a draft
resolution by twenty-nine vites to fifteen with five abstentions
reaffirming resolution Mt(l) of 8 December 19^, requesting the two 
Governments to enter into another round V ble conference on the basis 
of that resolution and to report back to the Secretary-General of the 
united Nations on the result of the discussions. Although this draft 
resolution received a substantial mea.-nre of support/ it failed to be 
formally adopted because of a ruling that its adoption required a two- 
thirdi: majority. .he net renu t of the deliber? ti me on this question
during the second see.uion of the General Assembly was that this body
failed to make any further recommendations on the subject. Nevertheless, 
it c m  be seer that the United Nations clearly regarded the Agreement 
ee international in nature, entitling that body to intervene. This 
attitude is borne out by resolution 26$ (III), adopted by the General 
Assembly at it 2i2th plenary meeting on U  Hay 19^9, which invited 
the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa ' to 
enter into discussions at a round-table conference on the treatment of 
people of Indian origin in South Africa.
' • Yearbook of ti c I'n ,V ♦ : :a: (1946- 148.
29- Thirty one votes to sixteen with cix abstentions.
30. letter from the Indian At iresentative, v.V. Pilley to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 12 July 1948, 
requesting further consideration by the General As-e-nhly of the 
treatment of Indians in South Africa; N . Hansergh Document  and 
Speeches cn Britiah Commorwealth Affairs (1931-52) (l<)( >) i l 90^ ff.
31. Forty-seven \ •’ ; to one, with one at -tention.
32. Yearbock of the United Nation;; (1948-49) 340.
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Tne Element of Registration f u « Requirement for a Treaty
Article 1 r of the Covenant of the 1 opue of i.xtiono read as follows:
1 'Ivery treaty or international enp-afement entered into hereafter
by any Member of the L ague of Nations shall be forthwith
registered with the Secretariat and obeli as soon ao possible 
be published by it. be such treaty or international engagement 
shall be binding unless r»o registered. 1
one of the .-oath African representatives tc the United Nations in
19‘H contended that, because the Cope Town Agreement was ’merely a state­
ment of good intention1 which had never been signed or registered or. a 
treaty with the Learue of Nations Secretariat, it was not to be regarded 
as a treaty with legally binding consequences in international law."'" It 
is true th.-.t neither the 1927 Agreement nor its successor of 1932 had 
been registered with this body. iv d they in fact been registered, this 
would have proved une juivee illy that the South African Government regarded 
them as binding treaties. However, the failure of the parties to 
register is net neccfisar-.ly conclusive evidence to the contrary.
Although there existed some doubt us to the effect that a failure to 
register would h vt on a treaty, very little lirht was thrown upon the
meaning of Article lr of the Coven- ct of the League by any international
35tribunal. Ar. Lord McNair* pointed out,
’(e) xperivnce showed that this language was too extensive; 
literally construed it would me; n that ... every time two btatec 
reached an accord by means of diplomatic correspondence, for 
inf.v wee, to give facilities in certain territory for a 
scientific mission, to grant vis a "or certain persons attending 
a conference or to percr.i : a ‘’round-the-world" flight, the 
diplomatic correi jondence < dying the agreement ought to be 
re, it tered. ’
As a result, thr United Kingdom Government find other Governments, in 
practice, placed certain limitations on the language of Article 18. So 
it became customary to register only written treaties or international 
engagements; oral engagements such at the Non-Aggre: f^ ion Pact entered 
into by means of r-cken declarations at the Geneva Conference in April 
and Kay 1922, were not registered.
The Union of South Africa contended that, ac the mandate for South- 
West Africa had not been registered with the league of Nations Secretariat ,
33. K.S. o; .cit. 248.
34. J.L. Briefly Thu Law of l.atioiu 6 ed (lQ6.3) 3 4.
35. McNair eg.cit. l8l.
*L Vi " “v - ^indinr in Internationa' low. The International Court
..'n.eve-, staged that as one of the main pttrpocefi cf Article 18 was to
1 '"l -1 icitnt publicity % ,s riven to an international engagement
ad pi- : icily in this instance had been achieved by other means, that is,
1; put licet:on through dengue documents, the mandate was binding on the 
mandatory.
The Cape Town Agreement and the Joint Communique of 1932 were 
v -i ""inly not :orm..!, signed instruments. They were simply engagements 
embodied in identical statements made by the ministers responsible in 
the union rouse of Assembly and the Delhi Legislative A s s e m b l y . They 
i4v 1 e ®ssentja iy oral in nature. Using ti. above guideline, it would 
se,--rr to have been ar extra-ordinary measure *o hove registered these 
Agieemeiitt., rather than the reveret . V«hen the Qener 1 Assembly passed 
resolution 44(1j on • December 3446 it simply assumed that the oez 
existence or the la/ o Town Agreement "ad Joint Co.mtunique' wat- uf ficient 
to remove the dispute from the domestic jurisdiction of the Union of 
be th ,->fr' ca. It iid no Attention whatsoever to the fact that the Agree-
-lents had never beer registered with the League -f N: tions.
%o
Rosalyn Higgins adds that although, at first glance, this practice 
of non-reg-istr ticn oeess to run counter to Article 102(2) of the Charter
of the United Nations (which corresponds < stantially to Article 18 of
the Covenant),
'it is at le st arguable t! it the ter. "invoke" means to invoke 
for the purposes of claiming rights or obligations under the 
treaty; it aoes not necessarily mean that the unregistered
agreem at ray not be cited tf re the United Nations as
evidence of the international nature of the dispute.'
Surely - similar ar.<;ur.e:.t could be applied to the wording of Article 18
zq
of the Covenant of the Itugue. Lord chair, however, endorses the
goner'1 rule that
'in view of the language of Article 18 it is difficult to 
escape the view that non-registration was a fatal defect end 
affected the essential validity of the treaty; and that 
memb’-ve of the League having for the period of their member­
ship ttac1ed thie condition to their ability to enter into 
binding international agreements with other members, the engage­
ment remained incomplete until that condition was satisfied.'
"•*>6. South 'Arst Ifr.i cr. Jano; (Preliminary Objections) 1962 ICJ Rep'.te
3?. House of Assembly Lebatet vol.8 , cole, 308-9 (21 February 1927)
38. Rosalyn Higgins .cit7 86-7.
39. McNair on.cit. 1 8 3 .
. c:.air claims further that it w:i.. the sub tance of these intemat-
i'1: agreements which determined their relationship to Article 18 of the
Covenant. ne fo"lowing three categories of agreement did not fall
wi .],;n its scope: first, agreements between the Allied Governments in
re. pect o.‘ the settle ent of claims and counter-claims for goods supplied
and .or services rendered during the First iorld <ar; secondly, agreements
reciting to loans and other financial transactions between governments;
and thirdly, agreements of a purely commercial nature such as sales or the
b.!.rter of coal tor coffee. Clearly, the Cape Town Agreement does not fall
wit!in the scone oi these exempted types of international agreements, and,
had it been ,vrj tten rather than oral in fern, non-registration would
prol'bly h; vc been regarded as a f t.il defect, affecting the validity of 
this ‘treaty 1.
(c) fhe Inter . e ^octrine 
fhe inter-.;e ' ;ctrine constitute 1 another important exception to L. 
rule requiring treaties to be registered. This doctrine, strictly applied, 
asserted that t:os e relations between countries of the Commonwealth which, 
h: d they subsisted oetween any of them and foreign countries, or between
foreign countries per se, .ould have been reg rded as internnfic .al relat-
41ons, governed by international law, were not international relations 
and were not governed by interactional law. It followed that Article 18 
applied only to treaties and engagements which were 'international* and 
that therefore it did not apply to engagements, under whatever name, 
entered into between the different self-governing members of the British 
Empire inter rc. Thi doctrine was derived from the traditional consti­
tution'll. princ It of the unity anc indivisibility of the Crown and the 
common allegi nee owed to i< by its subjects in the Commonwealth. Although 
it was imed at securing the political unity of the Commonwealth in its 
international relations, it ws. basically only n constitutional convention, 
which woulo be nd which, in the course of time, was, in fact, altered.
had the Cape To.vr. Agreement b-en concluded earlier, that is to say, 
before 1921, when the inter se doctrine was in its hey-day, there is 
little doubt that the doctrine would h vc been strictly applied, which 
would h. ve me nt t> it the Agree:: ant would net have been regarded as inter­
national in n ture or justiciable tv the Permanent Court of International
40. Ibid. l8l.
4 i. J . E . i  . F ivcett Tht brit i: h Cr ,-cnwe.''l:h in International La?' (I.963) 
144.
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wu. 1 ice, ai:;i registration under Article l8 of the Coven nt of the League 
vnu 1 rot h'ive or-on the usual practice or at all necessary,
1Ue traditional view of the United Kir dom Govemo nt was that 
article 18 applied only to treaties and er *ag« nents which were international 
in c racter and not to those, under whatever name, ent red into between 
the different self-governing members of the British Empire. It did not 
regard mutual relations between the Commonwealth countries ae inter- 
mi tonal re 1 avlore. The Government * view of this is ue was expressed in 
R dispatch to the Gecretary-Generil of the League dated 27 November 1924. 
This dispatch followed on the dispute between the Irish Free State and 
the United Kingdom over the character and effect of the /rticleo of Agree- 
rr.ent for a ,reaty between 3re i Britain and Ireland -igned by the British 
and Irish lel-,rates on 6 i.ece"ber 1921. The Irish Free State Govern­
ments challenged the principle that the possibility of international 
relations between the Dominions and the United Kingdom v. is precluded by 
the doctrine of f e unity of the Crown, by caking the initiative is 
January 924 to register the fr- ty with the League of Nations Secretariat 
under Article 18. The ".cited Kingdom Government immediately lodged a note 
of protest with the Secretary-General, stating’" that
1(6 irce the Covenant of the league of Nations came into force,
His " jjesiy*s Government have consistently taken the view that 
neit: er it nor any convention concluded under the auspices of the 
Le gue .re intended to govern the relations inter r:e of the 
various p rtf of the British Commonwealth, his Majesty's Govern­
ment cor. idem, therefore, that the terms of Article 18 of the 
C©venant, are not applicable to the Articles of Agreement of 
D-.ce,- .or 6, 1921.'
However, t < Irish Free ■tate Government remained firm in its stand,
44
writing to the iecretary-General that
'(t)he obligations contained in Article 18 are ... imposed 
in the tro t specific terms on every member of the League; we 
are unable to accept the contention that the clear and 
unequivocal language of that Article is susceptible to any 
interpret, tion compatible with the limitation which the British 
Government now seeks to read into it.'
45Fawcett " describe* this ie the first successful challenge to the 
inter se doctrine and notes that the Irish Free ! tate went on to register
I
42. Ibid. 194.
4 . Ibid. 199; h.Y. Jei ‘ting. 'The Comr mwealtl r.nd International Law' 
(1953; ;(I Bnti: h Y- . f International Uiw 320 at 332.
44. Fawcett o£>.cit. 135.
45. Ibid. 154-5.
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. Virement,ry Agreement of December 192$ with the League Secretariat, 
wUch, in accordance with itr urual practice, permitted registration 
:ut *';lch did not undertake to settle the dispute), 
y*"’' 'Lmperial Conference expressed no direct opinion on this 
tter U1 6-ration, but the principle was noted there that agreements 
lo wmch two or more members of the Cor.zonwealth were p rties were not
‘ t"L‘ ^ t*t'er- them without express urovision, and this implied that
w''re not registrable bt between members of the Common- 
w, .th. It was also mentions at trie conference* that the making of
" v' !& •' J,6I‘e": °y or on be!‘If of any or all of the Govern-
ments of the Lipire) in the - of the .in, ,s the symbol of the
special relationship between the different parts of the aspire would 
1 ■ —  -a tne inclusion of any provision that its terms must 
net be reg.rded as regulating intense the rights and obligations of 
the various territories. Tie report added that the question was 
discussed at the Anns Traffic Conference in 192!,, where the Legal 
Committee of that conference laid down that the se principle
unneriiee all international cc nventione.
■LS -^nst: tutional convention had been considerably weakened 
through tie practice of Commonwealth States. An examination of the Index 
tc the League of :.'ations treaty Series," which includes the list of 
registered trratie, approxicately fro 19.1 to 19)2, shows that every 
Cocvxinw ,1th country r. gi.tered trc ties with the i.e»gue lecretariat. 
Caxada registered thirty nine; Australia seventeen; hew Zealand 
eighteen; India twenty nine; rnd the Union of South Africa twenty one. 
m  nur.ber of these treaties where either the British Empire"' or 
Cre t Britair w s -i con' me. ing party another Commonwealth country 
was one of t’re other con racting parties. That is, the separc,« 
sign Lure, c; individual lomonwealth countries appeared in the treaties 
in addition to t si nature of the British Empire or Great Britain.
F-.*cott" entions never, other contradictory instances. For example, 
•the London .val Treaty was expres. cd to be a Tre, by for the Limitation
46• 1926 “riR2 Conference - Summary of Procs and Appends
cmd. 27' - f 2j; P.. Y. Jennings qp.cit. .
• - > -r.o«x to . ague cf . it ion, Tre t; Series, vols. 4 S B  (treaties 
10C1-2CX Q) and vols. 39-130 (treaties 2001-3000).
48. Its pre-1% appellation.
49. Its post-1926 appellation.
50. Fawcett op.cit. If>-6.
' 1 * 1 kk. kea ue of Nations treaty Series vol. 184 p .  115
-]: =rr
]  ,, ' ' rom .uued bef .een members of the Commonwealth
,ith the or by South Africa.
1 .. . '.......  i-.iiatered a nueber of agreements concluded with the
-
h V ,min‘ ■ ' "  -• *«» * t ■ for the i n t e ^  doc,nine
;._cv ’ "" ertl ^  even # 0  B”lon did not follow any consistent
\
:.v,ceu- .maintains that no clear conclusion can be drawn from
prsctrce a to how tie Cotmo,.wealth countries in this period regarded
registration of tree tie, under Article 18. It appears that
practice in the Comoro-a*h on the registr tion of treaties was not
uni tore. All he is prepared to assume is that those agreements between
members of the Ccnron.calth which were not regiet, red were not recorded
»y their ,-mh.rt an treaties or intemationel engagement.. Th.e Cape Town
Agreement .occurring as it did right in the midst of this period of
unceri unty, was not. registered either by India or by South Africa, and
on .wcett's reasoning it would appear that neither party regarded it as 
a treaty.
-he Inrex to the :eag»e of Actions Treaty Series'^ indicates that
52. Fawcett op.cit. 167.
55. Jennings o^.cit. 335- 
54. Fawcett cj.cit. 167.
55' :"u'55. °f rre8ty SeriEa' »ol =- 40-88 (treaties
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treety number 1344, registered *ith the Icn^e in 1928, was a treaty
'"v Soutn Africa in conm ctio with errata in certain money 
- " ' ' writer iae been unable to rove conclusively that 
a treaty did exist - on the contrary, upon investigation, it appears 
tnat the index is incorrect. Treaty number 1)44 does not concern a treaty 
between India and South Africa at ,11 _ 't is a treaty concluded between 
the Irish free State. If, however, such a treaty was concluded 
between India md South Africa, this would amount to a strong implication
v *'... ' * * 1 ai,<* ult’*a were register ing mutual agreements at that
,e ’ 1 dij rict reK"‘rd the Cape Town Agreement as a treaty with inter­
national obligations in tow. In -*ny case, at the ver; least this treaty, 
whatever its exact nature, indicates that Commonwealth countries were, at 
that time, reri taring treaties inter se.
; The status of the Contracting Part.--f
Another question arise, in connection with the international status 
o- India and the nion of South Africa at the time the Cape Town Agreement 
w-s concluded. A contracting party to a treaty must hive ..nternatior.nl
personality. it is, a treaty presuppose:.: the capacity in international
la* to conclude it. Unless it can be proved U  it the Union Government
and In i a. v ch : id this capacity in 1926. i.e. unless they were both 
fully . overeign, the Cape Town Agreement cannot constitute an inter- 
r.- tional agreement. Roealyn Higginr contends that this argument has
never ? ound wic.r; prer 1 support and been advanced only by a very
lieited gro n c States who ., all parties to a similar dispute cr 
potentially involved xn proh'j of a li ce nature. Certainly, this 
itrue wa. never raised by t a general Assembly in relation to the Cape 
Town Agreement, .hi' tody, by is;-;inf. ;■ number of revolutions referring 
c^.plicit^y to ae Ce-ue - own Agreen. nt a. an international agreement, 
sia;<ly aseumed that South Africa nd India did have capacity to enter 
into inter-.atiorv L relation.- hips. In ..11 the objections that the South 
African Government rni, ed to the contention that the Cepe Town Agreement 
wa i tre ty, it never once mentioned that the Union had been incapable 
of concluding -■ international treaty. I n the cont: try, it seems clear 
that South Africn >r d Indi r< u-ded themselves as fully-fledged members 
of the international com (unity. As , . shown above, South Africa refused
y  . h v r a l y n  . i ,  ’ : rv cri . c i i . P>.
Jn r e lx>ndon - ' Val Treaty of 1936 because the treaty did 
net indicate clearly enough that South Africa would be negotiating on an 
equal basis with the other signatories.
r;riuerrore, the emergent statehood of the Dominions and India *as
marked by their admission to the League of h.tions. Ln the one hand, the
' a ‘ le 0 t: ' treaty of Versailles included 'the British Empire' among
'..... """ z'i'b' '' '*ed r>owers, without reference to any of its component
part^. but on the other hand, rhen listing the deleg tions, it had used the 
following form" :
I
vontr' cting Parties represented as fellows:
-  t°f.the United kingdom -f Great Britain and Ireland
am. the British Dominions Beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, Dy 
[name o: British delegates] and for the Dominion of Canada by"
, ' -r.pdian .'.patet , for the Commonwealth of Australia
k' c-v '-es of Australian delegate; , for the Union of South Africa 
. n :es of Jttth African delegateeJ, for tin Dominion of New 
aec. an . by names of New Zealand delegates], for Indie by 
[n*r*s of Indian delegates].1
tr.e enn o i he treaty a1! the delegates • signatures appear in order
.r * .9 Annex to t-.e Covenant of the League of Nations the following names
are found in the list of original members of the League of Nations:
rntisr; E-spire, C -n: ia, Anstrail? , South Africa New Zealand, India.
Article 1 of the Covenant rends:
'Che original Members rf the League of Natit  ^shall be these 
of tl.e Ci w. tori or ,-,o ore \ in the Ann to this Covenant.... 
'.ny fully - If-govern :i- Jt te, .. ir ion or Colory not named in 
the Annex may become a member of the League, if its admission 
if agree to by two-third of the A: e bly.1
In otnei words, far as joining the Le.. « s c:..ncf,rr. d, the emphasis
WUl nct on i' t ood kut on - 1 f-governm-nt. In 1923. for example, the
Irish Free ..tat' wa admitted if a member of the League on its own
ini. ifctive a.n ; apj kicatian. Ihu vmt®d Kin ;dom Govemmcnt did not
participate even formally, althcu h it cannot he doubted that the Irish
Free Jtate had strong constitutional liclu with the United Kingdom. In
relation to the other members of the League it would appear that thv
Union of South Africa and India wen. fully self-governing States.
Dr. F.S. Ion, the act it. South African Prime Minister, stated in
t (
Par] lament in February 1919 that the I men at that time was in even
57. Fawcett o^.cit. I1#?.
5'°. Co: Tinao: If February 1r ■ 9•
mcre-y a sham to put before His Majesty the King.
“'*■ ' U ' ' the South African Parliament h id nothing to do with 
the ratification b, the British Parliawpnt:
illlllliPiiE
rearer the question of status, S^ute added:^
glllllilif
lULtre, .he representatives of the Dominions would act for the 
Loxii.-ons. ihie precedent had now been laid down for the future.«
In proposing the v.otior 'or rntific tion of the Vere illes Perce Treaty,
which was ultimately carried/ " Smuts said^ '' that the self-governing
Dominions had utterly received greater and greater legislative powers,
so much so that if the British Parliament were then to pass legislation
in regard to the opinions, it would bt .• revolutionary action. As a
result of the Paris Conference
the lA-minions wou:d, in future, with regard to foreign affails,
ieei 1 r)U,"n their own represent tives The .-ritieh Bopire
would, there'ore, be a leagu- in which all the Dominions would 
be or. ai. - ,u.l basis as regarded their Governments ... [Ijn 
the Le< gut of Nations all the Dominions, with England, would 
stand az. an equal footing azid would be recognized as such. The 
oi. i V ui i erence would be that Eng lar.d would be a penr.anent 
me:’ber of the central Council. Therefore in future all parte 
of the Empire would equally be consulted in matters of war and 
peace.'
So it happened that the Dominions and India signed and ratified the 
Ver dlles ‘Treaty separately fiom or it xin and were 1'ecognized at the 
name time as being separate 1,embers of the Longue of Nations. The British 
Dominions becive equal members in the Assembly, with a full right to be 
elected. Some of the other Powers, America in particular, were not very 
happy with this state of affaire as they felt it gave too large s vote to 
the British Empire. As Smuts stated in the House of Assembly
t c . Cane Timer K  .Septerber ly 19.
63. By eighty-four voter to nineteen.
64. Cr-nc_Tinse' 11 .uptv oer 1919.
65. >kp<* Tin it v Seytcrnber 1 19.
gf.
Ireody been mentioned, the Dominion;; (including South 
' j1jC"'1 ‘ U v - c 1 'fed a.;d registered a number of treaties during the
in itself, in icatct very strongly that they
regard,} themselves as fully capable in international law. It is
mt-re: ting to n. te that often Greet Britain was a party to these treaties 
• no raised no , bactions to their registration. As C.J.h. Dugard6‘writes, 
the . -ate !or iouth-lVest Africa was conferred on South Africa in 1920 
so '-rt *yn ii dependent State, despitj the fact that South Africa 
be:ie 'ally ind« endent only in 1931, when the Statute of Westminster 
wai p.. sed, r.7 cf which declared that 'the Parliament of a Dominion 
nas lull power to cv ke law? having extra-territorial operation1. 
cf -i n j of he < outh i rica /.ct empowered the Union Parliament to
' e laws for tl ■ peace, order and good government of the Union' alone.^ 
Thjin section, together with the subordination of a colonial legislature0 ‘ 
to the British It :islature cast doubt on the Union Parliament's competence 
tc her-; late extr i-territori ly in re: ect of fact.) and events that
occu-red outside he territori 1 limits of t. e Union.
(v) Form of Treaty 
The South Afr. v. r. represent, tive to e United Nations in 1946 raised 
the isi ue that no form 1 instrut ent had net. signer and that, therefore, 
the Cape Town Agreement could not be a treaty. It was simply embodied 
in iden leal *; itemrnts tnr.de in the Union House of Assembly by the Scv.th
African mini? ter n-i in the Delhi Legislative Assembly by his Indian
6C'counterpart. C ther u;ember tatee objected to this argument, maintain­
ing that thif procedure, in xtst if, would not preclude the agreement 
being regarded an a treaty bee; . e ar.y solemn agreement between States
‘ C. C.J.R. Du i .'outh-We t frier- r.d the Supremacy of the South
African Lari', tment1 (19’ W) 86 South African law Journal 194 at 195.
6?. Walter Polla! 'The Legislative Competence of the Union Parliament’ 
(19.71) 4?' outh Afric-n I-u* Journal 2’>9 at 273.
68. i •■Cleod v. A 1 ‘orney-G- jier -1 for New South /ales [1891] A.C.455 (P.C.).
69. House of A;;:.- ibly Debates vol.8 , colt . 5* 8-9 (21 February 1927).
'11 ■'* " ( PPenheii / states tl it international law contains
6 •>' •ibing the necee ary form of & treaty, A treaty will be
001 a" the mutual consent of the parties to be bound becomes
1 ' 1 '■*en< * although most treaties are in written foiir., signed by
’ 11 i repres ntatives of the parties, a treaty may just as
'• 1 ,e uni'iy- I he Permanent Court of International Justice in
" ' between ivorway and lenmark concerning the St'-tu: of liaste-n
hf,* in that an oral declaration given by the Minister
<1 x m  eign Af! aj.rcn behalf of his Government will be binding on the
state that he represents provided only that the subject-matter of the
declaration falls within his province. In 1961 the International Court
of Justice, in it judgment on the preliminary objections in the case
concerning the Te pie cf hr,., h Viheah * stated :
'->here, a is generally the case in international law ... the 
law prescribes no particular form, parties are free to choose 
what form they please, provided their intention cle *•'*• results 
from it.'
The Court #ddec'1
M r"]he ;•<:■. e relevant questi n is whetb- r the language employed 
in any given declaration does reveal clear intention.1
.'his attitude wat reflected by th« International Court in the Nuclear
■75
Tests case in 197 e ' where it said :
'.v ith i re' to the question t f form, international law [does
not imnos 3 any special or strict requirements. Whether a 
statement is r rde orally or in writing makeo no essential 
differenc , for such state entr, made in p rticular circum­
stances may create commitments in international low [and 
this, doe not require that they should be couched in 
written form.‘
76For the purposes of the 196'' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'
i tr« ?ty is 1 m  international agreement concluded between Jtates in
written form'. However, Article 3 of the Convention declares tnat
70. Y'"-rbook of ' he hnited 7- tlonr- (19^-4?) l4o.
71. L. Vppenhcim International L w - A Tr< 1 ire 0 ed. (19 55) I Peace
898.
72. 1933 PCIJ :eports, Series A/B, No.53.
73. 1961 1CJ Reports 17 at 31.
74. Ibid. 32.
75. i97u ICJ Re: rtfi CT at 267-8.
76. D.h. iierri C-res end tori a I on international haw (197;) 554.
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’ forc< °f such agreements;
£E£EAES9»Hs;F ^
•" 0ther ,0r"r" th* V U ™  Mention, elthou, h applylng „nly t0 trw>t, „  
concluded in wr.tinr, explicit!, » yt thn, , to, m.-,y ,,.lidl, conclude 
Oral treaties.
-"'urthermore, i, in irrelevant tint the Cep, Tom, ngreecnt hue al.nye
ref erred tc an 'agreement' rather than a 'treaty'. According to
, Ola there le no eesentiei differ,,,, between an 'agreement' and a
blni-il,‘< ‘ once Upon the contracting part ice is the some,
 .........    '* 1:0118i-ders that the decisive factor is not its
let uription, which varies considerably, but, rather, whether it is
ended to Create legal rights and obligations between the parties.
' ' :I ot ,hHt ttm wore nad, tn a number of ways.
■ >, for example, „ tre ty between the Union of South ,foica and Southern 
rdic .esra in regard to the avoidance of double death duties was concluded
' "  lhe e“1,!* «  exchange of Uotea between General nertzog (the
then Wniete, of External Affairs) and 1 of fat, the am da, i an represent,.
ttve. 'he l.V t. from General hurt nor , • the formal' straight forward
letter.
:n ' ; •t,rm of an Agreement between the Union Govern- 
ment and the Government of the Republic of : ortugal was signed et Cape
fown, which regulated the use of the of the K e e n ,  River for the
uroces of m e t i n g  hyiro-electric power in and for the irrigation of
the mandated territory of South-best Africa. The terminology used was
much more formal the, that of the Cape Town Agreement, for example, it
it eabestially , written agreement and ends with the wore,, Thus done and
' i,.ne. at the U t y  o! Cape Town on the I t M y  of Jul; 1 ,26'. Thereafter
follow the ai,nature, of the South African ,md 1 ortuguene representative,
WHO concluded the Agree, ent. ."he Agree ent state, further that it was
presented by the secretary of state fc orei„n iffsir, to Parliament by
command of is - 'jesty. All of these elements are missin from the Cape 
Town Agreement.
77. Cppsnheim op.cit. < iSff
76 Unic,i lovemn t Treaty Serief No. of 19 2,
7''. United K,np(brc Tre.ity Series No.70 0f i c # .
1 ' r>?? 1,0 lofore.-.l protocols instead of formal .reaties
concluded, which ,melded for the ouep.noion of inter-gov,rnmortol 
oe. ts payable by the Government of the leraan ! eich^r.d by the Govern, 
ment of Czechoslovakia. The fa. t toot they .era not termed 'treaties'
lr,,1*V nt th-ir ’"‘litity. In 19H South frier bee -e a :orvv 
Convention r„. the Regulation C  IVhuling, aimed t Geneva. 82
Another Avreement, thin time between the Union of South Africa and 
n. .-uaziland Protectorate, providing for the exemption of double taxation 
faraer‘ 6,rr,,ne 0n buBin“ ,K I'Cth in the Union and Swaziland, van 
' * * * *  at Cai’e Town 60 6 March 1932 end at fbabane on 2 March 19t2.8j 
‘ n . «  quite different in style from the Cape Town Agreement,once
being very much more formal. The opening paragraphs, -or example,
The /greement concludes »
h e m ,  h,,, " ^ ^ 6 1.
vn oehalf Of the Union of South Afixca 
Bodenrtoin
Cape Town ^th^nr^'igs/ *'
Ut. be ha f of Swazi land 
T. Ait worth vickr or.
Resident Cumniiosioner, Sw.tiv. land 
Mbabane <;nd Karcl 1 o;■* 5,»
i.ne cat. compare the above forxat with th t c" the Caim Tow, Agre,:nent ^  
which re«d6 as follow {
'It was rymcunccu in April M  6 tb t the Government of India
The Agreement war not . igned ,t ali by the negotiating' mlniatere. It 
ri,:p?y rtates ir an informal manner what agr, ed on. Th,.- tame ippliea 
tt.e Joint Cor. unique of 1' 32. However, although the Agree mot et nde 
( J 1,3 rtu' ? lta C:,LU6 - Approach, th 6 alone wvuld not be enough to
c (j union Govern: ent Treaty series Vo, 9 of 19S2.
^1. Ibid. No..if of lnV.»
32. Ibid. No.11 of 1931.
33. Ibid. No.2 of
*1'' tes vol.8, colt , ;.0«'-10 (21 /ebruarv lo?o)
fef.*e Annexurt 'u' tta< hed heret '
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' “  n ir 14 had been independent. ,t the Paris Peace
-i-r.eicuce tne South African repr.sentotivt ■ enjoyed the same right
1‘ ;I lle dlscUJ >ions m  the representatives of the oth  
J  ho::.inions. The Prime Minister of the Union could communicate direct!)
w-tU the i rime Minister of Great Britain, so the possible impression 
J  that iouth Africa was Kiel, n Crown colon) had been altogether removed.
1 ' t! ' l! a beague of Nations were to be established, South Africa
j  would claim the tame representation in the League as it had enjoyed at the
fence Conference.
1] _ -‘vvcr.ior-uener'l, Lora Buxton, addressing the Houf e of Assembly in
sieptei :ber 1919, said:
'/he Peace treaty constitutes a great landmark in the history of
fwerr*'"' t'"* fy'rt become co- signatories, with the other 
^  rower.,, cVich an instrument, but under the Covenant of the League
L  ,SO beccme members of the new League on a footing 
- -J <=.;«<. rity With the other Powers and nations of the world. *J ^  ratified by the King only after he had obtained
 ^ the separate approval of the Dominion f rlianents. As f iwcetAmys, this
J  " bee* import nt when one realizes that the British Govern-
rent expressed it: :esire to ratify the Treaty before the Dominion Parlia-
1 nent3 cculd consider it, and lord Miner, the Colonial-Secretary, contended
^  t lt *-rie al Prov ■ • of the Dominions was unnecessary and that their initial
"] ‘ 1 nature 0003d bt taken -e equivalent to the tendering of advice to ratify.
U  led hy Canada, the Dominion Governments rejected this view and insisted on
1 the Treaty before their respective Parliaments. Cnee a Dominion
J  Government had secured Parliamentary provai, it drew up its own Orders
in Council advising the King to ratify on its behalf.
J  General Smuts addressed the House of Assembly on 9 September 1 T ;,61
and proposed a motion whereby the Assembly would ratify the Treaty of 
Versailles, which had been signed by himself as Prime* Minister and by 
the Minister of Defence in their capacities as plenipotentiaries for the 
Lnion of South Africa. He told the House that, despite the British 
** Parliament1, ratification of th, Treaty, ratification by the Union
59. Cape T1 ,e£ C September 1919.
60. Fawcett oji.cit. 150.
61. Cr-.pe Times September 1919*
72
1  "°MlUd* *"a‘ “  ’as not a all its informality it remains
-t-j .erre.,^  o intention between the Governments of India and 
1  SOUth A,ricu “ I could he labelled a solemn agreement.
r'llE "tt;lt"de 1 8 eadorsed by the Nuclear Tests case,8 5  where a number 
1  °f ""tentative stat. rents were made on behalf of the French Government
** nc' i intentions ar to future nuclear tests in the South Facific
Ocean r ^
u
"1
J
-w . i - it. . i t w ig contained in a communique^ issued by the
office of the resident of the French Republic on 8 June 197'.6 6  shortly 
betore the commencement of the 197* series of French nuclear tests:
. m m m m s L . .
^ A copy of the communique .es tr nmmitted in a Note dated 1 1 June 1 9 7 4
^  fr.r the French Embassy in Canberra to the Australian Department of Foreign
Affxirs. At a Freer conference on 25 July 1974 the President of France 
had myeelf :ade it clnr t, it t is round of atmospheric tests
* ~n aaditiont statements^ similar to these above were 
mMe on lo Jrly 1974 in a Note sent by the French Embassy to the New 
' 2e land Minister of Foreign Affairs and at a Frees conference h^ld on
' ^  Minister of Defence of France. Farther statements
t ' this effect were ^de on 1< August 1 9 1 - by the Irench Xinirtvr of 
lefence and on 25 Septerber 1974 by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.
In view of what had t ken place, the International Court found that
~ce ---I- ff-’-e j-'Ui lie ito intention to cease conducting atmospheric
^  nucUar tests fc . owing the conclusion of the 1974 series of tests. The
Court stated :
’it is well recognized that declarations of this kind made by 
way o. unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations
creating legal obligations. Declarations 
. . Klnd be often are very specific. ..hen it is the
.W intention o* the state making the declaration that it should
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on
_  the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
being ther ceforth legally required to folk w a course of conduct 
consistent with the declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if
I
"1
'^5 • 1974 ICJ Peports u5?
8 6 . Ibid. 2 6 5 .
n 8 7 . Ibid. 2 6 6
6 8 . Ibid.
n
n
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y  Thomas , . Franck " calls the Court’s vice as to the legal consequences
1  SUCh G^t"°ents an important but not unconscionable extension of prior
J  ^cisions respecting orel etat? ents. This case rakes new law by
recognizing that a written or oral undertaking nay give rise to legal 
rights and obligations even when made without a reciprocal or mutual 
exchange of commitments, outside the context of for, 1 negotiations, and 
to the world at large or to specified or perhaps even unspecified but 
ascertainable beneficiaries. One of the most important elements in 
leciiing whether a statement made by & &t.te will be bindinr on the 
U  State is intention. Franck adds ^ that when State speaks, through an
ostensioxe Pgjnt, md the statement contains ;n express commitment s to 
a future course of conduct by that State, it should not be necessary to 
^ enquire whether the St,te intends to be bound; it is necessary merely to
enquire whether other states with terest at stake could reasonably
^ ascumf that the state' ent constituted a commitment. Cne should ask whether
another State or other States have relied on the statement in any way, and 
perhaps, one could add, whether they had the right to rely on such a state- 
ment. So the Court, in reaching its decision in the Status of Eastern
case referred to above, was impressed by the fact that Denmark,
1 relying on 'orway's unilateral 'promise' of non-interference, proceeded
i to execute plans and projects for its colony. Ever if the Union Govern-
, !T'er,t did not intend the CaPe T own Agreement to be a traaty, it could be
* argued that, at the very least, it regarded the Agreement as a serious
declaration o: its intention and that it had thereby committed itself 
 ^ to a particular cours, of action. The elements of mutuality and reliance
by the ucvernoent o< Indie are both present here, as the Indian Government 
took an active part in the « iftiocs that led to the ultimate formation
of the Agreement. Surely it had the right to rely upon the Agreement in 
the future.
9- xhomas rr&nck ’World Made Law - The Decision of the ICJ in the 
..1 cl ear Vest Cases' (1975) f>9 Amor: can Journal of International Law 
612 at 615. ~ ---------
90. Franck qp.cit. 617.
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•e; Developments After World tVar II
I
Events following upon the second World wsr confirmed that Members 
J  of the Commonwealth had come to be regarded as sovereign States in inter­
national In. possessing independent treaty-making powers.
misters of Commonwealth countries,including General J.C. Smuts,
J  made significant contributions to the drafting of the Charter of the
^ , mteJ Nations. The Charter signed and ratified not only by the
erare.. vf Umted Kingdom, but by the Governments of South Africa, 
•>r.ada, Australia, hew ..ealand and India as well.92
A Conference of frime Ministers held in London in 1949 remolved that
This resolution, while stressing the close co-operation of the Dominions.
~| nevertheless evidenced their independent status.
In January, 1951, the Secretary-General of the United Nations addressed 
a circular to member States requesting information relating to their 
national la.e and practices in the matter of the conclusion o' treaties, 
following on this request, Memoranda concerning lews and practices of 
_  ‘-reety-making in various countries, including the United Kingdom and all
the Dominions, were published by the United Nations. 94
The Me r or nr.'lac of the South African Government" stated that the 
treaty-making power in the Union was almost exclusively exercised by the
'1 Governor-General in Council. Her Majesty was authorized to conclude
treatles on bfhalf of the Union9^  but only exercised this right in respect 
n  °f treaties between Heads of State. No limitation was placed on the South
J  African Government's treaty making pow r either by Parliament or the
electorate.
___________________________________
91 • i-ouse.of Ascembly Debates vol.55, cols. 1215 ff. (? February, 19461.
9P. Halsbury op.cit. 455.
•3- De^laration ^  2 ,d 454: The Co»mwe,I,h
' J5 ‘ Ibid. pp.105 ff. Document cited as No.77.
95. The Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934. section 4(1).
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lr,.ft •.gree-.entc were drawn up by the Department within whose sphere
T  ' ' ',1 ,U . tl0q7 :iey “°"ld rrl1, in conjunction with the Department of
or ernal Affairs- ana the external Trade Relations Committee (in the case
°’_C e-cijl agreements). Negotiations would then be initiated with the
rt-.te or organisation concerned through the Department of External Affairs.
••here the treaty took the form of a Heads of State treaty, the 
requtstte full Powers would be issued by Her Majesty on the advice of 
Ct Union hmisters. In »1: other instances, the South African Executive 
touncil would ic„ue the full Roiers. These would usually be signed by
" C '■|I ‘ * rl°' Klni','ei and the l.iniater of External Affairs.
If an agreement required ratification by the Union, this was to be 
effected by tn,- deposit of an Insiru , t of Ratification signed by the 
Prime Minister and .“Ulster of xter ! Affairs, or, where the treat, was 
one between Heads of State, by Her Majesty the Queen. Authority to " 
ratify was to be obtained from -he Execute,, Council. No legislation 
required that treaties be ratified by Parliament, with the execution of 
the Treaties of fence Act of <#89 which required peace treaties to be 
ratified only with the prior concurrence of Parliament.
-he Memorandum described in some detail the current practice in 
relation to those treaties which n i to be tabled or proclaimed by the 
Governor-General in the Government Gazette.
It stated that although there was no specific legislation requiring 
the publication of treaties, the practice of publication had been followed 
in the wnion for a considerable period,
The Nemorar dun, went on to list those Acts of the South African Perlia- 
ment which h d a bearing on the negotiation and conclusion of treaties, 
together with extracts of their relevant sections.
This document proves conclusively that the real treaty-making power 
in Couth Africa was exercised by the Government of the Union. Even where 
Her Majesty the (.ueen signed the Pull Power,, or the Instrument of katifica- 
tion of a Heads of State treaty, she always acted on the advice of her 
Jnion Ministers. Nevertheless, the Vueen remained officially the head of 
State, and although the Union, lik the other Dominions, formulated an 
independent foreign policy, close contact w„s maintain- with the Imperial
9.;. Today called the department of Foreign Affairs. 
9^. Act 20 of 1948, section 1.
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1 r‘ ' t '1 ough an improved system of communication.
t 'vo r7l&ln channels of communie, rion and consultation within the 
^ommonwealth were the Commonwealth Relations Office and the system of 
C 1 'f h Commissioners, fne former body communicated daily
with the South African Depart,ent of vinal A f f a i r s . i n  addition, 
the Government of the Union of South , frica w a represented in London 
by o high commissioner, who regularly consulted with the Secretary of 
It - te for Commonwealth Relations end other United Kingdom Ministers or 
departmental officials. The nigh Commissioners enjoyed similar status 
''"d riVlle«e6 to that of ambassadors.1 The formal Imperial Conferences 
were superseded by meetings of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers which 
continued t< be held in London, as from 1944, at irregular intervals.
1 J ^gZgbopments after the Attainment of Republican Status
1
1
n
"n 1 ’ 'he bouth African electorate, in a plebiscite, approved
tr.e ere tion of a republic to replace the ini on of South Africa.2 The 
•.or. fere nee of Commonwealth Prime Ministers decided that were this to take 
-lai-e, ani the country still desired to reaiin in the Commonwealth, its 
uveraTent rhould request the corsent of the other Commonwealth Govern­
ments. he Union Cabinet subsequently announced that it wished South 
/.frica tc remain in the Commonwealth;^ r.i a rice Ministers' Conference 
wen duly arranged in London for March, 1961.
'-n 15 March, 1961, a communique' was issued to the effect that South 
Africa, on becoming a republic, was to leave the Commonwealth. The 
communique' stated that at the meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
in London, Dr. ...p. Verwcerc 'informed the other . rime Ministers ...
>9. Kalsbury op.cit. 439.
1. Ibid. Besides V  is, South Africa e? oyed the right to separate 
diplomatic end consular re resentation in foreign countries, 
although it could request the United Kingdom representative'to
act on its behalf where it had not appointed its own representative. 
6ee Aade and Phillips op.cit. 456. A detailed discussion of the 
development of the consular and diplomatic corps is contained in 
: ekker op.cit. 30ff.
2. Cee Lllison K»hn 'Constitutional and Administrative Law' i960 
Annual Survey of South • fnc Law 1.
3. C. Hood Phillips Constitutioral »nd Administrative Lnw 5 ed. (1975) 
626.
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t . t m  tr... ii ht of the views expressed on behalf of the other member 
T ' “ indie- tion of their future intentions regarding the 
P°"1Cy e: 1 r:e 'Jnicn Government, he had decided to withdraw his
3 icat.c.^  .i r couth Afnei. 'e continuing membership of the Commonwealth
as e Republic 1.
 ^y  ince its withdrawal from the British Commonwealth of Nations in Kay,
^  * ''"n' aCJ ' ' lorei*n Policy and international relations, including
tne treaty-making power, has vested entirely in the Government of the 
•epuolic of South Africa, without intervention by the Crown.
iarticip, t in international conferences and the negotiation and 
conclusion of treaties have continued since 1961 in much the same manner 
previously. .There has been one import? nt change. The Crown's former 
role in the appointment of S uth African oleni; otentiaries, the issuance 
cf Pull powers and the subsequent ratification of treaties ceased to exist 
once the State President replaced the ^ueen (acting through her represent,- 
tive, the Governor-General) as Head of I twte/ The State President, 
acting on the advice of the South African Executive Council, has, since 
l"ci, exercised the executive government of the Republic in regard to all 
- * - r> uf i»L f. reign affairs.' The new Constitution vests in the State 
• resident the power to conclude and ratify international conventions, 
treaties one agreements’ as well is those powers and functions as were 
previously possessed by the Queen by way of prerogative.~
T: e It ’tue of the Onion Act and the Royal Executive Functions and 
Seals Act of 19}4 were both repealed' ae bring no longer relevant. In 
place of the Royal Great Seal, the Constitutionprovided for the 
ertat,. ishment of c eal of the Republic vhich must today be used on all 
public documents on which the Royal Great Seal or the Royal Signet of the 
Union or the Governor-General's Great Seal were, prior to the commencement 
of the Act, requ.red to be used. Yet another section1 ' provided that 
' "v * 1 •*• ''n(* pleasure of the otote - resident shall be expressed in writing 
under his signature and every instrument shall be countersigned by a
4. Ellison Kahn 'Constitutional and Administrative Raw 1961 Annual
Survey of .muth African law 1 at 1,5; a detailed discussion oFth7
reasons why outh Africa left the Commonwealth follows it at pp.15 ff.
5. Republic of south Africa Constitution Act 52 of 1961, section ?.
6. Ibid., section 16(1).
Ibid., section 70) (g) •
Ibid., section 7(4).
Ibid., schedule 3.
Ibid., section 1.8.
11. Ibid., section 10(1).
7.
8.
9.
10
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1*HE PREROGATIVE OF THE GROWN’ (ANT? STATE PRESIDED) 
AND TREATY-KAKING
Introduction
Jr.iifr the Dritieh constitutional system the power to conclude 
treaties, to declare war or the return to peace"' vests in the Crt «n 
as part, of the exercise of the prerogative. These propositions have 
also found favour with the South African Appellate Division. Van den 
Heever J .A. in fachs v. Donges AC. * stated:
'As far as 1 know nil constitutional authorities are 
agreed that in England foreign relations are essentially 
embraced in the prerogative powers'.
Blackstone, writing in 1?65, defined the prerogative as
that special pre-eminence which the King hath, ever and 
above all other persons, and out of the ordinary course 
of the common law, in right of his regal dignity'. 5
This definition serves to emphasize that the prerogative is an inherent
legal attribute unique to the Crown.
Dicey described the modern relationship succinctly when he wrote 
that the prerogative was 'the residue of discretionary or arbitrary 
authority, which, at any given time, is legally left in the hands of 
the Crown'.'
1. W.S. Holdswcrth 'The Treaty-Making Power of the Crown' (1942) 58
Law quarterly Review 175 fit 1?8 quotes the authors of The Federalist, 
who had rr.-ide a special study of the English constitution as part of 
their task of making a new constitution for the United States of 
America, as saying 'Every juri, t of that kingdom md every other 
man acquainted with its constitution knows as an established fact 
that the prerogative of raking treaties exists in the Crown in the 
utmost plenitude'.
2. S.A.de Smith Constitutional and Adrini .trative Law (1971) 115;
K.C.8. fade and Godfrey Phillips Constitutional haw 8 ed. (1970)
281.
jj. Juridical support for these proposi1 ions may be found in the state­
ment by Lord itowell in The Hoop (1799) L C.Rob. 196 at 199«
Jansor; v. i-riefontein Consolidated Mines [1902] A.C. 484. (K.L.).
4. 1950 (2) -A 265 AD at 509.
5. Blackstone 12 Co.hep.74 as cited by de Smith pp.cit. 115.
6. A.V.Dicey 1. In' n. Suction to the i * of the Con: i iti.tion 10 @4.(196?) 424. 
?. This definition w a  firct approved jurid. cally by lord Dunedin in
Attorney-S'ner,' ■ v. De Keyaer's Royal Hotel Ltd. [1920] A.C. 508 at
526; it has also been approved by the South African Appellate 
Division in Sachs v. Dorges NO og.cit. 275•
1
J
One of the elements stressed by Dicey it the residual nature of the 
j) re rug, tivo. frace ole to the dojs bef ire Parliament existed,the 
^ prerogative cannot today be enlarged by the Crown. On the contrary,
iarilament can take away any prerogative power and has frequently done 
Prerogative is the residue any given time of the rights 
U  and P°wers which the sovereign possessed before the advent of Parliament.
The prerogative is discretion ry and arbitrary, in that, although its
existence is determinable by the courts, the manner of its exercise falls
outside the court", jurisdiction.' If an individual is detrimentally 
afhected by the exercise of the prerogative, the courts may not substitute 
t.iei r discretion for that ot the executive. The individual's extra- 
judiciai remedy lira, in the c o of an alien, in diplomatic means;
^  and, if he is o citizen, in political means.'‘
"l Another essential feature of the preregat:ve is that it is a non-
w  statutory attribute of the Drown. It is a power which the common-1aw
^ recognizes as exercisable by the Crown.1c
■a Prerogative powers c m  basically be clac ified as the prerogative
in foreign affairs or the prerogative in domestic affairs. The former 
is the ability of the executive to act externally in relation to other 
States. By virtue of her pre-eminence as Head of State, the Sovereign 
(or, in the Republic of South Africa, the State resident) controls 
numerous powers in the realm of foreign affairs. Acts done in the 
n  exercise of such powers arc generaI y known as Acts of State. The
declaration of war and peace a,-, well s the negotiation and conclusion 
-I of treaties fall into this category. Wade defines an Act of State as
'an ict of th- executive as a ■ tter o: policy, in the course of its 
relations with another St >te’. The King' ; Bench Division3-4 has
"1
8. For a resume of this hit.tort val development see de Smith op.tit. 
U?ff.
9* Sachs v. Dongcs r.D op.cit. 288.
10. C . Hoed Phillip* Constitution^ r.r Admin i ve l,.v 5 ed.
11973) 230; Sachs v. Don, e v Do op.cit. at 303,307,311.
11. Hercules Booyoon Di<; Toopasf ing . >n Vo 1 1 ■ ■ r■.y, in Ho S iid-
Afrikaant e he.j' - 'n Stant«'.egtelike 6 ndersoak. dissertation for 
the do; ree of Doctor of Lawn, Pert Elizabeth University (1974).
12. Wade and Phillips op.cit. I83, De Smith op.cit. 115.
13. E.G.S. Wade "Acts ot Dt, te in English Law" (1934) 15 Britiah Year­
book of Interr.M nus'tl Luw 98.
14. Fletcher Foul ton L.J. in PaIem.T*n v. t i-cretary of St ate for India
[1906] 1 K.B. ,13 at 639-
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described it as
^verciKn puwer [which] cannot be challenge!, 
controlled or interfered with by municipal courts. Its
S r
t is generally accepted that Acts of State are not subject to the 
jurisdiction of the municipal courts and rightf alleged to be acquired 
thereunder cannot be enforced by ouch courts. 15
The question arises in South Africa of the extent to which the 
prerogative rents cn principles of English or Eoman-Dutch law.16 The 
Cape Articles of Capital,cion,1? binding on the Crown in English law, 
Stipulated that the inhabi,ant, of the Cape would preserve all rights 
‘nd :‘’r;y::"Seil *hich they had theretofore enjoyed. The attitude of the 
South African Appellate Division was that these Articles covered the 
retention c" the Eoman-Dutch system of law an general and rules of 
the prerogative concerned with the acquisition, alienation and dis- 
position of propeity in particular. However,
"suuch questions as ... [the constitutional position [of the 
atwr.. in regard to matter, of government stand on a different 
foot.ng and no inference affecting them could properly be
t h : r o f % ^ a L \ ' l ^ ' ^ ^  "  " ^  ^  differing from
ifus judp, Tent meant that the Crown could not be taken to have foregone 
ita English pierog tive rights relating to bread constituti, nal issues, 
iwo ye r- later, the Appellate Division once again ruled that 
tjh,* rang':; prerogative, s ve where duly modified, is the same in 
every part of the Empire'.1V
Ihis proposition was finally confirmed in 195C2u by the Appellate 
aivision. Chief Justice A’atermeyer noted that since
'the loyal Prerogative is as externive in the Union as it is in 
wigland, except in so far aa it hns in either country been 
duly modified or abandoned, ... in enqwrin- into the scope 
of the E.oyal Prerogative one must have regard to English and 
not Hornun-Dutch authorities'.
15* Viade and I hillipe op.cit. 265-6.
16. See H.R, H-hlo and Ellison Kahn The Uuj.,n ('f South Africa ; The
Sevelo: t cf I" La A. -a.u JvUl,: * :! u t ; u,i Tl9oCj 170.
17. Dated 18th January, I806.
18. i’er Innee C.J. in Union Government (Minister of Lands) v.
Whittaker 1916 AD 194 at 203. ’ -----
19. Ptr 1 nnet, C.J. in Union Government v. Ponkin i<il8 AD 533 at 539.
20. I er Van den Teever JA in Sachs v. Donges NO op.cit. at 309
21. Ibid. p.288.    "
r b
U) It^_Pr£i2 ^ u , e  of Treatv-H.kinr i,„.r„tiv^  Act
' 11 ‘ powrar to negotiate and conclude treaties is
vested in the head of the executive, that is, in the Crown, by virtue 
of the prerogative. This power is exclusively th, Crown's.22
■hen South Africa bccam a Union, provision was made for 'the 
executive Government of the Union [to be] vested in the King end [to 
.-v.ir.::;stv:v.d by His Majesty in person or by a Governor-General as
6 l " 1 1'' ' Prerogatives which were not delegated to the
Governor-General were reserved for the Crown. Among these wa. the pre­
rogative of treaty-raking (with the exception of agreements of a 
commercial nature). ' The South Africa A. , did not, therefore, confer 
on the Governor-General the treaty-mating power. This right was 
exercised by the Cro.n a l o n e . T h i s  is not to infer that th. Union
ov< 11 Pl.'yeJ no act ire role in the negotiations and conclusion
of treaties in the jeers preceding 1931. Hut in the final analysis of 
hose instances where treaties ,-re negotiated and signed by South 
African representatives, the Full Powers under which they were authorised 
to act were issued by the 1 ing. This was the position, for example, with
ice .'r-aty of Versailles.' Even the Mandate for South-West Africa was 
conferred nominally on the King 'for and behalf of the Union of South
Africa.' his c dearly indicates that the prerogative of treaty-making
vested in the Crows «s Head of State.
:he evolution of Dominion status culminated in England in the pawing
' "e ‘ ' ' meter. ' This Statute was incorporated into the
Union by the Status of the Union Act,* wati,* 4(1 of which declared
that
v'2. E,W. Hidgea in his Constitutional Low 8 ed. (195c) 233 states
et ie part of the prerogative to make treaties, and s treaty in
°'‘r ] "'v c °nly be made by the Grown, which acts through delefitee 
to wnom express authority has been granted*.
2 3 . Section of The South Africa Act 9 Edw.VII; ch.9, 1009.
vb. H.J. Mandelbrot* 'The Royal I rerogative in the Union1 (1936)
53 South African Lm* Journal 426 at 4,32.
23. f .J. Vessels Die Kepubliekeir,'»e Grordwet (1962) I63.
26. See above pp. 64-8.
27. See above pp. 16-9.
78. 2i Hr 23 Seo.9, c.4.
29. Status of the Union Act 6 9  of 1934.
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Phis ensured thnt the executive prerogative of the Crown, including
the treety-waking process, continued to be governed oy those practices
wd conventions which had hitherto evolved among the members of the
British Commonwealth, unless duly modified by SNtute. In effect this
meant that the Crown concluded t^.utiea on the advice of the South 
African cabin'/t,
cnee the decision was reached that South Africa should become a 
republic,' ' a written constitution was drafted. This w s accepted by 
both Houses of larli-^ent Snd on 24 April, 1961, it was approved by the 
Jo rnor-Qeneral. ’ It appear d cn >1 May, 1961, as the Republic of 
South Africa Constitution Act.>2 The new constitution retained, as 
far as possible, the constitution of the Union but some new provisions 
were, o course, inevitable. A major innovation *is the institution 
of the State fresident as Head of .tate.'^ Me replaced the ^ueen, 
acting through her representative, the Governor-General, and cnee 
South Africa left the British Commonwealth of Nations the presence and 
functions of the Governor-General became totally redundant, 
provisions of the Couth Africa Act which dealt with the monarchy' 
w-re omitted. C-thsr statutes concerning the powers of the monarchy 
were repealed in the Schedule to the constitution. In the words of
.I'D
All t) 
..34
(Vessels'
'(tat na one mining by *epublie'<wording gebeur het, is dat 
die etaat bloot die persoon like bande met die kroon 
deurgeany het en die p. rsonele unie so beendig is.'
* constitution' vests in the State ?re*;dent all the prerogative 
powers that were formerly possessed by the Queen. Apart from this, 
many of these former prerogative powers ore now expressly and
50.
31
This was achieved by means of a plebiscite held in terms of the 
Referendum Act 5<? of I960.
C.. .J. Steyn lY'/rpgatief en Diskresit by_di« Uitvoerende Gesav in 
die Republic, van Suid-Afrika Dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of UimTu I s t: rat ion University of the Orange Free State 
(1970) 119.
32. Act 3? of 1961.
33. Ibid , s^.tion 7(1).
34. Sections 2 and 3.
33. These Act*, included His M, jeaty Ring Kriwmd the : ‘ '.h*. / i: if at ion
Act cf of 1937; the Coronation Oath /cl 7 of 1937; the Royal ft vies
and Titles Act 17 of 1948.
36. Weasels op.cit. 30.
37. Section 7(4).
i-.inieter' and confirmed by the Seal of the kepublic which is kept in the 
otate 1 resident's custody. All these provisions have ensured that the 
Government of the Republic of South Africa has oeen invested with 
full power to conclude treaties under whatever name.
individually conferred on him by the corstitution.^' Anon? these 
express powers is the ability to conclude and ratify international 
conventions and agreements 3v Thus, while the treaty-making rower 
"D “nElaRd remains based on the prerogative, in South Africa it has 
largely become regulated by st tute. This does not necessarily imply 
tnr-.t the common law or conventional limitations on the exercise of 
this right ceased to apply as from 1 * 1 or that all vestiges of the 
prerogative have disappeared.^
When the State President concludes a treaty, he acts in his 
capacity as head of the executive and binds not himself but the State.
In the depublic, as in England, the Kean of State is not a free agent. 
Respite the prerogative or section 7(3)(g) of the Republic of South Afri 
Constitution Act, the kucen or State President cannot exercise their 
treaty-making powers at their sole discretion. They must act on the 
advice of their Ministers. In England, thi is the result of a 
constitutional convention^ while in . outh Africa this matter has,
Since 192'% been regulated by statute. ^  Both the Status of the Union 
Act and the oval Executive Functions and Seals Act**5 provided that 
the King or his representative, the Governor-General, was oblir i to 
act on the advice of his Ministers of State for the Union.
The discretion of the State President has similarly been curtailed 
>-> legislation, -’he crux of section 4 of the Status of the Union Act 
was incorporated by section 16(1) of the Constitution Act which
; . G.E. Cockram Constitutional i. in the h-mblic of South Africa 
(1975) 49. 1----------- ----------
39. Section 7(3)(g).
40. This is more fully discussed at p. 102 be lew.
41. Supra.
42. Hood Phillips op.cit. 230 states that the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility is the most important develc ent in modern British 
constitutional history, and resulted from the discretionary nature 
of the prerogative. He ad*s that there are very few occasions
nowadays when the Queen can act without or against the advice of
her Ministers.
43. Prior to 1934 the Crown, by convention, acted, at first, on the 
advice of British Ministers, aid after 1923, or the advice of 
Union Ministers.
44. "-ct 69 of 1934, section 4.
45. Act 70 of T 34, section 6 .
provides that
GoverGKent of the Republic in regard to any 
• \>0i 1 domestic 01 foreign affairs, is vested in the
i resident acting on the advice of the Executive Council".
precision Act provides further that unless the context
otherwise requires, or in the case of any statute it is expressly
provide,, therein, the term "State President' rreans the State President
•cting by and with the advice of the Executive Council'.
do the State President, like the Cucen, is bound to exercise his
legal powers in accordance with the dvice tendered to him by the
Jaoinet through the Prime Minister. He ha: the right to be kept informed
ana to express his views on ti questions at issue but not to override 
ministerial advice.+
-n strict law, the treaty-making function is an executive function. 
Neither the State resident nor the Executive Council are bound to 
r™u'1 Ci e,er'‘ " inform Parliament bef. re entering into a treaty.
Ever if Parliament subsequently disapproves of the treaty, it will, 
notwithstanding, be binding on the State in its relationship with the 
other contracting parties. Nevertheless, for political reasons, Parlia- 
":nt ray often be involved in the treaty-making process, despite the 
lack of a legal obligation to consult it. This stems from the fact 
that the executive often requires the support of the legislature to 
give effect tc the end it is trying to achieve through the negotiation 
of the tre-ty. If Parliament is not consulted, the executive could 
theoretically bind the State by treaty, which treaty would be impossible 
of fulfilment without the co-operation of the legislature. This flows 
from the ru^e that treaties generally require statutory incorporation 
before they can affect private rights cr initiate a change in the law. 
Eerious international ramifications would result from the refusal of 
Peril unent to approve the treaty.
As a result, a British constitutional convention has arisen to the 
effect that the Government should not advise the Crown to conclude a 
treaty unless there is ample ground for supposing that the majority of
^6, Act 33 of 1957, section 2.
97. Hood i'hillip' ojp.cit. 86.
48. J.D.B. Mitchell Constitutions I 2 <• j. (1966) 179.
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the 'iouee of Commons approve of the treaty.^ ^  important issues,
Stf ri~ ar‘ auty bound, before tendering advice, to seek an 
. portunity to consult Parliament."0 This convention found judicial 
support when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council met to discuss 
the internationally binding effect and the applicability in Canada of 
cer'ain I.L.O. Conventions which had been ratified by the Federal 
Government of Canada, lord Atkinf^ helu:
within the Britisi Empire there is a well-established rule 
that the making of a treaty in an executive act, while the 
performance of 1 obligations, if they entail alteration of 
existing dcmesti. law, requires legislative action .... If 
. iV uu:ione1 executive, the Government of the dav, decide to 
incur the obligations of a treaty which involve alteration of 
-a* they have to run the risk of obtaining the assent of
^ r:1!vent tG th<? necisG&ry statute  It cannot be disputed
/'*Jv the creation of the obligations undertaken in treaties 
and the assent of their fo**n and quality are the functions of 
the executive alone.'
This dictum is expressive of the juridical opinion within the British 
commonwealth that the executive branch of government is always competent 
under international law tc bind the State by treaty, regardless of its 
prospect of subsequently securing implementsry legislation.
lie orocedure often adopted is that many treaties are concluded 
subject to ratification. Ratification is then withheld until Parlia­
ment has approved the treaty either b) resolution or by statute.""
It is widely accepted th t treaties which will impose a financial 
burden on the State or which will entail alteration of existing law 
must be approved by Parliament before ratification.
This principle of parliamentary consultation is well-established in
South Africa. The early Transvaal Republic"' had a written constitution
which expressly provided''" that
1IgJeen traktaat of bondgenootekap met buitenlandsche 
mogendheden of volkeren mag bekragtigd worden, dan 
nadat de Eerate Volksraad daarover cijn gcvoolen heeft
49. Hood Phillips op.cit.8 8 .
50. I.Jennings Cabinet io\ -:..m- j.t } ed. (1959) 48?.
51. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario (19371 
A”.C. 326 at 327. '
52. Ridges ojp.cit. 224.
5 3 - I8 9 6 .
54. In article 24.
■
2”!
kenbaar gemaakt, zullende het Lraktaat volgens het 
oordeei van den Eersten Volksraad gcedgekeurd en 
vastgesteld of afgekeurd worden, met nitzondering 
v"n 'Ue .traktaten, welke de hegering bij Wet of 
Eerste /olksraadsbesluit gen.achtigd ie a an te gaan.
in similar fashion, the Volksmad of the iepublic of the Orange 
Eree State was required to 'ratify* treaties which the executive made 
with foreign powers.
!n o r  to 1961, the Queen was - mpowered to conclude treaties on 
behalf o r South Africa. According to convention, she exercised these 
rights on the advice of her Union Ministers. As in England, so in 
Eouth Africa, the Ministers did not advise the Queen to conclude an 
international agreement unless there was ample ground for supposing 
tnat the majority of the Lower House approved of the move.''7
When the he Llogg-Briand Pact was introduced into the House of 
Assembly in 1929, General Smuts made the following statement in 
connection with this issue:'"
’I am in agreement on th* constitutional question that the 
vrown is the treaty-making power of our constitution, that 
treaties are made by the executive authority, and, in the 
last resort, are not dependent upon the apprival of the
representatives o' the people outside the executive authority 
for their force. ' ^
But, of course, it has been felt that that position is not 
in H!rmony with the rights of the people, popular rights and 
democratic self-government as it has developed in more recent 
time . 'he result has been that in spite of this strict 
con .titutionol position under which the making of a treaty 
* Prerogative ci the crown, it has become customary to 
submit all treaties to the legislature for approval.1
>5* Le iirondwet der Zuid-Afrikaonsche Republiek, Wet No.2, 1896.
Le Localey.etten der Zuid Afrii* 'j ■ cache Kepubliek (1896) at. 37. 
Article 24 translates as follows! *No treaty or alliance with" * 
foreign powers or peoples may be ratified before the First 
Volkeraad has expressed its view.; on it, and the treaty shall 
be approved and confirmed or rejected according to the decision 
of the First VoIksrand, with the exception of treaties which 
the Government is empowered to enter into by lew or by 
resolution of the First Volkeraad.* >er J.G. Strydom House of 
Assembly Debater vol.55, cols. 1216-7 (7 February 19467.
5b. J.J. Fouche Die Bevoegdhcde van die Scaatspresident van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika Dissertation for the degree of 
Doctor of Laws, University of Stellenbosch (1964) 240.
57. Verlo’-»n van Themaot Staatsreg 2 ed (196?) 159.
58. Houp ’snombly Debates vol.12, cols. 10-11 (28 January 1929).
8?
kenbaar gemaak t, aullcr.de het traktaat volgens het 
oordeel van don Eersten Volksraad gcedgekeurd en 
vastgesteld of afgekeurd wcrden, met nitzonderlng 
vuii ;)ie traktaten, welke de Regering bjj Wet of 
Eerste Volknraadsbesluit gemachtigd ic aan te gaan.
In similar fashion, the Volksraad of the Republic of the Orange
Free State was required to 'ratify' treaties which the executive made 
with foreign powers.
rnor to 1961, the ^ueen was empowered to conclude treaties on 
behauf of South Africa. According to convention, she exercised these 
rights on the advice of her Unim Ministers. As in England, so in 
ooutn Africa, the Ministers did not advise the Queen to conclude an 
international agreement unless there was ample ground for supposing 
i:.at the majority of the Lower House approved of the move.^
When the r.e.ilogg-Briand Pact was introduced into the House of 
Ho. A j in h. i, .leneral Smuts made the following statement in 
connection with this issuer^
'T am in agreement on the constitutional question that the
Crown is the treaty-making power of our constitution, that
treaties ore made by the executive authority, and, in the
last resort, are not dependent upon the approval of the
re..a esen. stives o; the people outside the executive authority 
for their force.
ut, of course, it hat been felt that that position is not 
x..i harmony with the rights of the people, popular rights and 
democratic self-government as it has developed in more recent, 
time:. The result has been that in spite of this strict 
constitutional position under which the making of a treaty 
is the prerogative of tne Crown, it has become customary to 
submit all treaties to the legislature for approval.'
IP. Le Gronbwot der Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, Wet No.2, 1896.
Le I.ocnle ..ettcn cer ...uih Al’rir.ainschc heyubliek (1896) JM at 
Article 24 translates as followa! 'No treaty or alliance with * 
foreign powers or peoples may be ratified before the First 
Volksraad has expressed its views on it, and the treaty shall 
be approved and confirmed or rejected according to the decision 
of the First Volksraad, with the exception of treaties which 
the Government is empowered to enter into by low or by 
resolution of the First Volksraad.' Per J.G. Strydom House of 
Assembly Debates vol.55, cols. 1216-7 (? February 1946). ‘
56. J.J. Fouche Cie Bevoegdhcde van die Scaatspresidcnt van die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika bissercation for the degree of 
Doctor of Law :., University of Stellenbosch (1964) 2k0.
57. Verloren van Thenaat Ft a a tare.-, 2 ed (1967) 159.
58• House of Assembly Debates vol.12, cols. 10-11 (28 January 1929).
L'-opite t air;, lucid statement on the importance of executive 
consultation with the legislature ae part of the treaty-making process, 
m  1946 -muts, in his eagerness to have South Africa become a founding 
member State of the United Nations, not only signed the Charter of 
th . Uni.td is. t ions in hi a capacity as head of Jovernr ent, but ratified 
it as well before submitting it to Pariif .-nt for approval. This 
action did not, however, deter him from standing by his original point 
of view in the ensuing heated debut- in the House of Assembly. On 
that occ sion he reiterated"
The ratification of treaties rests with the Crown as part 
cl the exercise of its prerogative, and in South Africa it
16 exercised by the Governor-General and the Government on
behalf 01 the Crown. 'rom a purely juridical point of view, 
that is our constitutional position. But that is not the 
whole matter. As a democratic country we have developed the 
practice of obtaining Parliamentary approval before 
ratification by the Crown, That is the practice. 1
ihia speech o: Smuts highlights the practice, still prevalent
today, of making important treaties subject to ratification.
vilification is then, in turn,net given unless parliamentary approval
by way of rvsolu:ion or statute „s forthcoming.^ 0
(b) ^..Prerogative 0f v,ar and Peace : Its Development in South Africa
The ability to declare war or peace is the ultimate and most 
important manifestation of any nation's independent status. No 
country can regard itself ai truly t>v. _ rc: c if it does not exercise 
complete control over this aspect of its foreign affairs. While 
definite progress toward, autonomy for the Dominions had been 
achieved at the Imperial Confers;ces of 1923, 1926 and 1930, and 
'*hile the Statute of Wer trains ter had clarified the powers of the 
Dominion Peril meats in accordance with th, principles expressed at 
thtse Conferences by giving those borii. s full control over matters 
of Dominion concern and by removing the last v< t igee of legislative
59. House of Assembly Debated vol.55, cols. 1265-6 (7 February 1996)
6C. Ridges op.cit. 224-5 speculates that a convention may bt in the 
making whicn requires Parliament to be consulted in principle 
before any important treaty Is concluded.
restraints, nevertheless the preamble to the Statute stressed the fact 
that the Dominions .ere 'united by a common allegiance to the Crown'.^ 
* he subsequent South African statute, viz., the Status of the Union 
Act, - rhich provided inter alia that the King, acting personally or 
through his representative, the Governor-General, .culd continue to 
exercise his executive powers in relation to the Union 'in regard to 
*ny aspect of its domestic or external affairs' albeit on the advice 
o? .us Majesty's Union Ministers,' did nothing to dispel the notion 
that the Britisl sovereign could declare war on behalf of the British 
hx^ire at a whole. However, the Royal Executive Functions and Seals 
by providing for the striking of a Royal Great Seel and a Royal 
Signet exclusively for the Union did, at least, establish a foundation 
.or independent action in the executive sphere.
Notwithstanding all this, the Statute of Westminster and the two 
South African Acts did not purport to affect the prerogative powers 
. the Crown or to touch at all on the problems of Dominion status in 
it .er national law. It is, therefore, not surprising that in view cf 
the doctrine of the indivisibility of the Crown, to which common 
allegiance was habitually accorded, it was generally assumed even
as late as the beginning of the Second World War in 1939 that, 
irrespective of the changes that had taken place between the two world 
wars in the position and status of the Dominions in both their internal 
n. in ..f rnnt. ionai affairs, sen.arete neutrality, belligerency and pence 
were inconceivable, .-'any hnglich constitutional authorities in 
particular ' stl'I adhered to the view that many prerog live restraints, 
including the prerogative of war and peace, were still firmly vested in 
the British Crown. t was generally believed in regard to these 
declarations that the component parts of the British Commonwealth of 
Nations could not act separately and individually, but were bound to 
heed the decree of the Crown. Such assumptions were soon to be
61. The L * atute of Westminster, 1931, 22 Geo.', c.4, second paragraph.
62. Act 69 of 1934.
63. Ibid., section 4.
64. Act 70 of 1934.
63. See, for example, Arthur Berriedale Keith The D inions as 
Severe i .-n M  ter. (1938) 203.
discredited by events surrounding the outbreak of the Second World 
War. however, until they were no discredited, no Dominion could validly
assert true independence in its treaty-m king (and breaking) powers,
despite the fact that a substantial measure of autonomy in the treaty-
making process had mcreasm ly been granted to the Dominions for 
almost a century.6
ih® ability to declare war and to conclude peace is closely linked 
with the treaty-making processes of any State. Apart from the fact 
that many important political treaties are basically treaties of 
aiUance and mutual defence pacts, many other treaties of a purely 
commercial and technical nature arise out of and depend for their 
effectiveness on the maintenance of peaceful relations thus established.
A declaration of war has the effect of abruotly terminating or at least 
of suspending the operation of moot of these treaties, thereby disrupt­
ing not only the peaceful and harmonious co-existence between one State 
and anothei but the internal stability of these States as well. It is, 
therefore, extremely important t' .t sovereign independent States have 
che unimpeded right to decide for themselves whether or not they are 
at war with another State, quite ipart from any rights they may possess 
to conclude treaties g nerally. The negoti- on s„.d conclusion of 
treaties is the exclusive province of the Head of State. As long as 
the British sovereign could ueclare war or conclude peace on behalf 
oi South Africa, and because of the ’domino' effect such a declaration 
would inevitably h, ve on all other pre-existing treaties, it could not 
be said that South Africa manifested true independence in the treaty- 
making process.
The declaration of war and peace has traditionally been regarded 
as the ol est and most important prerogative power cf the British Crown.*? 
The Grown alone v 3 entitl'd to determine whether a state of wnr existed 
be tween the ocv- reign and for- ign power. This principle is illustrated 
by an incident which occurred aeon after the end of armed hostilities in 
the Second World fc ir concerning one Carl ./alter Kuechenmeieter, i German
66. M.ii.M. Kidwai 'International Personality and the British
Dominions : Evolution <nd Accomplishment' (1975) 9 University 
of Queensland Law Journal ?6 briefly outlines the developments 
of the treaty-making pow r in the Dominions.
6?. De Smith op.cit. ))).
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national who had originally come to England in 1928. In May, 1939, 
he applied for British nationality but this had not yet been granted 
when the war beg n and ht was cent to Australia for internment, where 
he remained until 1945. He then returned to England and was promptly 
sent to an internment camp at Beltane School. Fearful that he was 
soon to he deported, he applied for a writ of habeas corpus, contending 
th't he was no lorgar an enemy alien. Kuechenmeister's argument was 
based on the proposition that the war wnn at an end because war could 
only take place between sovereign States, r.d sin.e the unconditional 
surrender of Germany, the displacement of its central Government and 
' he assumption of supreme authority with respect to that State by the 
Government of His Majesty and his allies, Germany was no longer a 
sovereign independent State. The King's Bench Division** conceded 
that while these facts might in international law be regarded as 
putting an end to the state of war, nevertheless,
'[ijn the British Constitution ... the King makes both war
and peace  the King ; ays by an Act of State that
the Commonwealth of countries over which he reigns is at war 
with a particular foreign State, it is at war with that State 
.... A'nen the King makes pe c, with an enemy State, that war 
comes to an end, but it does not come to an end before that 
peace is made. Whether int.cn ttional law has a different 
rule is irrelevant. '
As with the prerogative of treaty-making, the prerogative to 
declare war or peace is, by British constitutional convention, 
exercised by the Queen on the advice of her Cabinet and especially 
or. the advice of the rice Minister r.d Minister of Foreign Affairs.*'
’he Cabinet is not obliged to consult Parliament. Parliament can express 
its disapproval by resolving to denounce the decision or by refusing 
to vote funds for the war effort but 1 powerless as a body to declare
war or peace. In practice, however, the House of Common., is consulted
70
wherever practicable, partly because of the fund-raising aspect and 
partly because the Cabinet Minis:era are ultimately responsible to the 
electorate.
CH. Fh v. Bottrill, ex parte Kuechemn-i .n r [194?] K.B. 4l at 50.
69. Hood Phillips op.cit. 206.
70. I. Jennings (J.-bin.-t Government ’ ed. (1959) 48J.
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In the United Kingdom, the- declaration of war in 19.59 against 
Germany occurred in the following manner. A public notification of 
a state of war was issued by the Privy Council Office on 3 September, 
1939, and this was published on the same date in the London Gazette. 
There was no Koyal i reclamation. The Prime Minister, Mr. Neville 
' ‘mbei . nn, broadcast to the nation at 11 a.m. and made a statement
to the House of Commons at 12 p.m.'1
-iie problem arose wi ether this declaration of war on Germany was 
e^fet ive for the onion of Louth Africa. In the early years of the 
Union any such declaration would without doubt have been part of the 
. r i -r og t. j ve power of the Crown't conventionally exercised on the advice
of the Crown’: Ministers. Up to and including the First World War,
only i ; itii h :• inist ers (and not Dominion Ki, tens) were consulted. 
ihe British declaration of war in 1914 therefore automatically included 
•he vnion• i>o serious thou/ht was given to the necessity of a Separate 
declaration by the Union itself.
The question of the legal possibility of South African neutrality 
in a British war was, nevertheless, raise i in the Union as early as 
1911. It ultimately led to a quarrel between Generals hotho and 
Kertzog in 1913 and was one of the causes of the 1914 rebellion.' *
The issue of neutrality was regarded as important because it was the 
ertrial test of independent status and a large »'*rt of the Bov-r 
majority resident in South Africa had a strong desire for constitutional 
liberty.
nL
At the 1923 Imperial Conference a resolution was passed' to the 
effect that
’it ]s for the Parliaments of the several parts of the 
Bmpire upon the recommendations of their respective Govern­
ments to decide the nature and extent of any action which 
should be taken.'
Thi f resolution did not transfer the prerogative power of declaring
war to the Un^on executive. It merely gave the Union Government
(.lor a with th" Gowrnmmts ol the other Dominions) the competence
71. H.J. Harvey Consultation and Coo,oration in the Commonwealth; a 
Hnr: 11 co' tm Method: and I'x-.M’fiae ? 19921 4l f.
72. See above pp. 6-9.
73. Brooke Cl; xton 'The Commonwealth and South Africa1 (1935 ) 42 
queen's Quarterly 110 t T 1.5.
?4. 19?5 Imperial Conference, App.ndtvu ; to the Summary of Proceedings
cmd 1988 r>. 16.
to decide, once war ,vas declared b; tLa britisk Crow, the extent of 
oouth Africa's active involvement.
In 1926, at the Imperial Conference, it was decided that Dominion 
Ministers should replace British Ministers in advising the King as 
regards the affairs of such Dominions.
'IX i! reC°sn9 ' d th“t “  1= the right of the Government of 
,“ t0 sdvine the Crown in all rcetterb relating to
v'tVcorL M m " Consequently It would not be in accordance
matter appertaining to the affairs of the Government of that 
vominicn .
Thereafter, the declaration of war or peace, as far as the Union
Wdb concerneu, continued to Le the prerogative of the English Crown,
but, by convention, exercisable on the advice of His Majesty's Union 
Ministers.
Ln l9?i+’ with the enactment by the South African Parliament of
the Royal Executive Functions nd Seals Act,?* it became possible for
the Governo.-General, in certain defined circumst aces, to exer,.de the
prerogative to declare war on behalf of the Union on the advice of
his Union Ministers without consulting the King. Despite this, certain
Britisn constitutional autloritiee, such as Keith, maintained that
'the argument for the right of neutrality is not very strong',77 and
that 'a British declaration of war involved the Dominions in war'.7^
Oi.*. ilariy, . is count 6 imondi > wrote!
'In 1939 it was widely believed that by virtue of the 
indivisibility of the Crown, to which a common allegiance 
was owed, a declaration of war by the Crown mode on the 
advice of United iun.dom Ministers would extend automatically 
to ai! parts of His Majesty's Dominion*, that separate 
neutrality and separate belligerency were alike impossiole; 
hut ,.i.n i the < xi.ent of a Dominion'* active participation in 
the wa; wan a matter for the Dominion concerned.'
South African st iteumen had long been divided on the irsue. The 
two main protagonists were General Herteog nnd General Smuts. WHn the
75- 1926 Imperial Conference Summary o: droceedinrs cmd. 2768 p.l?.
76. Act 70 of 19)4, section 6.
77. A.B. Keith The Doniajona as , iiv, r, i,-; States (1 58) 92.
78. Ibid. 47.
79- Halebury'n I nw«: of rn.rl .nd ) ed. v o l . (195') 4$4.
94
former cam,, to power in 1924, it was the avowed object of hit National 
“ ,My 1 ' ’00r up ‘hl3 constitutional question. He attended the
Icieria] Conference of 1926 determined to secure recognition of 
n"r 11 “ ' ■ ir .t to accede and to remain neutral.^ He came
..way djpar'-iitly satisfied that he had achieved this goal. During 
the debates on the Conference in the Union house of Assembly in March 
192\  General hertzog and the majority of the House expressed the vie. 
that South Africa and any other Dominion could not only rem,i» passive 
in a Hritist wr, but could claim absolute neutrality and hove this 
recognized by other States. He declared:^1
'UJt 1 -j not unknown to [honourable] members that I am one 
of those who maintain that the Union ... has, in case of war
nUtr%l r T t  T * * ' "  -tate, the right to remain
ih<.
countries equal in status to Great. Britain and in no way 
eutor-irate to her in any aspect of their domestic or external 
af.uire .... Such being the state of independent freedom of 
the Dominions, on what .rounds then could a Dominion which has
-!! her desire to be neutral in e war in which
Britain is a belligerent, be denied the right of 
neutrality?'
- cut£ ' rePlJW  *fae ^  rded. He defined the essence of the problem 
as the existence of
'a sinyle kingship in the empire .... The question whether
oouth Africa can remain under that Bin,1« and common kingship
and at the some time be neutral when Great Britain is at war*
is a very baffling question indeed and one thrt is difficult 
to answer'.
In 1935, during, t ,e debate in the four, of Ac; embly concerning 
the status of the Union, hertzog reiterated: ^
j  f .iy again and i estate , mphntically my views as to the 
leyal consequences ... flowing from our sovereign independent 
statue, in which is included the right, and the fu leet rirht 
of neutrality'. ’
Hertzog was supported in hie point of view by Dr. D.F. talon,^
80. Brooke iloxton qp.cit. 113.
• House of Aaeorrbly Debates vol. 10, col .1846 ( 8 March 1928).
8 2 . Ibid. CO 1.1850.
83. House of Assembly Debates vol.24, ecl .1?7'> (Id February 1955).
84. M.P. for Calvinia, ibid, col.1790.
mi
85. House of A... frr.My Debate.-; vo) .22, col.lt 77 (25 August 1938).
86. Ibid. cols. 1678-9*
87. U.K.T.S. 2926, No.28; cmd. 2764.
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who added that 'freedom without the fullest international right of 
neutrality simply m  'ins that there is nt. freedom*. This was 
rhetorical but t:ii. jioint. was clear.
In ’ Wlth t e likelihood f war betv,,en Great Britain and 
Utn. any .< reel prob the subject was, once again, broached in
the Lower House. By this, time the two Generals K.d put to one sice 
the differences whirh ' for twenty y,ar; divided them, and in c great 
el fort of statesmanship endeavoured to unite the country by forming a 
co fit ton Government, with He"tzog as Prime Minister and fnmts as 
Minister of Justice.
In rep'y to ouesiions put to by Dr. L.y. Malnn, B^ts declarer 
the juridical position to be as folx'ws: '
* .'he policy of the Government a far as participation by 
' cuth Africa i i ny wcr ... has l-e.: repe* tedly. laid down 
oy tne t-'rime Mini, ter, by me and b. other Ministers, viz. 
this, that South Africa will not be ;nvolved automatically 
in any way in a war, that tauth Africt will only take part 
in any war when the varliameit of the country has passed a 
resolution to that effect in t i interests of South Africa*.
He added that, whereas, in 1914
'the fact that we went to war at that time happened
automatically in accordance with the status we had at 
t..rit lime .... -o .ay the pos.tion is that in accordance 
*i i.h the Locarno treaty we are not automatically at war, 
a.vj we can only decide when the time comes according to 
.he .ircumst ?nces that ray then 8 ’ise, as to what our 
policy will be*.
The Treaty of uocarno of 1925 was a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee 
between the United Kingdom. Belgium, France, Germany and Italy/7 
ikie to repeated protests .-,nd growing concern demonstrated by the 
dominions at this t’me on account of the automatic application of 
politics^ tr< iti. signed by the Imperial vovernn.! nt without prior
consultation with them, a cl use was incorporated in the Treaty of
Locarno which excluded the Dominions from is application. It was 
evidence of the- Dominions' grew;nr reluctance to become involved in
,
96
P^re.y Europe- n issues and by inserting this extinction clause the British 
government recognized, at the very least, that the Dominions would not be 
committee to any active obligations that might be incurred by the 
Imperial Government. Stewart, an his book IVoaty He!it ions of the
nv. cal th of Nat ions': " comments that this exemption clause 
raised the very significant issue that
'[i]f His Majesty went to war to fulfil his promise of 
assistance, would not the Dominions also be at war? Many 
answered this question in the affirmative. Thus interpreted, 
the Treaty recognizes the dirt action between active and 
passive belligerency. Although the Dominions might legally 
ee in a state of belli erency they would be morally free to 
decide whether, and to v.'^at extent, they would participate 
in the enforcement of His Majesty's obligations'.
It is clear that General Smuts aid not agree with such an interpretation
of the Locarno Treaty. He nude no distinction between 'active' and
'passive' belligerency. Either the Union of South Africa was able to
remain neutral or it was not.
.he essential difference between the respective views of General 
Smuts and General Hertzog was not, therefore, that the former believed 
that a British declaration of war would automatically plunge South 
Africa into the war, while the latter did not; but that Smuts was 
firmly convinced that
'if Great Britain is t-t te ' eti and came into real danger - not 
merely that she goes to war ir Central Europe as an ally of 
France, but where England herself is attacked and is in 
danger - that South Africa will help her .... it is my opinion 
that wnen Great Britain re,illy gets into great danger it 
would be absolutely impossible for South Africa, and it would 
be morally wrong of us, to keep ourselves out of the war'.
Hertzog, on the other hand, believed that the Union Government 
should not
'poke our noses into oatterr concerning Poland [or any other 
European country].... The Union should keep ou* of European 
problems which do not affect us ... [and stay out] until the 
interests of the Union '■-re affected1 ,90
Matters came to a head in South Africa once Britain declared war 
on Germany on 3 September, 1939* When'a: in Britain the House of
88. (1939) 17t  n9
89• House of Assembly Debates, vol. 32* col.1679 (25 August 1938).
90. House of 'i.uiembly Debates, vol. )4, cols.2? -^5 (12 April 1939) •
CcLnxn... . u: not been consulted before the declaration, in the Union the 
il^aaen, a major roie in leading the country into war. The
Inion ..Ouse ol Assembly met on 4 September and a tempestuous debate 
e..^ ueu. z-vvn at this late hour certain lu mbers protested that the 
coum.ry was automatically at war and that the only business of the 
House was to decide the extent of its active involvement. 91
I'or t. majority of members, however, that point hau already been 
ueciaed in favour of allowing the Union a separate right of action, 
ihe question left to be decided now was whether South Africa should 
enter the arena of war on the side of Great Britain. The Prime 
Minister's proposal that
'the existing relations between the Union of South Africa 
and the various belligerent countries will, in so far as
 ^livZ1 ■Li- concerne i, persist unchanged and continue as 
if no war is being waged1 9-
was unacceptable to the majority of the House. In its stead, the
9 3
Louse carried the motion proposed by General Smuts that
'i'his Mouse declare ti t the policy of the Union in this 
crisis shai be based on the following principles and 
considerations, viz.:
1. It is in the interests of the Union that its relations 
with the German Reich shall be severed and that the Union 
shall refuse to adept an attitude of neutrality in this 
conflict.
2. The Union should carry out the obligatiom to which it 
has agreed, end continue its co-operation with its friends 
and associates in the British Commonwealth of Nations.
5. The Union should take all necessary measures for the 
defence of its territory and South African interests and 
the Government should not send forces overseas as in the 
last war.
4. This House is profoundly concerned that the freedom and 
independence of the Union ar« at stake in this conflict and 
that it is, therefore, in its true interest to oppose the 
ust of force as an instrument of national policy.' 94
The Prime Minister thereupon requested Mis Excellency, the Governor- 
95General " to dissolve Parliament with n view to a general election.
91. See, for example, the speeches delivered by Mr. Karwick,M.P. for 
Illovo, Lour', of Assembly Debates vol.56, cols.55-5 (4 September 
1959) and Mr. Nicholls, M.P. for Zululand, ibid. cole.54-5.
92. Ibid. col.25.
95. 3y nighty v ter to sixty-seven.
94. House of Assembly Lcbntt r; v< 1.56,cols.50-1 (4 September 1959).
95. Sir Patrick Duncan.
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wa“ refused by the latter, ’ whereupor General Hertzog 
tendered his resignation, which was accepted. General Smuts was 
requested to form a new Government.
Ihe alternate course op n to the Governor-General, Sir Patrick 
Dune...), a c ot Ly birth, but by this time a South African national, 
would have been to accede to General Hertzog's request to put the 
matter to tin electorate. 1, clearly did not regard this alternate 
course as either necessary or expedient. Apparently he saw his duty 
as neing limited sImply to the question whether a viable Government 
' u H‘ for-nv<: ;!nd °ot extending to consulting the electorate on the 
1 .su<- of v:he; r they ap; rowd of becoming embroiled in the war or not. 
The motives be im: his actions were most likely two-fold. On the one 
hard, <\e may h ve wished to expedite the entry of South Africa into the 
war on the side of Great Br tain, and it is possible that he saw this as 
his primary dut as guardian of the prerogative. Certainly, the
pi act Lea] effec ol his <’ cis ion was that South Africa came into the
war on i he hr: i r> di i h the minimum delay. Or. the other hand,
Sir Patrick Du; an s eraed to have decided in his own mind that public 
opinion in the matter was firmly behind General Smuts and that to call 
a general election on the eve of a global war would have had too dis­
ruptive an effect or the country and would have been most unwise. If 
the views of members of the House of Assembly accurately reflected the 
sentiments of the voters thev were supposed to represent, the Governor- 
General was certainly correct in deciding that the majority of the 
electorate believed that a declaration of war by the Union was imninent 
and unavoidable. In any event, at the next general election which took 
place in 1943, Smuts was returned to power with a decisive majority - 
an event that could not have occurred without at least subsequent 
ratification by h-- South African electorate of his war policy. Not a
single seat wan won by antl-w ir splinter groups which had proliferated
during the war years. In addition, in the House of Assembly the war
97opposition shrank from sixty seven votes to forty three
On 6 September, .1939, the Governor-General issued a proclamation 
declaring the existence from that date of a state of war between the 
Union and the German Reich. In so doing he dispensed with the Royal
96. In a letter frc l te Governor-General to the Hon. J.B.M. Hertzog 
dated 4 September 1939 and published in the Cape Times
5 September 19 39.
97. Paul Knaplund Britain Commonwealth and Empire (1901-1955) (1956) 361.
® “d ^|„un,'er uhe provisions of the Poyal Executive Functions end
authorized such a  ^- '.rse on the grounds of urgency.
..he r'roclamntion reads!
, iiis Excellency the Rifht Honourable Sir Patrick Duncan
"Eer ... Lin .Majesty's Mo Honourable Privy Council, Knight
urand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael
^ baint George, one o' His Majesty's Counsel Learned in the
-y<.w, voctor of Or or-Generol in the Union of South
Africa.
No.197. 1939
WHEREAS it is in the interests of the Union that the peaceful
i nations with the German hsich be severed and that it be at war
with the German Reich:
New, IHEREK-RE, under .•.»id by virtue of the powers in me vested 
under section rsix of the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act,
' 1 No.70 of 1934), I do by this my Proclamation in the name
and on behalf of His Majesty the King declare and make known that 
from this tle sixth doy of September, 1939, the peaceful relations 
between the Union and the German Reich are severed and that the 
Union is, for the purposes of all Inwa, at war with the German
Reich as from the aforementioned date.
God Save the King!
Given under my hand and the Great Seal of the Union of South 
Africa, at Cape Town, on thi" the Sixth day of September, One 
Thourand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Nine.
PATRICK DUNCAN 
Governor-Gene ral
Ly Command of His Excellency the Governor-General-in-Council
J.C. SMUTS.'
This was the first occasion in South Africa that a break with 
tradition had occurred. Not only did the declaration of war by the 
British Crown not automatically include the Union, but the Crown was 
not even consulted by the Governoi-General-in-Council as regards the 
declarable.; made by ths Union.
98. Act 70 of 1934, section 6 .
99. Proclamation 197 >u Extra-ordinary 267b of 6 September 1939.
1. This Independent attitude was not adopted by rll the Dominions, in
Australia, for example, the Cabinet met immediately after Chamberlain's 
broadcast It approved the issue, by the Governor-General (acting on 
the advice of the Federal Cabinet), of a proclamation of the existence 
of war :-8 required unaer the Australian Defences Arte 1903-9« The 
proclamation was immediately published in a special edition of the 
Doffinonwen i th Gn ..tie. At 9.13 p.m., the Prime Minister, Mr.Menziee, 
broadcast to the nation that in consequence of Germany's persistence
in her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war; and, as a
result,Australia is also at war'. Gee further Harvey op.cit.4l; 
Docker's analysis of the situation eker op.cit.89-90, confirms 
that Australia regarded the British declaration of war on Germany as 
autc .atically binding on it.
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-'• position with 13 pect to the outbreak of war with Italy in
^ 1 o0rT'ewhat different, for this involved a declaration of 
I  ^^ ;. t,t‘ -rea( Britain, and not a declaration of war by Great
'** i e f. one 0: the Dominions was mentioned in the notification
" J 1 r‘-,v t - K June addressed by the King of Italy to the govern- 
y  " ° t '■ • * *es»' espite this, certain Coi; nonwealth countries
(incluoira Austi tlia) issued proclamations of war which seemed to
indie .te tiv t they still vdhered to the view upholding the indivisibility 
W  of the British Crown.'
*fi" ,Jnicn of South Afric; persisted in its chosen course of deciding
independently whether it would declare war on Italy. A proclamation
I declaring the existence of a state of war with Italy as from 11 June,
”' 1 f‘ h--ued, which was similar in style to the earlier proclamation
-t of w,.r hf ■ _/ fct err,.' ay. Cr.ce again the Governor-General acted by virtue
_ ' +: e P0*«r- vested in him by section 6 of the Royal Executive Functions
and Seals Act.
1
On this session, the Soutl African executi,e took the lead in
proclaiming war. At the time of the proclamation, the Union Parliament
was not _n ession ar thus did not give pjior thought or approval to
this step. It was mly on 29 August, 1940, in response to a peace
resolution moved by General Hertzog' th t the Prime Minister, General
cmuts, move a comprehen- ve - yndment re-aff•rving the Union's
intention to abide oy its re-. Lation of 4 September, 1939, to enter
the war. omuts rtnted that
'however ardently thi'. iiou e and the oeople of the Union 
long for peace and would co-operate zealously for its 
restoration, the Union cannot make a separate peace with 
Germany without forfeiting its honour and sacrificing its 
vital inters its .... In view of the entry of Italy into the 
war on 10 June, 1940, this House approves of the action of 
the Government in severing relations with and declaring war 
on Italy on 11 June 1940'. 0
The Government amendment was carried by eight-, fiv>. votes to sixty five
n
Similar proclamations declaring the Union to be at war with Japan,
2 . Doeker op.cit. 90.
3. Harvey op.cit. 4); Doeker ibid.
4. Proclamation 116 GO Extraordinary 2??4 of 12 June 1940.
5. At that time the leader of the Opposition.
6 . House of Assembly Debate'; vol -40,00. >.100-101 (29 August 1940).
?. Proclamation 230 GO hxtra-ordinary 2971 of 8 December 1941.
ini,nti, -urn •» y, rfouroania, nd Bulgaria' were subsequently issue, 
ty the Governor-General on the advice of hia Union Ministers.
‘-'Orre time later, after lengthy debate, the House of Assembly adopted 
the following motion:
^  View ° ‘ ’ fact that the Union is at war with Germany 
unu taiy, and that Japan, BuJ: aria, . ..nrary, Kounania and 
liniaj d are taking an active part in the war on the side of 
-hose powers, this House approves the Union's declaration of 
war also against these Duntries1.1-
1 v lh cienr 1 hat the South African Parliament played a major role 
n the oi igmal decision, in 1959> to to to war with Germany. There- 
niter, the executive alone, through the offices of the Governor-General 
acting in accordance with the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act, 
exeicistd the prerogative of declaring war. T e executive obviously 
believed by then that it enjoyec the support of the Lower House. That 
r.is attitude was fully justified was evidenced by the subsequent 
ratifications of all the proclamations by Parliament.
As a result of South Africa's independent stance throughout the 
Second World War, Lauter? acht was led to commentthat
'[a t the commencen^ nt end in the course of the Second
Aorld War, the vinous Dominions ■ exercised, in principle,
their right to declare war separately from the action taken
by Great Britain'.
In the third action of i ttbury 't * f England, which appe-v ed
in 1953,  ^* the learned author wrote tha»
1[i3n face of the acceptance of the conduct of Eire, Canada 
and the Union of jovth Africa in 1939 [and thereafter], it 
is difficult to contend that a declaration of war by Her
10
8 . TheProcln.a iticr. < GC xtn-on ir.^ r 2971 of c December 1941. 
proclamation embraced all three countries.
9. Proclar ition 3 GG bxtr-ordinary 2979 of 2 Janvary 1942. This
proclamation made the ■trte of war retrospective to 13 December 1941.
10. By eighty on< vote; to fifty 1 ;ve.
11. House of Ar-emb. . ».bateu vol..+5, col. 536 (17 January 1942).
12. Cppenheim op.cit. 207.
13. Canada reacted in icilar t. x-mer tc the Union, while Iieland 
announced her neutrality which she trainti Lned throughout the 
war and which was recognised by the belligerents.
14. Halebury op.cit. 455- I
: ti t ie advice of United Kingdom Ministers would now 
ox.erm jt , itically to the other Members.'^ 5
bei-wf.tn oouth Africa and Japan was terminated by a treaty of 
peace signed in San Francisco on 8 September, I9?l.1b In the cases *
* i'-iig'-’n a  , i inlanu " and Hungary, ^ the Union Government 
ti.r.ai -8ted ....<• si to of war by concluding separate pence treaties, all 
aigne . n • ■’- i' on 10 1 ebruary, 19^7, which provided for the cessation 
c‘ v' 1 an  ^ ‘-^ -'tilities. In each case the pence treaty was signed 
separately by representatives of the Union Government.
Anr cetween the uerman Reich and the Union Government has never been 
officially terminated. This resulted from the circumstances which pre- 
ailed s i t e :  the del eat of the Reich and the destruction of its Govern­
ment. ureal Britain, America, Russia and France in a Joint Declaration 
issuer, on 5 June, 19^5, assumed supreme authority over Germany, including 
the contro. over si 1 powers formerly possessed by the German Government - 
At the dame time they expressly disdained any intention to annex the 
conquered territory. As a result of the Declaration ' nd the various 
measures token to implement it, the international personality of Germany 
was leemed to have been suspended until on independent Gerrin Government 
was set up exercising with relative freedom the right to conclude 
treaties and international agreements/ Germany was ultimately split 
up into the Federal Republic of Germany ( Jest Germany) and the Democratic 
Republic of Germany (East Germany), neither of which wished to be
15- Doeker op.cit. 93 contends that, during the war, Austral! changed 
its attitude towards its automatic inclusion in a war by virtue 
of a British declaration. As regards state of war between 
Australia, Germany and Italy, the proclamations issued by the 
Australian Governor-General were merely notifications of that 
state. At that stage, Australio still adopted the view that a 
declaration of war by the Crown necessarily involved all the 
Dominions. The war with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Roumania 
wa a different matter. Here, the proclamations we re operative 
instruments, themselves creating a rtate of war. Australia had 
thereby also established a precedent for separate action with 
respect to the declaration of war.
16. Union r:"v'- nf-cnt Treaty Series 1? of 1952.
17. Ibid. 15 of 1948.
18. Ibid. 33 of 1948.
19. Ibid. 14 of 1948.
90 . Ibid. 19 - f 1948.
21. Oppenheim op.cit. 568-9.
J
J
D
u
]
]
j
]
1
]
i
:
j
i
regarded as the successor of the Third Belch.
. ^;,MO’ t^e South African Parliament enacted the Treaties of Peace
net which provided for the carrying into effect of the peace treaties 
between the Union Government and the Governments of Bulgaria, Finland, 
Hungary, tioumania and Italy.
uection M 1) ni the Act provides for a possible peace treaty with 
the successors of the Third Reich, by stating that
[w„ i.r-rear, a treaty of peace is concluded between the Government 
0' * “e jr‘ion and any power not mentioned [above], between whom 
and the . nion a state of war exists at the dote of commencement 
of this Act, or has at any time since the sixth day of September, 
19J;9, existed, the Government may, after such treaty has been 
ratified with the prior <. ucurrence of Parliament, provide by 
proclamation that ... such treaty shall for the purvhEes of this 
Act thereafter be deemed to be included in the definition of the 
expression 1 the Treaties1 in section one contained. 1
This provision has never been utilized vis-a-vis Germany.
Since 19^1, the declaration of war or peace has been governed by 
the Republic of South Africa Constitution A c t ^  section ?(3)(i) of 
ich provides that the Strte President has the power to declare war 
and to make peace. Such declarations are now controlled by and large 
by statute. Almost certainly, hcwever, som-; vestiges of the prerogative 
remain. The mere incorporation of a nrerog-itive power into an Act of 
Parliament does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the legislature 
intended the prexogativr to be replaced entirely. In this particular 
instance an inter rotation of the Republic of South Africa Constitution
25
Act seems to indicate !hat the South African legislature merely 
intended to clarify and restate the powers of the S'ate President 
possessed in terms of the historical prerogative. South Africa had 
just gained complete independence from Great Britain and in the process 
had bet n transformed from a union into a republic, governed by a new 
[{..ad of State . The moat practical method of reflecting these changes 
vas by drafting a new constitution. An ir >ortant aspect of this new 
constitution consisted in defining the powers and capacities, rights 
and dutie of this new Head of State. It is notable that his functions
22. Australia vercame this legal obstacle by issuing a proclamation
in 19f,l to the effect that while a treaty of peace was pending
the formal state o* war with Germany was terminated as from twelve 
noon 9 July, 19.51. The full proclamation is contained in Doeker 
op.cit. 91*.
23. Act 20 of 1948.
24. Act 52 of 1961.
23. Ibid.
' ‘ 1 ai 'r Materially from these previously exercised by the Queen, 
either personally or through he- representative, the Governor-General.
Ac. .cd to -hi-3, section 7(4) of the new constitution provided generally 
1 k' ‘^ '1‘L ‘ e ; * erogative powers that wen formerly possessed by the
ereign were henceforth to be vested in the State President, 
let. another indication that the legislature intended merely to 
explain rather than to change the prerogative nature of the powers of 
the . tc.te 1 resident lies in the fact that certain English constitutional 
conventions re iting to the exercise of the prerogative were now 
specifically incorporated into the constitution itself. For example, 
whereas in England a constitutional convention decreed that the preroga­
tive powers oi th< sovereign to conclude treaties or to declare war and 
peace were to be exercised or; the advice of her Ministers, in the 
Republic of South A rrica th^ constitution itself provided that the 
equivalent powers of the State President _n this regard must b<i
pZ
exercised on the dvce of the Executive Committee.^' In addition, 
other tr ditional constitutional conventions have also survived the 
change-over from anion to republic which have not been expressly i. cor- 
porated into statute law. Cae of these ensures that the Executive 
Council mutt not advise the State President to declare war or peace
unless it is sure t at such a move would be supported by n majority of
27
the House of Assembly. <hy retain ell these constitutional safeguard*? 
surrounding the use of the prerogative in the spheres of treaty-making 
and declarations of war and peace unless the prerogative itself has 
remained intact'
Finally, certain other statutes should be mentioned which also affect
the freedom of the State President in the declaration of war and peace.
The Defence Act provides' ^  that the State President 'may establish a
Council of Defence which shall be constituted in such manner and which
shall perform such functions as he nay prescribe'. According to Article 2
of the Interuretati n of Statute* Act ' this power must be exercised on
31
the adv.ee of the Executive Committee.'
2 6. Ibid. sections 1.6(1) and ( ’).
27. Vessels op.cit. 165.
28. Act 44 ot 1957.
29. Section 73*
30. Act 45 of 14‘>1.
31. Fouchc op.cit. 259-61 ex',Irina comprehensively the powers of the 
State President under these Acts.
i. he De fence Act' was amended early in 19?6„ partly as p. result 
of the criticism pursuant to the involvement of the Couth African Defence 
Force in the Angolan Civil War in 1975,to th- effect that the State 
President had no authority to dispatch troops to fight outside the borders 
of the country during times of peace. The net result of these amendments 
has been to empower the State iresident (in Council) to mobilise the 
South African Defence Force and to order it to fight both within and 
beyond the borders of the Republic of ."outh Africa without the formality 
of a declaration of war. Traditionally, the definition of 'service in
34
defence of the Republic1' has meant military service in tint of
(that is, once war lias been formally declared) or in connection with
the discharge of obligations arising from any agreement between the
Republic and any other State (that is, treaties of alliance and defence
xc
pacts). Since the amendment " it now includes service for the
prevention or suppression of any arr.t• d conflict outside the Republic,
which, in the opinion of the hre.sident, is or may be a threat to
the security of the Republic. This amendment effectively dispenses wit 
the traditional oresidential rite of formally issuing a declaration of 
war before engaging the State's troops in battle. In view of the more 
recent practices of warfare in which States rarely declare themselves 
tv be at war, this amendment is, perhaps, essential in defining the powers 
of the State President in this regard. Certainly it is a practical step 
designed to provide the constitutional authorization to cover euch 
situations as striking at guerilla bases situate outside the Republic 
whether such strikes take the form of military reprisals, pre-emptive 
raids or so-called 'hot pursuits', practices wnich must surely become 
more prevalent as guerilla warfare aimed at tor ing the present South 
African Government is stepped up. This amendment ;>!-o attempts to 
provide the legal justification for sending uninvited South African 
troops into neighbouring territories in an Angola-type conflict which 
does not originally involve Couth Africa but which, because of its clou, 
physical proximity to the Republic, may constitute n real threat to the
32. Act 44 of 1957.
33. By the Defence Amendment Act 1 of 1979,
34. Contained in section 1 of the Principal Act.
if. In terms of section 1(a) of th, Defence Amendment Act 1 of 1976.
security oi South ntries. In this way tb-jre alterations to the principal 
Mot ei (actively Bides tap the necee*^*- to p.: ua-.ly declare war and 
extend even 1 urther the powers of the State Presi.ient-in-Council 
possessed in terms of the historical prerogative
Furthermore this extended definition of 1 service in defence of the 
Republic1 is explicitly 'deemed to be service in time of war against an 
enemy thus enabling the htate President to compel members of the 
South African hefer.ee Force to 'perform service against an enemy at 
any place outs;de the Republic'" which they have hitherto been compelled 
to do only 'in time of war' - that is, traditionally, once war has been 
formally declared. From, thv viewpoint of public international law, there 
seems to be no real difference between the situation in which the State 
President orders South African troops abroad r ty after war has been 
declared and the one in which the armed forces are dispatched abroad 
i hout such declaration and simply when the State President opines that 
such a course of action is necessary to prevent or suppress 'any armed
conflict cut* i .(•> the Republic which ... is or may be a threat to the
39security of ths Republic'.
It is an established principle of international law today that any 
aggressive warfare is illegal• lb' presence or absence of any formai. 
declaration of war its irrelevant in evalut.'.ng whether the action of the 
State President in sending troops to fight outside the Republic is 
aggressive or not. The Defence Amendment Act would afford no defer, 
in such a situation because a ^tate will not be able to avo^d incurring 
international responsibility by hiding behind its own -Legislation, -he 
question whether a statute conforms with international law is for inter­
national law to decide. This fact induced Judge Lauterpacht in his 
separate opinion in the Norwegian Lonno Care to declare that
’[national le y;is ’ ation ... may b contrary ... to the 
international obligations of the State. The question of 
conformity of national legislation with international ,v 
- e matter of international law ... It is not enougn for ft 
State to bring a mattei under the protective umbrella of its 
legislation m  order to shelter it effectively from er?
By the amended Election 95(1) of the principal Act.
Ibid.
Ibid. , , \
Defence Amendment Act 1 of 1976, section l(n,.
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Rations.
(1957) IC5 Reports 9 at 37
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
4-2control by international law.' 
i here:ore, il the State President should choose to exercise the discretion 
granted to him under the Defence Amendment Act of 19?6, the international 
community would ignore tie legislation and < *«„ ,i instead ask only one 
question - was the action one of aggression or ore of Svlf-defence?
Only if it fell into the latter category would it be justified in the 
eyes cf the world/*'’
^ne final question arises in connection with the extended powers of 
the otate President to ’declare war’ and vhal is whether this prerogative 
operates outside the republic. The matter was recently considered by the 
House of Lords in the case of ftisran v. Attorney-General! 4 As a result 
c. the civil strife between the ureek and Turkish communities in the 
Republic o: Cyprus in December 1963, the Governments of the United 
Kingdom, ureece and Turkey appealed to the Government of Cyprus to arrange 
a cease-fire and offered their joint services with a view to helping to 
resolve the difficulties giving rise to the occasion. This offer wui 
accepted by ::he Government of the Republic of Cyprus in a communique' 
issued on 29 December, 1969, and pursuant to this agreement British troops 
were dispatched to Cyprus or, the following day. The respondent, a British 
subject, claimed against the Crown damages in respect cf breach of 
contract nd trespass arising cut of the occupation by British troops 
of an hotel in Cyprus of which he was tenant during this period. The 
essential question thus posed to the court was whether such actions as 
securing food and shelter in peace-time for troops situate abrcad are 
Acts of State and, if so, whether the British Crown is immune from 
prosecution by British citizens.
In the course of its decision, the court held that there r->_- nothing 
unconstitutional about the presence of British troops m  Cyprus as there
was no doubt that it w is within the prerogative of the Crown to moke
45
treaties. " Lord Pearce in his judgement discussed the British
92. The jurisprudence of the Tersnnnnt Court of International Justice
was imilrly emphatic in tht course of its decision on the Treatment 
of tb.tional^ in Dar.zig 1932 CIJ Rep., £er.A/B, N>.44 at
p.24 where it held that ’a State cannot adduce as against °i;other 
State its own Constitution with a view to evading obligations 
incumbent upon it under international low or treaties in force.... 
[Tjhe question of tbr treatment of Poish nationals ... must be 
settled exclusively on th* has a of the rules of international law1.
43. Article .51 of the Charter of the United Nations.
4A. [1S69] 1 All E.R. 629 (H.L.).
45. Per Lord Reid at 63'7.
Government's action in terms of the prerogative in p;rer . r depth. H» 
stated:^
'1 fir i the que- on of the prerogative difficult. There is an 
attractive simp vy about the view that the prerogative operates
only vithin th m. And there seems something odd in finding
it employed on xgn soil by a vi dting Sovereign who is only
there by suffer^ _e of the true Sovereign of the realm. Yet the 
prerogative is the power which directs the movements of forces 
abroad and through the centuries until comparatively recent times 
it was the source of all their disciplinary procedure. The 
prerogative was the warrant for the presence of British troops in 
vyprus. Therefore the prerogative is operating within the lines 
of the army when it it; on foreign soil. Of course it cannot 
operate against an alien in an alien land. But when Sovereign 
and subject meet through the operation of the prerogative in an 
army overseas, there eee-s no inherent rermon why the prerogative 
should not be valid. It seems reasonable that he should, as part 
of his allegiance, be under a duty to the Sovereign in respect 
of the prerogative right which is for the protection of that 
realm of which he is a subject. Therefore, not without some 
doubt, 1 think the view that the prerogative applied and that 
the Crown were exercising it is probably the correct view.'
Though this issue has not yet cone up for consideration before a 
South African court, it is unlikely that a different conclusion would be 
reached. Ap-irt fro the f >ct that the South African court would, in all 
likelihood, regard the above decision in the light of persuasive authority, 
especially in view of the fact that South African courts have consistently 
accepted that the prerogative rests on principles of English law and not
1)7
Roman-Dutch law, it may be justified on the grounds that the subject 
has unquestionably given the State resident-in-Council a hand in
the conduct of foreign policy in general. It would, therefore appear 
that if the State President exercised his right to send South African 
troops beyond the borders of the Republic or. sufferance of the foreign 
Sovereign or without such sufferance but in defence of the Republic, 
this action could be justified in terns of the prerogative.
46. At 652.
47. . ee above p . 6l.
3 NEGiXTIATION AND CONCLUSION OF TREATIES
'a" Appointment of ^out^ African lenioctentiaries
'ihe Republic of South Africa Constitution Act attributes to the 
State ^resident the power 'to enter into and to ratify international 
conventions, treaties and agreements'^  Usually, the first step with 
iegard t> the conclusion of a treaty is the appointment and use of an 
,’ent who will negotiate and enter into the treaty on behalf of the 
Republic. With this in mind the South African Constitution^ empowers 
the State President 'to appoint rnd to accredit, to receive and to 
recognize ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, diplomatic representatives 
and other diplomatic officers, consuls and consular officers'. In the 
.-.epublic, is elsewhere pen ally, the appointment of agents or pleni­
potentiaries is a function of the executive arm of Government.
tnee a decision has been taken to enter into international negotiat­
ions with a view to concluding an international agreement, the negotiat­
ing tea: is usually chosen frorr officials attached to the interested State 
Department as well as from officials attached to the Department of Foreign 
A1 fairs, inhere negotiations arc to take place by correspondence, tho 
Department oi 5ore. -n Affairs will generally be responsible for the 
handling of the diplomatic correspondence. However, in the cas'; of 
treaties of a technical nature such a treaties for the avoidance of 
double taxation, the parties may allow *he particular State Department 
which would ultimately administer the treaty to conduct th; correspondence, 
at least until the stage is reached where the parties ere id idem about 
all technical aspects.
Depending on the nature of the negotiations and the wishes of the 
participating States, the agents may be furnished with special documents 
showing that they are legally entitled to carry on the negotiations. In 
the case of multilateral treaties and international conferences it is
1. Act of 1961.
2. Ibid., section 7(2)(g).
3 - Ibi i., section ?(2)(d).
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customary for aJl plenipotentiaries to be in possession of proper 
documents in order to attend the conference where the treaty is being 
negotiated. i'he draft rules of procedure of the conference or the 
constitution of the organisation under whose auspices the conference 
ie held will set out any such requirements. In addition, a note or a 
telegram must often be sent to the conveners of the conference within 
• certain period before iti commencement, which note or telegram indicates 
precisely who will be attending the conference. On occasion (but this is 
unusual} such a note or telegram may be all that is required. If 
credentials are requested, the draft rules of procedure of the conference 
wi.il usually indicate how these rust be formulated; if not, this inform- 
atjon may be obtained from the Secretariat cf the conference.
J n * v-e case of bilateral treaties it may not be necessary to furnish 
agents with such documents, as, for example, where the negotiators of 
both States are known to each other. tVhere negotiations take place by 
correspondence or by an exchange of notes between the respective Govern­
ments, the procedure with respect to the appointment of plenipotentiaries 
and the furnishing of credentials is frequently very informal.
V.here credentials are necessary, the executive Committee must 
authorize the Minister of Foreign Affairs to issue them on its behalf. 
This is done by way of a Minute, a typical example of which states:
•Ministers have the honour to inform the State President that 
the twentieth General Assembly of the United Nations on ... 
decided that an international conference of Plenipotentiaries 
shall be held to consider ... and to draw up an international 
convention with regard to ....
Ministers have the honour to inform the State President that 
arrangements have been made to hold the conference from ... 
to ....
Ministers further have the honour to advise the State President 
that attendance of the conference in the name of the Republic of 
South Africa is desirable.
Ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the State 
President may be pleased to approve that (the Government of) the 
Republic of South Africa participate in the conference and that 
the following persons be appointed as Plenipotentiaries to 
represent (the Government of) the Republic of South Africa at 
the conference ....
Ministers also have the honour to recommend that the State 
President may be pleased to approve that the Minister o#‘ Foreign 
Affairs take the necessary steps in that connection.*
Ill
.ihis is followed by the issue of credentials by the Minister of
foreign Affairs, which document nrune3 those persons who will represent
the Republic. Next to the name of each person nominated will be
indicated the capacity in which he will attend the conference. The
p re'-ice title required by the constitution of the organization under
whose auspices the conference will be held or,by the draft articles of
procedure,will be used. Examples of such titles are: leader of the
delegation, delegate, alternative delegate, representative, alternative
represent t^  ve, advise*1 ana observer. Crede: tialc will be issued in
re?.-pect of all the members of the delegation. Usually more than one
person will be appointed as deleg te to cater for the situation where
one negoti; tor is suddenly indisposed. The credentials authorize 
delegates
(a) to attend the conference and V' take part in the discussions;
(b.) tc vote during the proceedings;
(c) to sign the .Inal Act of the conference.
On occasion credentials will be included with the Full Dowers to sign
the envisaged treaty, which procedure will be explained in the section on 
F\i* lowers below. -he text o* the credentials for the Vienna Conference 
on treaties, for example, reads as follows:
1WHERL-XS an International Conference of Plenipotentiaries will 
be convened in Vienna on the 26th March, 1968, to consider the 
law of treaties and to embody the results of its work in an 
international convention and such other instruments as it may 
deem appropriate;
AND .VHEHLkS it is expedient that fit and proper persons be accredited 
to represent the Republic of South Africa at the Conference 
aforesaid;
NOW, TfiERLFCKE. I, [NAME], Minister of foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of South Africa, have etherized and appointed and ao 
by these presents authorise and ppoint, the following persons 
to represent the republic of South Africa at the Conference
aforesaid:
HIS EXCELLENCY, [NAME], Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of the Republic of South Africa in Vienna: 
Representative and Chairman of the Delegation;
[NAME], law Adviser, Department of Justice of the Republic
'+. A .D. McNair The Law of Treaties (1961) 24 defines 'Final Act' as 
'a formal statement or summary of proceedings of a congress or 
conference, enumerating the treaties or conventions drawn up as 
a result of its deliberations'.
5. See pp. 129ft- c. low.
of South Africa: R resettative;
[NAME], nder Secretary, Lepartment of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of South Africa: Representative;
[NAME], ,v mister -Counsellor, South African Embassy, Vienna: 
Representative.
jJ WITNESS ^HEREOI I nave signed and sealed these presents at 
Cape Town on this the ... da7 of March in the year of Our Lord,
One thousand Nine hundred and Sixty-eight.'
(b) Negotiation of Treaties
formal negotiations to conclude e treaty with foreign Governments 
will be initiated once the work is thoroughly assessed by
(ij the State Department vhich will administer the treaty and, if 
necessary, the Minister in charge;
(ii) the Department of Foreign Affaire and, if necessary, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs;
iiii) the treasury in the event of treaties with financial implications;
(iv) the inter-departmental Foreign Trade Relations Committee in the 
case of commercial treaties;
(v) the Prime Minister’s Department or, perhapc. the Administration 
of South-West Africa where the treaty w." 11 affect South-West Africa;
(■ri) the Cabinet in treaties of an important nature; and/or 
(vii) the Executive Committee in the ctse of negotiations whore 
credentials are necesc-iry.
Negotiations may take place on both technical and/or on diplomatic 
levels. The rulec of international law itself prescribe neither the forui 
ror the procedure for the making of international engagements' and the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Act of 1961, unlike the constitutions 
of various other States which differentiate between formal and informal 
types of treaties, does not make any provision for different treatment to 
L# meted out to different types of treaties - t simply makes mention of 
’conventions, treaties and agreements’. There is no essential difference 
between them as far os their binding force upon the contracting narties ie 
concerned. The terra ’treaty’ has traditionally been reserved for more 
solemn, protracted agree ents such as treaties of peace and alliance, and
o. McNair op.cit. 6 .
7. Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961, section 7(2)(g).
8. L. Oppenheim International Law - A Treatise 8 ed, (1955)
I Peace 898.
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holder i reatiee;, \ „e tnere has been a tendency to uee the term
1 agreement' when everyday, practical ioaues have been negotiated, for
exampie, air ard visa agreements. The term 'convention' is most often
employed to describe multi-lateral law-makin ■ treaties1'' of general
interest, such a conventions for the- codification of public international
law. It may also be used for bilateral treaties whe.e complex issues,
such as the avoidance of dcuble ta; it on, are negotiated. However, there
is no absolute rule which stipulates that one title should be employed
above another in any giver circumstances.
Couth African practice regarding negotiation varies according to the
nature and significance of tie particular treaty. The following comprise
the main types of treaties tc which the Republic ie party:
(i- Treaties between Horae of . • t at c . McNair" describes these as
'historically the oldest, and, in practice, the meet orthodox form, in
the case of treaties of an important character'. This is a formal treaty
negotiated by Heads of t^ate, as for examale, the Extradition Treaty
between the 'public of Souti Africa and the Republic of Botswana, 1969,2
the preamble to which provides:
'The State President of the Republic of South Africa and the 
President of the Republic of Botswana ... 
have agreed to conclude a treaty ... and have for this 
purpose appointed os their Plenipotentiaries
(ii) Treaties (conventions or agreements) between States. This is a 
formal treaty negotiated on behalf of States. According to McNei<L 
'in a period ... when revolutionary changes in Governments ®r,d in forms 
of Government ar* so frequent, and when many new States are b verued by 
Mini, ters who ... possess little international experience, there is a 
great deal to be said in favour of oil important and permanent inter­
national ngi e ents being trade* as between Str ten .... [tie this formj 
is likely to attract greater sanctity'. An example of this type of
treaty is the Cultural Agree-: -nt between the Republic of South Africa
1A
and the Federal Republic of Germany, 1962. The preamble reads:
9. McNair op.cit. 22.
10. Ibid.
11. McNair oj^ .cit. 18.
12. Republic cf South Africa Treaty Series 2 of I969.
I). McNair op.cit. 17-8.
14. Republic of South Africa Treaty Seres 3 of 1962.
1
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n
.
' he Republic of South Africa and the Federal Republic of 
Geroany, en ieavouring to provide friendly co-operation ... 
and to ‘"urther mutual understanding b.tweon their respective 
peoples, have agreed as follows: 1
( i i i ) ^rgaties (Conve ntioni or Agree me n ts) be t Governments.
-hi; format is often used in thr Republic to negotiate formal treaties.
^outh Airican practice in this regard accords with international practice 
'.'.here thin form h s become increasingly common. v Examples are visa 
agreements ; nd agreements for the avoidance of double taxation.
' *v • iJCPApcol. This is yet another formal type of agreement which
is often an addendum to an existing treaty. Take, for example, the
■ zotocol of 19<i ' amending the Convention between the Government of the
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the United Kingdom of
'-rent Britain and Northern Ireland for the avoidance of double taxation
and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income,
signed ai Cap* .’own on 28 May 1962, the preamble to which reads:
'The Government of the Republic of South Africa and the
Government of the United hi. *om of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland,
Desiring to conclude a Protocol...
Have agreed as follows: 1
It should be noted, however, that a Protocol may also stand alone and
complete in itself cs did the rotocol between the Government of the
Republic of South Africa and the Government of the French Republic which
governed the installation of a scientific space tracking station in
South Africa, 1964. !/
(v) Exchange of Notes. This is u more informal type of treaty 
negotiation but no less binding than its more formal counterparts. The 
valicity of negoti ting international agreements in thi; way has been
approved by the South African Appellate Division in the case of S v. Ellarovt
On 19 November, 1962, an extradition agreement had been concluded between 
the Republic of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
18
15. Cppenheim op.cit. 495; McNair op.cit. 19.
16. Republic of South Africa Treaty Series 4 of 196?
17. Ibid. 1 of 1964.
18. 196? (4) SA 585 CAD); See, too, C.J . Dugard 'The Treaty-
Making Process1 (1968) c'e South Afrit Law Journal 1.
-
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I hie agreement had been duly published f.n the Government Gazette (under
i roc iri mat ion link of 1963) as required by section 2(3) of the Extradition
,'c~ * j •,e - eder ticn was, however, dissolved with effect from 31 December
■ . r i o r to the dissolution, an exchange of notes, designed to ensure
the continued application of the saii agreement as between the Republic
and Rhodesia, had taken place on 23 December, 1963, bet we-: n representatives
u 1 1 government of the Republic and of the Government of the constituent
-eiritory of Southern Ehoderia, On that date the then Prime Minister of
ocutnern Rhodesia, in x note addressed to the Acting Accredited Diplomatic
Representative c: the Government of the Republic, proposed that, in view
of the impending dissolution of the Federation, the existing agreement of
November 1 \>6< 'should continue to apply as between the Republic of South
Africa and Southern Rhodesia’. The note concluded in the following vay:
'It the foregoing proposal is acceptable to the Government of 
the Republic of South Africa, I have the honour to suggest that 
this letter and youi reply in that sense should be regarded ae 
constituting an agreement between our Governments with effect 
Trom the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and 
iJyosalrnd. ’
On the same day the Acting Accredited Diplomatic Representative of the 
Republic sent this reply:
'I have the honour to confirm that the proposal in your letter, 
os quoted above, is acceptable to the Government of the Republic 
of Scutn Africa, and that your letter nd this reply should be 
regarded as constituting an agreement between our Governments 
with effect from the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia 
and Nya< al. nd. '
20
The court u quo held that no valid extradition agreement existed as it
had not been published in the Government Goy.e11»■ os required by the 
?1
Gxtr iition Act. However, by the time the matter went on appeal, the 
requirement of publication had been satisfied, so the Appellate Division
was able to rule thut the extradition treaty as constituted by the exchange
22of no as was of full force and effect.
Becaui » there are fewer formalities involved, the format of exchange 
of notes ie often chosen to negotiate treaties of a routino type and to 
amend existing treaties. However, even weighty matters may be negotiated
19. Act 6? of 1962.
0. S v. Eliasov 1965 (?) SA 7?0(T).
21. Act 67 of 1962, section 2(3).
22. S v. Rli -f ov 1967 (4) SA 583 (AD) at 591.
by an exchange of notes, as was, for example, the so-called Simon town 
Agreement concluded between the Republic and th<- United Kingdom in 1955'^
(vi) Arrangement. This is another informal type of treaty negotiation 
between Governments. One example is the Air Navigation Arrangement with 
the United States of America of March and September 1933. 24
Understanding or Memorandum of Understanding. McNair"'7 defines this 
as being uaeo to an izcreasing extent ’to denote an informal but neverthe­
less legal agreement between two or more States, particularly when that 
agreement forms a step in the process cf tidying up a complicated 
situation1. It ay be used to elucidate involved situa ions as was the 
Understanding between South Africa, the United Kingdom and Swaziland over 
dugar, 19o4^ to serve as a temporary ruling as did the Understanding 
with .iotsvana over Air Services, 1966", or to serve as a subsidiary 
agreement to a treaty as did the Memorandum of Understanding Subsidiary 
to a Customs Union Agreement with the Governments of Botswana, Lesotho
pti
and Swaziland, 1969/
The various types of treaties mentioned in the list above have one
element in common, namely, they are all in written form and, while the
vast majority of international agreements negotiated by the Republic of
South Africa are in writing, there is nothing in the rules of international
law to prevent the negotiation of oral agreements which may be equally
binding in nature. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to
29which the Republic subscribes although not a signatory, defines a treaty
as 'an international agreement concluded in written form' but qualifies
30
this statement by providihi further' that
'the fact that the present Convention does not apply ... to 
international agreements not in written form shall not affect
(a) the legal force of such agreements:
(b) the application to them of any of the rules set forth in
23. Exchange of Lett. rt. Constituting an Agreement on Defence Matters between 
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Union of South .'.fries of 30 June ?955* 
Un. ted Nation's Treaty L cries No. ; V,-3 vol. 248 p.192; also, C.J.R. 
Lugard 'The Simonstown Agreement: South Africa, Britain and the
United Nations' (1968) i.*> South African Low Journal 142; G.G.Lawrie 
'The Simonstown Agrecme.it: South Africa, Britain and the Commonwealth* 
(1968) 83 South African Law Journal 137•
24. Union Government ~ Treaty Series 3 of 1933.
25. McNair op.cit. 13-
26. Not list'd in the Republic of South Africa Treaty Series.
27. Ibid.
28. Republic of South Africa Treaty Series o oi 19o9.
29. Ti.e Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 1.
30. loid., article 3-
the present Convention to which they would be subject 
ui.tk t international law independently of the Convention.’
i.na, ,aw independently of the Convention1 has never prescribed 
ni> st t .eti.i.t i the negotiation and conclusion of treaties but has, 
nev, rtheless, encouraged treaties to be in writing and to be registered 
witn the Secretariat of the United Nations. ,! in this way facilitating 
1:1 1 1 1 agieement and avoiding :he hazards of secret treaties.
Oral agreements, however, are certainly not without binding force although 
whether they may be labelled as treaties is debatable, especially in the 
light of the l^j_Status_o[ Eastern Greenland^, ase. Here certain public 
statements by fhlen, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, to the effect that
 ^ ‘ ' 1' "" ' ' a ‘>st' no difficulties ever Denmark's extension of sovereignty
to Eastern Greenland wore considered by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice to be binding on Norway althouj. i not constituting a treaty.
Fu; tlx rmorv, according to the decision of the TCJ in the recent Nuclear 
case unilateral statements made publicly and with an intent to 
be taken seriously are to be regarded as binding. If this is the case, 
an ora 1 agreement concluded between two States must, a fortiori, be 
regarded as binding on the parties.
1 ffe desirability of a treaty on a particular topic has been
informaliy agreed upon between the Republic and another State and once
both parties declare their willingness to enter into negotiations, the
States must appoint negotiators who will meet to plan the text of the
treaty, or it may be agreed that onv party prepare a draft treaty for
consideration and comment by the other party. Wherever the Republic
initiates bilateral negotiations, the administering State Department
will draw up this draft treaty in conjunction with the legal advisers
of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Once the negotiators of both States
agree on the wording of a text they will initial each page of the text 
34
ne varietur. Each keeps « copy of the initialed text.
It is often desirable at this stage of the negotiations to determine 
whether any constitutional obstacles must bv overcome by each respective
31. Article 102(1) uf the Charter of the United Nations provides that 
'every t•caty ... catered into by any member of the United Nations 
after th< present Chatter comes into force shall as soon as possible 
be registered with the Secretariat and published by ft'. Failure to 
register a treaty will not invalidate ft but 1 no party to any uch
treaty ... may invoke that treaty ... before any organ of the United
Nations' : Article 102(2) of the Charter of the United Nations.
32. 1933 PCIJ Series A/B No. 53.
33. 1974 1CJ Reports 253, discussed above at pp.72-3.
34. A fuller discus ion of the practice of initialling i text ne varietur
is presented on p.143 below.
Ltnte be'ore the traty Lecomes operational. South African embassies 
abroad can he of help in this regard. The question then arises of the 
consequences of failure on the puit of the - outh African Government to 
ove ,"„ome any such constitutional obstacles. The Vienna Convention is 
cl- ir on t! is point. It provides' ^  that a party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal lav. as justification for a failure to perform 
a tiv ity1. 11 may happen that the St"tc finds itself in the position of 
being bound, on tie one hand, to observe its commitments on an inter- 
n iional level even while, on the other hand, it is unable to do so 
because of its own constitutional limitations. A contracting party has 
not only the right but the duty to <vtb fy itself that the domestic 
procedures necessary to the finil acceptance of the treaty have been 
observed. The Convention continues:
*A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound 
by a treaty has been expressed in violaticr. of a provision of 
its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties 
n.- - nvo.'. ianting its consent unless that violation was manifest 
and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental 
import, nee. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively 
evident to any S.ate conducting itself in the .natter in 
accordance with normal practice and in good faith'.
This means that in the normal course of events the* South ..frican Govern­
ment should ex" mine it* constitutional position in advance and take 6 ‘epe 
to ensure that it is not overstepping the limits of its authority.
During negotiations any questions of a technical or legal nature 
corid be referred to the relevant Departrnt of State or to the Depart­
ment of Foreign Affairs. The question whether Full lowers will be 
necessary will also b<. discussed during these negotiations.
The Republic has generally accepted and zmplit 1 the principle of 
the alt n.it v4: -a-vis bilateral treaties. According to this principle 
the text of a trr ity is tw.ee signed in the original. Each party then 
retains an original text in which its name is mentioned before that of 
the other party in the introductory and closing clauses and in which 
the signature of its representative arrears first. In other words, one 
text given piici-ty to one St r while the other gives priority to the 
second State. To put on record the use of the altern.at in the text of 
n treaty, the word 'in duplicate' will a pear in the concluding 
p ragra h after the word 'done'. An example of the nlternat is provided
oy .re Extradition Treaty between ti > republic of South Africa and the
Republic c Tot want. The South African version reads:
Ihe c;tate President of the Republic of South Africa and the 
1 re..>ident of the Republic of Botswana -
desiring to regulate by mutual agreement the relations 
oetwceii their two countries in the sphere of extradition 
of criminals;
have igr ed to conclude u treaty to that effect and have for 
this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
ihe State President cf the Republic of South Africa:
Dr. The Honourable Hilgard Muller
1 be President of the Republic of Botswana•
Ihe Honourable Moutlakgola Palgrave Kediretswe Nvako.
The Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their respective 
full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows:
'For the Republic of South Africa: 
ape forn, this twenty-seventh day of February, 1969 
H. Muller
'For the Republic of Botswana:
Gt-herones, this fourth day of March 1 > 6 9  
M.P.K. Nwako. 1
The Botswana version reads:
'The President of the Republic of Botswana and the State
Pr sident of the Republic of South Africa -
desiring to regulate by mutual agreement the relations 
between their two countries in the sphere of extradition 
01 criminals;
have agreed to conclude a treaty to that effect and have for 
this purpose appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:
The Pre:ilent of the Republic of Botswana:
The Honourable Moutlakgola Palgrave Kediretswe Kwako
The State President of the Republic of South Africa:
Dr. The Honourable Hilgard Muller*
The Plenipotentiaries, af*er having exchanged their respective 
full powers, und to be in good and due form, have agreed as 
follows:
'For the Republic Botswana:
Gaberones, this fourth day of March 1 9 6 9  
M.P.K. Nwako
'For the Republic of South Africa:
Cape Town, this twenty-seventh day of February I.969
H. Muller.'
I
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. . lie choof.es the language in which it wishes to negotiate.
The hejiUolic o: South Africa Constitution Act'"'*' states that 'English
ana Afrikaans shall be the official languages of the Republic and shall 
Lie ed on a looting of equality and enjoy equal freedom, rights and 
privileges. From this stem.- the principle that the Republic will use 
ootn Jngiish and Afrikaans in negotiating bilaterial treaties with
" C;)U!‘> - ies. So, unless there are unusual circumstances which would 
^a' " on : ,'om this no re, South African negotiators will indicate
to the other contracting State that a bilateral treaty must be concluded 
m  both o-.ficial languages. Similarly, the other contracting State will 
indicate which language it wishes to use. A M  the languages chosen will 
be Mentioned by name in the conclusion of the treaty, for example:
If> vv 1T.,.uSS V.ilutBLF the abovementioned Plenipotentiaries
have Signed the present Treaty and affixed thereto their 
Seals
Done at ... in duplicate in the ... languages on ....’
It will also be decided during negotiations whether there will be
one or more authentic texts. Whore there is to be mor<; than one
authentic texv, the conclusion of the treaty will be worded as follows:
i/one ... in the Airikaans, English and German languages, 
all tnree texts being equally authentic.'
Where there is to be only one authentic text, the wording may provide:
'Done in the Afrikaans, Snglisl rid German languages, all 
three texts being of equal force and effect, provided that 
if there is any uncertainty concerning the interpretation 
of the Meaty, the English text shall prevail.*
Where more than one language is involved all texts or one only should
be indicated as authentic. Where there are three texts and two only
: re authentic, this may give the impression that the third language is
beinc discriminated against.
There is no rule relating to the sequence of the *exts in the
different languages or to the sequence of the names of the languages
in the conclusion of a treaty. However, a text placed above or to the
left of another text generally enjoys priority and a language mentioned
in the conclusion before another langurge will enjoy priority. Whenever
there is a common language or whenever one language only is indicated as
authentic, that language will enjoy priority. In a1"' other
3 6 . set 32 of 1961, section 1 0 8 (1 ).
instances the texts, ana the names of the languages in the
v.onclu, xon are arranged alphabetical]y or fellow the alternat. However,
/a . c tne application of the alternat ie simple when the treaty has been
oncluut'-i in two languages only, its application becomes more complex
w.tn a Liiatcral treaty has been negotiated in more than two languages,
such as a treaty between South Africa and Belgium which will normally
be negotiated in English, Afrikaans, French and Dutch. In such an event,
k-outh Africa and Belgium must decide which of their official languages
wixl have priority inter se before the all ■_mat is used. An alternative
ariangement would be to arrange the languages alphabetically.
in the case of an exchange of notes other nonside rations, prevail.
Uiven the les formal nature of an exchange of notes, it is not as
important to insist on the strict use of all the official languages.
The different possibilities include the following:
(i/ Whenever the exchange of notes is between a Foreign Minister
ano an ambassador it is quite acceptable for them to use the languages
they usually use in dealing with one another; foi example, in a Visa
Agreement between the Union and the Netherlands in 1952,'v one note was
in Afrikaans and the other in Dutch; and in the Agreement in 196? between
the Government of South Africa and the Government of the United States of
America amending the Air Trar port Agreement of 23 toy 194?/'' both notes
wene in English.
(ii) Whenever both States insist on the use of their official
languages, both notes may be drawn up in two or three languages.
(iii) When both States do not use the same language it is generally
accepted that each will sign in its ow: language(e). In the case where,
for example, the first note is in German and an English-speaking State
answers in English, the following form may be used:
'I have the honour to refer to your note of today's date, 
which, in the agreed English translation/version, reads as 
fellows: .... 1
In this way both languages are given equal status. If the parties wish 
the equality of the languages to be made even clearer, the following
39. Union 0 vernment Treaty Series 12 of 1952.
foiTr,, be adopted in the Iwnene River Treaties of 1964"' and 1969^
between bouth Africa and Portugal may be used. Here the Portuguese
Minister of . creign Affaire sent a note in Portuguese which was
answered by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs in English:
I have the honour to refer to your note of today's date, the 
text of which in the English language, which shall have equal 
authority as the Portuguese text...,'
As for ; multilateral treaties ere concerned, these may be concluded
in one language only; in more than one language, none of then taking
priority; in more than one languge with the condition that in the event
o, c clash in meaning, the text of one shall take priority. Where treaties
negotiated unuer the auspices of thv Un . ted Nations or any of its
specialized agencies alu the languages used are classified authentic.
r..e c m  fed Nations Charter, for example, i- in English, French, Spanish,
Russian ar d Chinese, and all five languages are authentic.
If multilateral treaties of a technical nature are concluded among
states, some c whose languages do not extend to nil the necessary
technical terminology, it might be advantageous to mention in the treaty
that the texts in one of the languages used shall govern. Whenever all
the languages used in multilateral treaties are classified authentic, the
problem remains which text is to prevail in the event of a clash. The
43Vienna Convention has attempted to cover this situation by providing 
that
.>"jhen a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, 
the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the 
treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, 
a particular text shall prevail:1 
44
It adds:
*A verson of the treaty in a language other than one of those in
which the text was authenticated shall be considered &f
authentic oily if the treaty no provides or the oarties so agree.’
4sMcNair states that ’there is ample authority for the view that the 
two or three texts should help one another, so that it is permissibl- to 
interpret one text by reference to another’. Thin implies that the
41. Ibid., 7 of 1964.
42. Ibid., 1 of 1969.
43. Article 33(1).
44. Article 33(2).
45. McNair op.cit. 433*
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attitude should be taken that all the texts have the sare leaning. -f 
so, the fact that different languages ere used -say then be turned to 
advantage. If there are, for example, four texts, one ol .v ich is unclear, 
the meaning should be sought in the other texts which should all have ,;.e 
same meaning, and the unclear text may be brought into line i.th ail the 
other texts. This line of approach » : , in fact, adoptea by the inter­
national Lsw Commissicr. The Vienna Convention goes on to provide:
'The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning 
in each authentic text - 1,1 
Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with 
paragraph 1, when a comparison which the application of Articles 
3 1 and 3 2 docs not remove, the meaning which best reconciles the 
text, having regard to the object and purpore of the treaty, 
shall be adopted. 1 ,f<
McNair’ adds that tribunals dealing with a treaty written in two 
or acre languages of equal authority will sometimes seek to ascertain 
the 'basic language'. that is, the working language i.: which the treaty 
was negotiated nd drafted a reg rd that as the moot important.
Negotiations tods are frequently conducted by means of formal notes 
between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, acting or. behalf of his Government, 
and the rt ident diplomatic agent of the other country. An exchange of 
notes ger.er lly results from oral discussions of the subject uiitter but 
on occasion , the outcome of cones; on donee .n which the proposal 
hai fceen put forward and discussed in advance. - m s  ha^merin, out of
details of the agreement in advance is iciportan. as .t. en i„ ot 
ultimate treaty to be conclude - by t? e simple exchange o notes.
The negotiations are usually initiated by repr tPtiv.s of the 
embassies or by the Department of Foreign Affairs i i procedure ie 
informal. The Minister of Foreign Affairs will u iress a note to the 
a-bassador proposing the specific agreement. If the proposed conditions 
are acceptable to the addressed Government, the note containing those 
provisions and a confirmatory reply are deemed to constitute as well ae­
ro evidence the agreement reached between the two Governments.
Two notes or letters which have be;?n exchanged will net automatically 
constitute a treaty. This exchange will be regarded as nothing further 
than diplomatic correspondence unless it is quite evident from the 
wording of the exchange that both Governments regard it a:: crea ive of
46. 
h / •
Article 33(3)• 
Article 33(4,. 
McNair op.cit. 43'*.
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a treaty and, furthermore, that constitutional authorization has oeen
obtained - (in South Africa this entails authorization by the Executive
Committee). The wording at the close of the n< Le which initiates the
exchange and at the beginninf and close of the replying note will
indicate the purpose of the exchange of notes. If the first note ends
with the words:
'Should the Government of ... agree with the abovementioned 
provisions, this letter and your affirmative reply thereupon 
shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments'
and the second note begins:
'I have the honour to refer to your letter of ... which in the 
agreed English translation reads as follows ....'
and er do:
'I have the honour to confirm that the Government of ... agree 
to the abovementioned conditions and regard your letter and this 
reply as constituting an Agreement between our two Governments,'
it is clear that the notes are meant to constitute a treaty.
Depending on the circumstances, the importance of the treaty and the 
degree cf publicity which both States wish to assign to it, the notes 
may be exchanged by post, personally by both signers, or signed and 
exchanged during a formal ceremony.
The following documents are cent to the archives for safe-keeping:
(i) the original note/letter received from the other State;
(ii) a certified copy of the South African note/letter;
(iii) the original or certified copy of the Full Powers (if any) 
of the other State;
(iv) a certified copy of the Full Powers (if any) issued by the 
hepublic.
Bilateral treaties may be divided into four parts: the heading,
preamble, body and conclusion.
The heading coneistr of the title, the names of both States, and 
the subject-matter of the treaty. The preamble will first identify the 
contracting parties - it might state, for example, whether this is a 
treaty between Heads of State or Governmentn, and thus will be followed 
by eurh words as 'have agreed as follow: Introductory paragraphs may
be inserted between the names of the contracting parties and these words. 
The precise wording of the preamble will differ according to the nature 
and importance of the treaty. Each paragraph begins with such words aa 
'whereas'. 'desiring', 'resolved', or 'determined' written in capital 
letters.
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There is no special manner of dividing the contents, although the
different points agreed on ar: strictly controlled by numbers. It i;
important to note that the numbers where texts are in different languages
J must correspond throughout.
The conclusion usually core i ts of cHher of the following two
___ paragraphs:
(i) where the plenipotentiaries are named:
1 IN ivITNfSS WHEREOI ttv abovementioned plenipotentiaries 
have signed the present Treaty and affixed thereto their 
seals.
DONE at ... in duplicate in the ... languages on . ..'
(ii) where the plenipotentiaries are not named:
'IN W1TNTSS WHEREOF the undersigned oeing duly authorized 
by their respective Governments have signed and sealed the 
present Agreement
DONE at ... in duplicate in the ... languages on ....'
Below these paragraphs are the words: 
'For (the Government of)
For (the Government of)
  ^the Republic of South Africa:
49. The treaty will be 'For the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa’ when it is a treaty between Governments. In all other 
instances it is simply signed 'For the Republic of South Africa'.
(c) Cabinet Approval
The Constitutional requirements of the Republic prescribe that 
authority must be obtained from the Executive Committee in respect of 
the following acts in connection with both bilateral and multilateral 
treaties:
(!) the insue of credentials to attend international conferences;
(ii) signature of a treaty with or without reserve as regards 
rat 1ficat rn;
(iii) ratification of a treaty;
(iv) accession to a treaty; and
(v) suspension or denunciation of a treaty.
Generally, no special authorization is necessary for signing the Final 
Act of a treaty because the issue of credentials implies an automatic 
right of such signature.
The authority of the Executive Committee it given by meeme of a 
Minute of the Executive Committee wnich sets out the proposed trea.y
negotiationo, which authorizes the Prit Minister, State resident T
50Minister of Foreign Affaire to take th- necessary action, and which
is signed by the State President and a second member of the Cabinet, 
usually the Prime Minister.
An explanatory Memorandum is often attached to the Minute. This 
states that the Minute seeks the approval of the State President for 
the a'tion propored, for example, rntificatioM und the completion 
of an instrument of ratification by the Minister of Foreign Affaire.
Because of the technical content of many treaties it if? usual for 
the Department which will ultimately be responsible for the administration 
of the proposed treaty to draw up a draft-Minute and to submit it for 
approval through the Department of the ri e Minister. And,as treaty 
negotiations with foreign powers inevitably affect the Republic's inter­
national relations, the Department of Foreign Afiuira usually has &r 
interest in the nutter as well. It i« established practice, therefore, 
for the Department of the Prime Minister, preparatory to submitting the 
draft-Minute to the Executive Committee, to submit it to the Department 
of Foreign Affairs for initialing. Before the latter will initial t’-.w* 
draft-Minute, it will check the wording and decide whether the proposes 
treaty is desirable from the point of view of the Reruolic's relationship 
with the other State. Thereafter the draft-Minute will be sent to the 
Clerk of the Executive Committee. After the Minute has been approved by 
the Cabinet, the stamp of the Clerk of the Executive Committee i a affixed, 
togetner with the date and a number. ’hio date indicates the date of 
approval. Only copies which bear the stamp are used or consulted in 
connection with the treaty negotiations. he number provides for easy 
future reference.
Where n bilateral treaty <s to be signed, the Cabinet will only be 
approached once the proposed text has been approved by the legal advisers 
of the South African Government unc once both States are ad idem over its 
contents. Any fu ther modifications mean that the Cabinet must be 
approached afresh.
50. This is in keeping with article ?(2) of the Viernu Convention 
on the Law of Treaties B:. ih bestows \ general validity on 
treaties negotiated by State i resident, i rime Minister or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The Minute of the Executive Committee in regard to the edgning of
bilater .l treaties should contain a,i introductory paragraph in »hich
the background of the treaty in briefly described:
'Ministers have the honour to inform the State President 
that the dov-roment of the Republic of Couth Africa and 
the Govern:, nt of are desirous of concluding a treaty 
(agreement, convention) with re md to ... (by means of an 
exchange of notes),'
A further paragraph will describe the attitude of the South African
Government:
'Ministers hwe the honour to advise that the Government 
has investigated the text of the treaty (agreement, 
convention, exchange of notes) and agree:, with it.'
In a final paragraph the State President will be asked to approve of
the treaty and to direct the Head of State, lead of Government or
Minister of Foreign Affairs to u<kw, the n- ceceary steps to implement it.
Where the treaty is between Heads of State this paragraph may read:
'Ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the 
State President may be pleased to approve that the Treaty be 
signed in the form of the attached drafts in ... (languages)
and to appoint ... as the State President's Plenipotentiary
for this purpose.'
Where the treaty is between Governments this paragraph may read :
'Ministers therefore h ve the honour to recommend that the 
State President may ,e pleased to approve that the Treaty be 
signed on behall of (th- Government of) the Republic of South 
Africa in the for: of ‘-he attached drafts in ... (languages) 
and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs take the necessary 
steps in that connection.'
Where the treaty is subject to ratification, the words ‘subject o
ratification' will be inserted after the words 'be signed' in this
final pa mgr a- h. Later on, when approval for ratification is sought,
reference may be rude in the r-'w Minute to the Minute authorizing the
signature, to the place and date of signature and to the provisions in
the treaty which call for ratification, ihe final paragraph of the new
Minut a will de end on whether the treaty is between Heads of States,
in whi-'n case it -light provide that
'Ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the 
State President may be pleased to confirm and ratify the 
Treaty' ,
or, where the treaty is one between States or Governments, the Minute 
might be worded in the following manner:
'Ministers therefore have the honour to recomcjnd that the 
State President may be pleased to .p rove that the Treaty be 
confirmed and ratified on behalf of (the Government of) the 
Republic of South Africa and that the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs take the necessary steps in that connection.'
In the event of denunciation or suepens. on of a bilateral treaty,
a typical example of the final paragraph of the Minute might state;
'Ministers may be pleased to approve that (the Government of) 
the Republic of South Africa denounce (suspend) the Treaty 
(as from ...) and that thu Minister of Foreign Affairs take 
the necessary steps in that connection.'
The Minute deal ng with a multilateral treaty will consist of an
introductory paragraph in which the background to the treaty is briefly
stated, followed by a paragraph an which the Government's attitude is
made evident. The conclusion contains recommendations to the State
President and any reservations. The text of the treaty will be
attached where the Minute seeks approval for signature or accession.
The following example of a Minute requesting approval for signature
of a multilateral treaty may be cited as typical;
'Ministers have the honour to inform the State President that 
the twentieth General Assembly of the United Nations on ... 
unanimously adopted the tent of a Treaty on ..., and that the 
Treaty was opened for signature on
Ministers further have the honour to ..nform the State President 
that the Government of ... in its capacity as depositary 
authority invited South Africa to sign the treaty.
Ministers further have the honour to advise that the Government 
has investigated the text of the Treaty (a copy of which is 
annexed hereto) and are of the opinion that it will benefit 
the Republic of South Africa to become a party to the Treaty 
(with the reservation that ...).
Ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the 
State President may be pleased to approve that the Treaty be 
signed on behalf of (the Government of) the Republic of South 
Africa (with the reservation that ...) and that the Minister 
of Foreign Affaire take tl.u necessary steps in that 
connection.'
The words 'subject to ratification', 'subject to acceptance' or 'subject 
to approval' may, if necessary, be inserted after the words 'South 
Africa' in the final paragraph above.
An example of a Minute in regard to multilateral treaties requesting 
ratification, acceptance or approval is as follows:
'Ministers have the honour to point to the Minute of the 
Executive Committee number ... of ... concerning the signing 
of the Treaty about ... and to inform the State President 
that the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the 
Republic of South Africa in ... signed the Treaty in the name 
of (the Government of) the Republic of South Africa on ....
Ministers further have the ho'.cur to state that the signing oi 
the Treaty by the Ambassador as a result of article ... of the 
Treaty is subject to ratification (accept e, approval).
Ministers therefore h ve the honour to recommend that the State 
President may be pleased to approve that the Treaty be confirmed
and ratified (accepted, approved) on behalf of(the Government of) 
the Republic cf South Africa (with the reservation that ...) and 
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs take the necessary steps in 
that connection.1
The final paragraph of a Minute requesting accession to a multilateral
treaty may state:
'Ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the 
State President mav be pleased to approve that (the Government 
of) the Republic South Africa accede (adhere) to the Treaty 
(wi; • the reservation that ...) and tt t the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs take the necessary steps in that connect ion.'
Finally, an example of the final paragraph of the Minute requesting the
denunciation or suspension of a multilateral treaty is the following:
'Ministers therefore hive the honour to recommend that the 
State President may be pleased to approve that (the Government 
of) the Republic of South Africa denounce (suspend) the Treaty 
(as from ...) and that the Kiricter of Foreign Affairs take the 
necessary steps in that connection.'
The documents cited above illustrate the present practice in the 
Republic of South Africa to seek approval for all necessary action with 
respect to the ratification, acceptance, approval and accession to treaties. 
Thin internal procedure of examination and approval by a competent body 
shows that, in the constitutional procedure, the executive is the sole 
treaty-making organ. The initiative in the entire treaty-making 
proce belongs to it. I reseat South African practice indicates, 
therefore, that approval of Cabinet is sought in all cases where South 
Africa proposes to ratify or accede to both bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, whether these treaties are politically significant or not.
Indeed, t could well be argued that in these times when the Republic 
is becoming increasingly isolated in diplomatic circles, that all treaties 
it does negoti te have politic.*’ significance, whatever their subject- 
matter may be. In the light or this it is extremely unlikely that Cabinet 
approval would not be sought.
(d) Issuance of Full Powers
Full Powers will be issued once the approval of the State i r.ident, 
acting on the advice of the Executive Committee, has been given. The 
term 'Full Power?-' is used to . ndicate two type. f ,ff. :iul authorization 
in connection with treaties. First, it clothes the agent with power to 
represent and negotiate on behalf of his country, Head of State or 
Government at international coiileKtnct s: and secondly, it grants him
mm
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authority to si^n the treaty. Thus the Vienn? Convention'defines 
'Full Power 1 an ’a document emanating from the competent authority of 
a State designating a person or persons to represent the State for 
negotiating, adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty, or for 
accomplishing any other act with respect a treaty. Often two 
separate documents are issued but this is not essential - a single 
document covering both aspects ie acceptable as well. Full Powers will 
not, however, confer on the agent power to bind his principal, except in
those cases where the eirnin.*, of a treaty alone suffice for this
52purpose.
Whereas an agent usually requires Full Powers both to negotiate 
and t i m  multilateral treaties, he will seldom require Full Powers to 
negotiate bilateral treaties. Duiing the course of the latter 
negotiations it will 1 <> decided whether Full Powers are essential for 
signature or not. Although there are no standard legal requirements 
in this regard as far as the Republic is concerned, it it important to 
protect the Republic against the possibility of a dispute arising at a 
later date over whether the agent had authority to sign. So, whenever 
there is no revision in the treaty for ratification, it is considered 
advisable that Full Powers be issued and exhibited. In most formal 
bilateral treaties a provision will be inserted which governs the 
question of Full Powers, however, in less weighty bilateral treaties 
where the agents are well known to each other, and where they are certain 
that they have authority to sign and that their Governments w 11 not 
repudiate at a later date, the necessity of Full Powers will often be 
dispensed with, t n example of this would be in the case of an exchange 
of notes between an accredited ambassador of a foreign country on the 
one hand and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs on the other 
to modify an existing treaty.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties'’ states:
•In virtue of their functions and without having to produce
Full I aera, the following are considered as representing
their State:
(n) Heads of State, ’leads of Government and Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, for the ourpose of performing all acts relating to 
the conclusion of a treaty;
(b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting 
the text of a treaty between the accrediting State and the 
State to which they arc accredited;
(c) Representatives accredited by States to an international
51. Article 2(c)
5F. McNair op.cit. 120-1, 
5F. Article 7(2).
conference or to an iternatioral organisation or to one of 
its orgmti, for the parpose of adopting the text of a treaty 
m  that conference, organization or organ.'
In conformity with this Article, the State President, Prime Minister 
and r.jni: ter o: ."oreign Affairs of the Republic will not generally be 
issued with Fvll Powers when signing treaties themselves. All other 
agents will be issued with Full Powers. This practice is in accordance 
with Article 7(l)(b) of the Vienna Convention.y*
if an agent purports to negotiate, authenticate or adopt the text of 
a treaty on behalf of the Republic without possessing the necessary Full 
Powers, it appears that his action will be without legal effect unless 
the Republic thereafter ratifies it. The Vienna Convention""' provides 
that 'an act relating to the conclusion of a treaty performed by a 
person who cannot be considered under Article 7 as authorised to 
represent a State for that purpose is without legal effect unless 
afterwards confirmed by that St-.te'. While ordinary diplomats have a 
clear authority to initial a treaty as an indication ol their approval 
of the draft, this will not bind their Sta^e and a formal, authorised 
signature must follow.
These Articles of the Vienna Convention should be read together with 
Article 46 which provides that a treaty made in violation of a provision 
of internal law of a State regarding competence to conclude treaties is 
net thereby avoided unless the violation was manifest and concerned a 
rule of internal low of fundamental importance. A violation is aid to 
be manifest if it. would be objectively evident to any S»ate conducting 
itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith. 
As D.P. O'Connell remarks,these provisions appear te ’minimise the 
dependence of treaty validity »rcr. ^stitutional law ana [they have] 
been ftpplauuea for this achievement'.
The State President, himself may issue Full Powers, but he will do go 
onlv as regards treaties between Ht ids of tate. the i.inistei of foreign 
Affaire will issue Full Powers in connection with all other types of 
treaties or in his absence the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs or 
the Prime Minister in his capacity as head of Government may issue the 
necessary documents.
rA. This orovideo that 'a person is considered as representing a State 
for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a treaty 
or for expressing the ccn.eut of the State to be bound by the treaty 
if he produces appropriate Full Powers'.
lb. V.P . O'Connell International I'1w 2 ed. (: : 0; I 216.
57. O'Connell op.cit. 21?.
'.ruiwt ,(!) of the Vienna Convention simply states that
[a. person is considered as representing a State for the
’^ "V* G ° "doptinS or authenticating the text of a treaty 
or tor expressing the consent of the State to be bound by a 
treaty if J
U) he produces ap ropriate Full Powers 
It ooes not. stipulate the form that the Full Powers must take. There is 
m  ticnal st.indard to which Full Powers must conform although 
it seems 'hat they may be rejected as inadequate if they do not declare 
' n 1 competence in the manner required by customary constitutional 
*outh African system. Certainly the mere existence 
of diplomatic status does no more tnan raise a presumption of 
competence to conclude agreements. This status alone, without Full 
Pozers, wirl not suffice to negotiate and sign treaties.
/ts far as bilateral treaties are concerned, where the treaty is 
between heads ol State, the Full Powers will be in both official languages; 
while Full Powers in regard to less formal treaties will be in English 
or in Afrikaans, depending on the circumstances. So, for example, where 
the other party is the Government of the Netherlands or Belgium, the Full 
Powers will be in Afrikaans only but where the other party is an f- ish- 
speaking country, the Full Powers will be in English.
Full Powers issued by the State President will be co-signed by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under the words 'By order of the State 
President in Council'. Thereafter, the Full Powers, together with a copy 
of the Minute of the Executive Committee, are sent to the Prime Minister's 
secretary with the request that they be submitted to the State President 
for signature and stamping.
Example of Full Powers in respect of a bilateral treaty 
issued by the Stnto Prow dent:
THE STATE PRESIDENT OF ThE 
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
DIE STAATSPREl'IZENT VAN DIE 
REPUBLIEK VAN SUID-AFRIKA
To All and Singular to 
whom these Presents shall 
come, Greetings!
iVHEREAS negotiations 
have taken place on the 
terms of a Treaty between 
the Republic of South Africa 
and the Republic of Botswana 
for the extradition of 
criminals:
Aan Almal en ledereen wat 
Hiervan kermis mag neem, 
Saluut!
NALEMAAL onderhandelings 
oor die bepalings van ’n 
Verdrag tuscen di? Republiek 
van Suid-Afrika en die 
Republiek Botswana vir die 
uitlewcring van oortreders 
plaasgevind het;
58. Gunther Doeker The Treaty-Making Power in the Commonwealth of 
Australia (1966) 119.
AND i.HEREAS i t  is necessary 
that a fit and proper person 
be invested with Full Power 
and Authority to sign the 
said Treaty on behalf of 
the Keput'lic of South Africa;
NOW, THEREFORE* reposing 
special trust and conf’dence 
in the discretion and 
integrity of Dr. the 
Honourable Kilgard Mulltr, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
of the hepublic of South 
Africa, 1 have named, con­
stituted and appointed him 
as I lenipetentiary and 
representative having Full 
Power and Authority to agree 
to, conclude and sign the 
aforementioned Treaty on 
behali of the Republic of 
’outh Africa with such 
Plenipotentiary or 
iieprescr.t.'tive as may be 
ve ted th similar Power and 
Authority on the part of the 
Republic of Botswana,
GIVEN un.ier my Hand and the 
Seal of the Republic of South 
Africa at Pretoria on thii
the .....................
day of  ...................
Dne Thou and Nine hundred and 
Sixty-eight.
STATE ! RE. i DENT.
N NADEMAAL ait nodig is 
dat "n gcskikte en gepaste 
persoon met Volmag en 
3evoegdheid beklee word om 
genoemde Verdrag namens die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika te 
onderteken;
Sv IS vlT DA: ek, uit hoofde 
van my be-ondere vertroue in 
die oordael en onkreukbaarheid 
van y Edele dr. Hilgard Mulder, 
Minister van Buitelantise Sake 
van tie Republiek van Suid- 
Afrika, horn a&nstel as 
levolmagtigde en Verteenwoor- 
riiger mr-t Vo 1 meg en Bevoegdheid 
om die voormelde Verdrag namens 
die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 
a.'-n te gain en te onderteken 
met die Gevol.iagtigde ot 
Verteenwoordiger wat met 
coortgelyke Volmag en 
Bevoegdheid dtur die Republiek 
Botswana beklee mag word
viEuEE order my Band en die 
Seel van die Republiek van 
Suid-Afrika te Pretoria op
die   ........... .
a, Van .................
enduisend Negehonderd Agt- 
en-sestig.
DTAATSPKESIDET.T.
By order of the Cp las van die
State i re iden*-in-Council. Sta,-'tspre6ident-in-Rade
Examnle of Accc.rpinying Minul£
ij.RETARIS
Voorgestelde I'itleweringsverdr.-\g tursen die 
Republiek van Suid-Afrika en die Republiek 
Botswana : Staatspresident se Volmag aan die 
En— ter van Buitelandse Cake.
1. Onderhandelinge oor ‘n uitleweringeverdrag tussen
Suid-Afrika en Botswana is gevoer, en eensteranigheid oor 
die teks van 'n verdrag is bereik.
i'‘6 gevolg van h versoek van die kant van Botswana 
neem -Me voorgestelde verdrag die vcnr, a an van *n verdrng
wusner. taatehoofde. Vooraienin, • word dat die
twae St.atehoofde Gevolsagtigde-s aanstel dm die verdrap 
te sluit.
. ie voorgea telde verdrag is onderwo *pe aan be- 
ragti m g  cn sal in werking tree dertig dae na die datum 
arop die bekragtiging&oorkondes uitgeruil is.
l ie owerbede van Botswana het amgedui dat Sy 
“ceae K.i'.K. Nwako, Minister van St t, as die Prc dd- nt 
van Botswana se Gevolmagtlgde a anger, tel eal word.
J' die Leparteotnt van Justisie het die Uitvr rende
i<aao se goedkeunng vir die aangaan van die verdrag ver- 
kry, asock goedkeuring dat Sy Bdele dr. H. Muller.
Minister van Buitelsndse Sake, as die Staatspresident 
se Gevolmagtigde vir die doel aangestel word.
Dit beoog dat die voorgestelde verdrag
ritur die Minister van Buitelandte Sake te Pretoria oncier- 
teken word en deur die uevclmagtigde van Botswana te Gaberones.
' voorgestelde verdrag word bepaal dat
volmagte deur die Gevnlmagtigdes gewiseel word.
Die volgende dokumente word ter insae aan -heg:- 
Munut van die Uitvoerende Raad nr. 1355 
soos op 7 Aunistus 1968 goedgekeur;
Afrikaans? e Engelst- tekste van die voor­
gestelde verdrag.
9. n Volrrsg waarit. y Edele dr. H. Muller. Miniate;
v m  Bui t elandse --akc. i-.: Tie Stsa tap resident se Jevol— 
magtigde aangestel word. word aangeheg vir voorlegginr 
aan die Minister van Buitelandse Sake en mede-onder- 
tekening deur hom indien hy daanr.ee akkoord gaan.
PRETORIA.
Augustus 3968,
DM- ) -MoTEn VAI, BUnElADD. • . AKE
Met verwysing na c 1 e laaete parnn tiaf van Uit- 
vcerende kuad minuut nr. 1.555 toc3 goedgekeur op 7 
Aujustus 1968, word die Volmag waarir* u as die Staats­
president fie Gevolmagtigde aangei :el word on die voorge­
stelde Uitleweringcverdrng met Botswana te onderteken, 
voorgele vir mede-ondertekenin dfur u indien u daarmee 
akkoord gaan.
8.
(a)
(b)
Example of Full Powers m  respect of a bilateral treaty
i s t u e d by the Minister of Foreign Affaire
m.LtvLAS negotiations have taker place on the terms 
ol er. Agreement between the Government of the Republic of 
oouth Africa and the Government of Portugal relative to 
the Cabora-Bassa Project.
AND V.HEREAS a text acceptable to the Government 
ol v ! t e  i :public of South Africa and the Government of 
Portugal has been formulated;
Ahij WHEREAS tne Government of the Republic of 
South .nirica have examined the draft Agreement aforesaid 
snd vieei. it desr.r< ale that the Agreement be concluded with 
the Government of Portugal;
AND WHEREAS it is necessary that a fit and proper 
person oe invested with full power and authority to conclude 
the said Agreement on behalf of the Government of the 
Republic of South Africa;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, HUG A HD MULLER, Minister of 
foreign Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, do he *eby 
certify and declare that
ABRAHAM COBUS FRANCOIS VIUOEN
Ambassador xti a -ry and Plenipotentiary of the Republic 
of South Africa in Portugal, is by these Presents named, 
constituted and appointed as Plenipotentiaiy and 
Representative having full power and authority co agree 
to, conclude and sign the aforementioned Agreement on 
behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
with such Plenipotentiary or Representative us may be 
vested with similar power and authority on the part of 
the Government of Portugal.
IN VvlTNESC WHEREOF I have signed and sealed these 
Presents at Pretoria on this the
day of August in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine 
Hundred and Sixty-nine.
(Sgd) H. Muller
There if no titled international custom regarding the handing 
over or display of Full Powers. Many States prefer their plenipotentiaries 
to exhibit, but not to hand over, Full Powers to other States. Whenever 
the two States do not follow the same procedure they should consult each 
her on the matter. The procedure chosen will sometimes then appear in 
the text of the treaty. The most common usage, however, is to exchange 
Full Powers. This ensures that both States have absolute proof that the 
plenipotentiaries of the other State are duly authorized to sign the 
treaty. In practice Full Powers are usually issued, not at the 
commencement negotiations, but when the treaty negotiations are
virtually completed or where the treaty is already in its final form.
In any event, authority to sign is only issued sIter the text has been 
approved oy the Executive Committee. This is the general practice of 
States in this regard. ^
The original copy of the Full Powers of the other negotiating State 
will be sent to the archives (or a certified copy thereof if the other 
State only displays but does not hand over its original Full Powers), 
together with the original or certified copy of the Full Powers issued 
by the Republic. Such safeguarding of Full Powers is especially 
import, nt when the treaty is not subject to ratification.
i owers to sign multilateral treaties will be issued upon 
authorization by the Executive Committee that the treaty be signed 
and that the Minister of Foreign Affairs take the necessary steps to 
effect signature.
If the Minute of the Executive Committee indicates who will, be 
the plenipotentiaries, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must certify in 
the Full Powers that certain persons have been appointed by the 
Government:
’NOW, THEREFORE, I ... Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of South . fries do hereby certify and declare that 
the Government of the Republic of South Africa have authorized 
and appointed ... as Plenipotentiary and Representative with 
Full Power and authority to
if not, the Minister will certify that he appoints certain persons as
plenipotentiaries:
'NOW, THEREFORE, I ... Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of South Africa do hereby certify and declare that 
I have authorized and appointed ....1
Full Powers to sign a treaty are sorrotimes included in the Full 
Powers to negotiate a treaty (credentials). In such a case the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs certifies in the Full Powers that certain 
persons are appointed as representatives of the Republic at the 
conference and that certain persons may r;ign the treaty on behalf 
of the Republic. The following specimens of Full Powers may be 
cited as typical: l
59. Kaye Holloway Modern Trends in Treaty Law (196?) 36 n.29*
Lxamplb.o• u II t-ower,-.; to sign a multilateral treaty
iULL PvJW/Vn
i'-.EWAZ the Government3 party to the International Sugar 
Agreement of 195& (as extended by the Protocols of 1963 and 1965) 
>l-cio v1 io extend, for a further period of one year the Inter­
na -ion'll Sugar Agreement, which is due to expire on the 31et 
December, I966;
AND vVKEI-EAS a Protocol for the purpose of extending the 
said Agreement has been opened for signature in London from the 
th November until the 30th December, I966;
and v/HFREAS the Government of the Republic of South Africa 
ueeir it desirable that the aforesaid Protocol be signed on behalf 
of the Republic of South Africa;
'"jk <-HPkEAS it is expedient that a fit and proper person be 
invested with Full Power to sign the said Protocol on behalf of 
the Republic of South Africa;
NOV, TIL.REFCRE, I, HITCARD MULLER, Minister of Foreign 
h.. lairs of the Republic of South Africa do hereby certify and 
declare that I have authorised and apnointed, and do by these 
presents authorise and appoint
CAREL PIETER CRCNJE DE WET
Arrh issaior Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic 
of South Africa in London, with Full Power and authority to 
sign tiio above-mentioned Protocol on behalf of the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa.
IN 'Al if..r re f^iEREOr i have signed and sealed these presents 
at Pretoria on this the day of
in the year of Our Lord One thousand Nine huncred and Sixty-six.
jhcamt lr- of Full Powers to sign a multilateral treaty 
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval
FULL POWER
WHEREAS the Sixteenth Congress of the Universal Postal 
Union will convene in Tokyo on the 1st October, 1969;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient that fit and propel persons be 
invested with full power to sign on behalf of the Republic of South 
Africa the Acts drawn up by the Congress, subject to ratification 
or approval by the Government of the Republic of South Africa;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, HILGARD MULLER, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of South Africa, do hereby certify and 
declarr that the Government of the Republic of South Africa have 
authorised .rnd appointed and do by these presents authorise and 
appoint
MICHAEL CORNELIUS STRAUSS
Postmaster Genomi of the Republic 
of South Afric.*
and as his alternate
NICOLAAS JOHANNES ALBERTOS JORDAAN
Deputy Postmaster General, Staff and Poets,
t<’ ) e t.' eir lenipotentiaries with full power to sign on behalf 
oi the Reput ic of Louth Africa the Acts drawn up by the 
-on; rose, subject to ratification of amendments to the 
Connti tut ion and approval of the other Acts by the Government 
of the Republic of South. Africa.
IK W1 IK ESS WHLi<iX)F I have signed and sealed these 
presents at i re*oria on this the day of Septemoer
in the year of Our Lord One Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Sixty-nine.
of Ful] Rowers to represent the Republic and to 
gign a treaty subject to ratification
FULL 10/,ER
n' J h the United Nations have convened a Conference on 
Road and Kotor Transport in Geneva on 23rd August, 19^3, for the 
purpose of concluding a new world-wide Convention on Road and 
hotcr Transport;
A .D i HLREA*» it is expedient that fit and proper persons 
be in- este>* with Full Power to represent the Government of the 
■ r.ion oi oouth Africa and to sign, on behalf of the Government 
of the union of South Africa, such Convention on Road and Motor 
Transport as may be concluded by the Conference;
KGiV, fHRitEFCRE, I, DANIEL FRANCOIS MALAN, His Majesty’s 
Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs for the Union 
of Louth Africa, do hereby certify and declare that the Govern­
ment, of the Union of outh Africa have authorised and appointed 
and do by these presents authorise and appoint
HERMANN REINHOLD RICHARD BNUNE, Leader of 
the Delegation, and
ABRAHAM JACOBUS FR/" CGIS VILJOEN, Adviser,
to be their plenipotentiaries with Full Power and authority to 
represent the Government of the Union of South Africa at the 
said Conference, and do also by these presents authorise and 
appoint
HERMANN REINHOLD RICHARD BRUNE
to sign, subject to subsequent acceptance by the Government of 
South Africa, such Convention on Road and Motor Transport ae 
may be concluded by the Conference.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have signed and sealed these 
presents at Pretoria on this the day of August
in the year of Our Lord One thousand Nine hundred and Forty- 
nine .
Full Powers will be lodged with the Secretariat of the conference 
at which the tn ity it being negotiated (whenever the treat; is signed 
at the close of a conference), or with the depositary authority (when 
the treaty is signed at a later date). Full Powers in regard to treaties
j;
■s
u
which must be signed at the United Nations must be deposited at least 
twenty-four hours before the signing ceremony.
The text of full Powers could in exceptional and urgent circumstances 
be tt-4egruphed ahead, The actual Full Powers must in such a case be 
sent on as soon as possible. The United Nations stipulates the following 
procedure where it is the depositary authority
in some exceptional cases and for reasons of urgency, if, for 
example, there v a time -limit, cabled credentials may be 
accepted provisionally but the cable should also originate 
from the head 01 State, Head of Government or Minister of 
foreign Affairs and shou d be confirmed by a letter from the 
Permanent Delegation or the Plenipotentiary certifying its 
authenticity. The text of the cable should also state the 
.^itie of he agreement referred to and whether the Plenipotentiary 
is authorized to sign subject to later acceptance, and should 
spyci,y that ordinary credentials are being sent immediately 
by mail. ’
• . ftei .i mul ti2ater< 1 treaty has been signed, a certified copy of the 
ri i i ow rs issued to the i>outh African plenipotentiary are sent to the 
archives together with a copy of the treaty certified by the depositary 
authority or or aniz tion. This is especially important when the treaty 
is not subject to ratification.
(e) Signature
Cnee the negotiations are concluded and the treaty has been drawn up
in proper form, the next ;t« p in the m king of a treaty is the signature
of the plenipotentiaries. A comprehensive definition of signature is
embodied in the keport of the Committee for the Progress* e Codification
of International Law of the League of Nations/ This states that
'a signature in the sign affixed by negotiators at the foot 
of the provisions on which they have agreed. It presupposes 
that each signatory ir fully in agreement with the othe’ 
signatories: it establishes the assent of each of th_
negotiators to the final result of w v  negotiations and 
the reciprocity of these assents. 1
At its fourteenth me.' si on in 1962, the International Law Commission
formulated the view that signature, subject to confirmation, has, in
addition to authenticating the text of the treaty,'the primary effect'
of establishing 'th* rifjht of the signatory State to become a p a r t y ' . ^
n
60. U.N. Document LEG 103/01(l)/AL of 11 July 1949.
61. Publications of the 1. ,cpie of aliens V. Legal, 1927, v.16, Doc.
c.211 1927 v.
62. U.N. Document (A/3209) Article 11 and Commentary; Kaye Holloway 
ojo.cit. 63.
!
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oouth African treaties are generally signed by the negotiator, who 
is the bearer of an instrument of Full Powers. However, the text of a 
treaty itself may indicate who is to sign the treaty. In formal, 
bilateral treaties the signatory will often be indicated in the preamble, 
-i pp.neu, .or example, in the extradition treaty between the Republic 
of South Africa and the Republic of Botswana cf 1969/^
The Minute of the Executive Committee may also 'u of assistance
1 tng problem of who is to sign a treaty as it often
specifies that person by name:
ministers therefore have the honour to recommend that the 
otate President be pleased to approve that the reaty be 
signed in the ... (languages) and to appoint [NAME] as 
the State President's Plenipotentiary for this purpose.1
Article V(?) of the Vienna Convention on the Low of Treaties allows
Heads of State, Heads of Governments and Ministers of Foreign Affairs
to sign treaties by virtue of their office without Full Powers. In
South Africa the Head of State seldom signs treaties himself. This is
r.ore in the sphere 01 activity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who
may sign personally or authorize so: eone to sign on his behalf. Hence
the provision in the Minute of the Executive Committee, commonly present
in treaties between Heads of State, that the Minister of Foreign Affairs
will take the necessary steps in regard to signature.
neither t.ie text o: the treaty nor the Minute mention who is
to sign and if the Minister of Foreign Affairs is empowered to take the
necessary action, he will decide exactly who is to sign. If signature
is to take place in the territory of the other State, he will usually
authorize the head of the diplomatic or consular mission to sign. In
the absence of nuch a person, he may appoint a special plenipotentiary;
If signature is to take place in South Africa, he will generally sign
most important treaties personally and appoint senior officials (often
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs) in the Department of Foreign Affairs
to sign the others.
In certain circumstances a Cabinet Minister may sign the treaty:
(i) where an Act of Parli'ment provides for this: see, for
64
example, the Prison i Act;
(ii) where a Cabinet Minister is nominated as the plenipotentiary 
of the State President in treaties between Heads of States;
63. Republic of South Africa Treaty Series 2 of I969.
64. Act 8 of 19^91 section 30(1).
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